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Introduction and overview 
 
 

Introduction and overview 
Introduction 
“A mountaineer is smoothly climbing one of the classical rock routes in the Alps. She 
uses the available grips and irregularities of the rock and places her feet onto the 
sometimes-small protrusions. Approaching a key passage in the route she hesitates and 
pays close attention to the opportunities before continuing. She assesses which 
possibilities the surface of the rock offers: Is it, for example, possible to cling onto the 
tiny hole at the right in order to reach the small edge a bit further away or is that edge 
then unreachable? How stable is that edge? Tension increases. She judges the 
alternative possibilities, weighing their pros and cons against each other. After some 
hesitation she chooses the tiny hole at the right. A few moments later she has passed the 
difficult passage.”1
This quote contains the key elements of the present thesis: human motor performance, 
anxiety, perceiving and realizing action possibilities, and attention. The work reported in the 
thesis seeks to further the understanding of the impact of anxiety on human motor 
performance. Human motor performance can be studied in different ways and at different 
levels (e.g., Michaels & Beek, 1995). The level of analysis adopted in the present thesis is that 
of human action. Studying movement at this level implies that human motor performance is 
considered a relational activity, that is, an activity whereby the environment supports several 
possibilities for behaviour (affordances, Gibson, 1979) of which the actor realizes the one(s) 
that is (are) most appropriate at a given moment. For instance, the situation on a soccer pitch 
offers a soccer player the possibilities to pass, shoot, or dribble. Depending on the concrete 
situation in the game (e.g., where the ball is, where other players are), the broader context of 
the game (e.g., the score at that moment, the relevance of the game), and the intentions, traits 
and characteristics of the player (e.g., technical ability, game insight, anxiety, fatigue, 
ambition), the player eventually realizes one of the affordances of the situation: he or she 
passes, shoots, or dribbles. In realizing affordances it is possible that more than one 
affordance is perceived while only one can be realized. It is, for example, impossible to both 
shoot at goal and pass at the same time. Only the eventual action reveals what the selection 
has been. 
The present thesis aims to understand how factors such as anxiety and fatigue co-determine 
which affordances are being perceived and realized (cf. Bakker, Oudejans, & Pijpers, 1999). 
With respect to an analysis of the factors that determine the perception and realization of 
affordances, Newell’s (1986) classification of ‘constraints on action’ into three categories is 
useful. Constraints can be considered limiting factors, that is, factors restricting the (number 
                                                 
1 This was the lead of an article on anxiety and climbing we once submitted. “I liked the evocative 
opening” one of the reviewers wrote, “I hope no one manages to convince you to sterilize it”. 
However, we realized that in the remainder of the article we failed to live up to expectations and we 
decided to drastically rewrite the paper and to remove the quote. Nevertheless, it seems fully 
appropriate to use the quote as an opening statement for this thesis as a whole. 
9 
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of) possible actions. The length of a basketball player, for instance, limits (in combination 
with other factors) the affordances of this athlete on the court, such the ability to dunk the 
ball. Newell distinguishes organismic, environmental, and task constraints. Organismic 
constraints are the limiting factors of the actor himself, such as length, jumping power, 
maximal running speed, but also factors such as motivation, anxiety, fatigue, and will power. 
Environmental constraints could, in principle, contain all limiting factors outside the actor. 
According to Newell, however, it is useful “to distinguish between environmental constraints 
that are general and those that are task specific. Environmental constraints and task 
constraints are not mutually exclusive as their definition depends on the nature of the task” (p. 
350). Examples of environmental constraints are gravity, temperature of the environment, 
humidity, and illumination. In addition, information sources in the environment that are 
available to the perceiver in a certain situation (so that he or she can catch the ball; e.g., 
vertical optical acceleration and time-to-contact information) can be considered 
environmental constraints. Examples of task constraints are the rules of a game in sports, 
which stringently determine what is and is not possible (allowed) during the game. 
The theme of this thesis fits well with the tradition of ecological psychology (Gibson, 
1979) as well as the study of human action and movement from that perspective (Michaels & 
Beek, 1995). In particular, Chapters 4 and 5 report studies on the perception and realization of 
affordances. Therefore, in the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will first provide an 
outline of the ecological approach focusing on the key concept of affordance. This concept 
has been, and continues to be, the topic of much debate. To provide the reader with insight 
into some of the issues at stake, parts of this discussion will be highlighted briefly. 
Furthermore, because this thesis focuses more on organismic state variables, especially 
anxiety, than has been the case in ecological psychology, I will also review the existing 
literature on the anxiety-performance relationship. While this literature is vast, the 
mechanisms underlying this relationship are still poorly understood (Janelle, 2002; Mullen, 
Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005). Finally, in the last section of this Introduction and overview, the 
contents of the present thesis will be outlined. 
Ecological psychology and affordances 
Ecological psychology (cf. Gibson, 1966, 1979) was developed as an alternative to the 
cognitive approaches that dominated psychology during the second half of the twentieth 
century. At that time (as today), most perception theories were based on the assumption that 
actors perceive their environment indirectly, via mental representations (e.g., Reed, 1988; 
Withagen, 2004), that is to say, objects and events have no inherent meaning, implying that 
their meaning must be created internally and stored by the actor (Jones, 2003): thus, 
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perception is indirect.2 Gibson (1966, 1979), however, asserted that the stimulus information 
available to the actor is rich, not impoverished, and he developed an interactionist view of 
perception and action (Greeno, 1994).3 Objects and events have inherent meaning, which is 
detected and exploited by the actor without mental calculation: perception is direct. Gibson 
sought to understand how perception could inform the actor about the meanings of 
environmental objects (Jones, 2003). For this purpose he introduced the concept of 
affordance. As Gibson (1979) put it: “The theory of affordances implies that to see things is 
to see how to get about among them and what to do or not to do with them” (p. 223). 
After the introduction of the concept in 1966 (Gibson, 1966) and its gradual development 
in the years thereafter, Gibson defined affordances in 1979 as follows: 
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the 
noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the 
environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the environment. (p. 127)4
As the concept of affordances was still evolving during his life and was unfinished by the 
time of his death in 1979, Gibson never fully explicated what he meant by perceiving things 
with reference to an animal (Jones, 2003), which has led to much debate in ecological 
psychology (e.g., Heft, 1989; Jones, 2003; Michaels, 2003; Stoffregen, 2000, 2003). 
                                                 
2 In addition, most of the psychology of perception was about phenomena that occur when an 
observer is stationary, which in Gibson’s view overlooks some of the crucial characteristics of what it 
claims to be about (Greeno, 1994). 
3 Greeno (1994) argued that Gibson’s view of perception has been difficult to understand for many 
cognitive scientists because “Gibson’s reasoning involves some quite general framing assumptions 
about activity and cognition that differ from those of mainstream cognitive science” (p. 337). The 
concept of information was at the centre of scientific research of the mainstream of cognitive 
science—that is, how is information constructed by people and animals. Gibson (1966, 1979) focused 
on the information that is available in the environment to guide the activities of humans and other 
animals. This theoretical shift does not imply a denial of individual cognition as a theoretically 
important process. 
Gibson’s revolutionary ideas, and especially the concept of affordance, sometimes led to irritated, 
(but also understandable) reactions:  
I [Don Norman] was quietly lurking in the background of a CHI-Web discussion, when I lost all 
reason: I just couldn’t take it anymore. “I put an affordance there,” a participant would say, “I 
wonder if the object affords clicking.” “Affordances this, affordances that. And no data, just 
opinion. Yikes!” 
Norman continues with “I originally hated the idea [of affordances]: it didn’t make sense. I cared 
about processing mechanisms, and Gibson waved them off as irrelevant.” (see 
http://www.jnd.org/dn.mss/affordances-interactions.html) Yet, Norman has embraced the concept of 
affordance and applied it successfully in the field of (industrial) design (e.g., Norman, 1988). 
4 Stoffregen (2003) wondered what kinds of things are afforded: “The answer is that behaviors are 
afforded. (…) if a stair is a certain proportion of a person’s leg length, it affords climbing...” (p. 116, 
italics added) 
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Turvey (1992) was one of the first who attempted to formalize the concept of affordance, 
also to encourage the systematic development of this key ecological notion. Turvey’s point of 
departure was that, in order to be successful, actions must be controlled prospectively. 
Prospective control requires that the behavioural possibilities of surface layouts and events be 
perceived. To understand prospective control in realist terms, it is needed to establish “that 
possibilities for action are real or factual states of affairs (i.e., they exist independently of 
perceiving or conception) that are perceived directly” (p. 174). This is in accordance with 
Gibson’s (1979) claim that affordances are not simply phenomenal quantities of subjective 
experience. Affordances are real properties of the environment relative to the animal; they are 
real properties that imply the complementarity of an animal and its surroundings. Turvey 
(1992) detailed what counts as a property at the ecological scale as follows: “There are only 
propertied things; neither properties nor individual things are real independently of one 
another” (p. 176). Consequently, Turvey argued that a description of affordances should be in 
terms of substantial properties5 rather than attributes. 
Disposition is the common term for a property of a thing that is potential, latent, or 
possible. Turvey (1992) argued that dispositional properties are fundamental to affordances. 
He identified the ontological character of an affordance as follows: (a) an affordance is a real 
possibility; (b) an affordance is a disposition; and (c) an affordance is complemented with a 
so-called effectivity, that is, “a specific combination of the functions of its tissues and organs 
taken with reference to an environment” (Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 1982, p. 197). Whereas an 
affordance is a disposition of a particular surface layout, “an effectivity is the complementing 
disposition of a particular animal” (Turvey, 1992, p. 179). So, an action is the actualisation of 
these paired dispositions. 
Turvey (1992) set the stage for the further experimental and theoretical study of the 
concept of affordance6 and inspired Stoffregen, one of his former students, to reflect on and 
critique Turvey’s definition of affordance, in particular his claim that affordances are 
properties of the environment (Stoffregen, 2003). Stoffregen argued that Turvey did not 
define affordances as properties of the animal-environment system. As the ecological 
approach to perception and action is a systems approach to behaviour, the unit of analysis is 
the animal-environment system (Gibson, 1979; Lombardo, 1987). Therefore, the concept of 
affordance should be explicitly positioned at the level of the animal-environment system, 
rather than its component parts as is done by Turvey (1992) by treating affordances as 
                                                 
5 “A substantial property is a feature that some substantial individual possesses and does so 
whether one is aware of it. By contrast, an attribute or predicate is a feature one assigns to some 
object. In other words, an attribute or predicate is a concept, an epistemological entity without clear 
ontological status.” (Turvey, 1992, p. 176) 
6 For further discussion about the (definitions of) affordances, the reader is referred to the 
collection of papers that appeared in Ecological Psychology: Chemero, 2003; Heft, 2003; Jones, 2003; 
Michaels, 2003; Stoffregen, 2003. 
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properties of the environment. Component parts of systems have properties as well as the 
system itself. However, as Stoffregen (2003) argued, the properties of the parts and the 
properties of the system may differ qualitatively as can be illustrated with a triangle (the 
system) and the lines that it comprises (the component parts of the system). The lines have 
properties, such as length and width. The triangle also has properties such as triangularity. 
However, the properties of the triangle differ qualitatively from the properties of the lines. 
Similarly, according to Stoffregen (2003), affordances are (emergent) properties of the 
animal-environment system that are qualitatively different from the properties of its 
component parts (animal and environment). 
Grounding the definition of affordance in terms of dispositional properties, as Turvey 
(1992) asserted, is in Stoffregen’s view also problematic, especially Turvey’s notion that 
dispositions occur in pairs. If an affordance is a disposition, Stoffregen (2003) continued, then 
there must be a corresponding disposition that is something else—that is, not an affordance. 
Consequently, Turvey was forced to identify another entity, not a property of the 
environment, that can serve as the ‘other’ disposition, complementary to the affordance, and 
which he found in the notion of effectivity (Stoffregen, 2003). Stoffregen argued that 
dispositions have additional properties that make them in his opinion unfit for use in defining 
affordances. Dispositions are tendencies rather than actualities, and when dispositions become 
real, they are said to be actualised. Because many actions are possible in a given situation, the 
great majority of them are not actualised, which is in contradiction with Turvey’s (1992, p. 
179) claim that “Dispositionals never fail to be actualized when conjoined with suitable 
circumstances. Disposition and suitable circumstance equals actuality” (p. 178). Thus, as 
Stoffregen (2003) concluded, Turvey’s definition of affordances cannot account for the 
actualisation of any given affordance when multiple affordances exist, which is always the 
case, and, consequently, affordances cannot be dispositional properties. 
 
The preceding discussion illustrates that there is a considerable divergence of opinion on what 
is exactly meant by affordance despite its avowed centrality in the ecological approach to 
perception and action (Michaels, 2003; Stoffregen, 2000, 2003). The debate on affordances is 
unresolved and still ongoing.7 Most important for the current thesis, it concerns an ontological 
discussion leaving the relevance of the epistemological questions addressed in this thesis 
unaffected. Irrespective of one’s particular position in the discussion, within an ecological 
                                                 
7 Several authors have offered their refinements or formalizations of Gibson’s affordance concept 
(e.g., Chemero, 2003; Heft, 2003; Michaels, 2003) that in some instances are qualitatively different 
from each other. See also for instance Kirlik (2004) who criticised Stoffregen’s (2003) definition of 
affordance suggesting that it is too broad; Kirlik even doubted whether this definition could play a 
fruitful role in the advancement of ecological psychology as a scientific discipline. A reaction on this 
critique can be found in Stoffregen (2004). 
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framework it is important to identify and understand how properties of the animal-
environment system constitute opportunities for action. How do properties of the environment 
and of the animal affect perception and action? This question is also central in the studies on 
the perception of affordances that have been performed under the rubric of ecological 
psychology over the last two decades. 
Affordance studies 
If an actor is perceiving affordances while being engaged in a particular activity, he or she 
must be capable of perceiving the relation between environmental properties and the 
properties of his or her own action system. By implication, actions are ‘body-scaled’ (e.g., 
Warren, 1984, 1988). For example, to successfully reach for objects, people must scale the 
distance of the object in terms of their effective reach actions, which are constrained by 
geometric measures (e.g., arm length, leg length; see, e.g., Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel, 
Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Mark, 1987; Mark et al., 1997; Warren, 1984, 1988). Initial 
research on affordances was focused on these ‘invariable’ intrinsic anthropometric body 
measures such as leg length (Warren, 1984), or arm length (Carello et al., 1989). Konczak, 
Meeuwsen, and Cress (1992), however, emphasized that action capabilities are not 
exclusively defined by anthropometrics, but that most perceptual-motor tasks are also subject 
to additional biomechanical constraints such as strength, limb mobility, and joint flexibility. 
They demonstrated that the perception of affordances (judgement of climbability of stairs) 
needs to be related to observers’ action capabilities, or, in Turvey’s (1992) terminology, 
effectivities (see also Cesari, Formenti, & Olivato, 2003; Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & 
Dolné, 1996; Oudejans, Michaels, van Dort, & Frissen, 1996; Pepping & Li, 2000). Despite 
these developments, experimental inquiry into affordances and prospective control has 
identified the animal’s body and its linear dimensions as the reference frame (e.g., Mark, 
1987; Pufall & Dunbar, 1992; Warren, 1984), which might be taken to suggest that only 
biomechanical and kinematic properties of animals play a role in affordances and their 
perception. However, as Stoffregen (2003, p. 125) remarked: 
Any property of an animal can bear a relation to some property of the environment that 
gives rise to an affordance, including biomechanical properties, such as leg length and 
other types of properties, such as strength and flexibility (…), skills, beliefs, and 
emotional states. [italics added] 
Thus far, ecological psychologists have given little attention to emotional (cognitive and 
affective) factors in the study of perceiving and realizing affordances although, as Stoffregen 
(2003) suggests, there is ample reason to assume that emotional states also play a role. 
Therefore, the current thesis focuses on the role of state variables—especially anxiety—on 
perceiving, selecting and realizing affordances. Given the paucity of research into this area 
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within ecological psychology, it might seem strange to adopt this particular theoretical 
framework for studying the relation between anxiety and perceptual-motor behaviour. 
However, as I will venture to do in the following, this choice can be motivated from a critical 
review of the vast literature on the anxiety-performance relationship in sport psychology and 
corresponding theoretical models and methods of investigation. To anticipate, it will be 
argued that work in this area has been largely dominated by product-oriented approaches 
where more process-oriented approaches would be required, and that ecological psychology 
offers a conceptual framework for pursuing the latter kind of approach in the domain of 
interest. 
Anxiety and performance 
The anxiety-performance relationship has been studied extensively and is one of the most 
widely investigated and debated areas in sport psychology (e.g., Woodman & Hardy, 2001). 
A number of models have been put forward to describe and explain the relationship between 
anxiety and performance, such as the inverted-U hypothesis (e.g., Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; 
Woodman & Hardy, 2001), the drive theory of Hull and Spence (Hull, 1943; Spence & 
Spence, 1966), Apter’s ‘reversal theory’ (Apter, 1982; Kerr, 1997), Hanin’s ‘individualized 
zone of optimal functioning (IZOF) hypothesis’ (Hanin, 1989, 2000), the multidimensional 
models (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990), and the cusp catastrophe model (Hardy, 1990, 
1996).8 Following Jones (1995a), and based on three major conceptual approaches that have 
been adopted in anxiety-performance research, this section is divided into subsections dealing 
with general arousal-based approaches, general anxiety-based approaches, and 
multidimensional anxiety-based approaches. 
General arousal-based approaches 
Research on the anxiety-performance relationship has struggled with conceptual and 
methodological dilemmas concerning the identification of the anxiety-performance 
relationship, and the examination of the anxiety response itself (Jones, 1995a). Until quite 
recently, the literature on the anxiety-performance relationship has been dominated by 
“general arousal-based explanations” (ibid.) such as the drive theory and the inverted-U 
hypothesis. Drive theory was originally proposed by Hull (1943) and later modified and 
extended to complex behaviour by Spence and Spence (1966). It posits that increases in drive 
(often used synonymously with arousal, stress, and anxiety) are associated with a linear 
                                                 
8 Several excellent overviews of theories on anxiety and performance are available in the literature 
(e.g., Cox, 2002; Gould, Greenleaf, & Krane, 2002; Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1993; Janelle, 2002; 
Jones, 1995; Landers & Boutcher, 1998; Raglin, 1992; Raglin & Hanin, 2000; Weinberg, 1989, 1990; 
Woodman & Hardy, 2001). 
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increase or decrease in performance, depending on the dominant response. When the 
dominant response is incorrect—often in the early stages of learning—increases in arousal 
will impair performance; when the dominant response is correct—later in learning when the 
task is well learned—increases in arousal will enhance performance. However, to the extent 
that empirical support is available (Neiss, 1988), drive theory only appears to pertain to 
extremely simple tasks, not to complex tasks, and is thus not apt to explain human motor 
performance (e.g., Martens, 1971; Weinberg, 1979). 
The inverted-U hypothesis—or the Yerkes-Dodson Law as it originated from the early 
work of Yerkes and Dodson (1908)—proposes that the relationship between anxiety will be in 
the form of a symmetrical inverted-U, such that increases in anxiety will result in increases in 
performance up to a certain point, beyond which further increases in anxiety will result in a 
gradual decrement in performance (Jones, 1995a; Martens, 1971). Hence, for every type of 
behaviour there exists an optimal level of arousal that produces maximal performance (Jones, 
1995a). The experimental support for the inverted-U hypothesis for human motor 
performance is limited (e.g., Landers, 1994; Neiss, 1988), and most studies have proposed the 
inverted-U hypothesis as a post hoc explanation of previously obtained results (Martens, 
1971). 
A rather different general arousal-based approach (Jones, 1995a) is reversal theory (Apter, 
1982). Reversal theory is as much a theory of personality as it is a theory of arousal (Cox, 
2002). It is based on the concept of metamotivational states.9 In particular, it postulates that 
there are four possible pairs of metamotivational states10 of which the telic-paratelic state has 
received the most attention in the context of human motor performance (Woodman & Hardy, 
2001). Individuals are described as being either telic—that is, as having a goal-directed 
orientation toward life—or paratelic—that is, as having a ‘here-and-now’ orientation (Cox, 
2002). Reversal theory proposes that an individual’s orientation can (suddenly) switch back 
and forth (‘reverse’) between those orientations. When in a telic state, individuals prefer low 
arousal and will interpret high arousal as anxiety, whereas in a paratelic state, they prefer high 
arousal and will experience high arousal as excitement (Kerr, 1990; 1997). This perceived 
pleasure is known as ‘hedonic tone’. One’s hedonic tone can be either pleasant (i.e., 
perceiving a low level of arousal as relaxation and a high level of arousal as excitement) or 
unpleasant (i.e., perceiving a low level of arousal as boredom and a high level of arousal as 
anxiety). Note that an individual seeks to increase the hedonic tone, not to increase or 
                                                 
9 Metamotivational states “…are ‘frames of mind’ which determine certain general 
phenomenological characteristics of motivation at a given time; they are about the way in which the 
individual interprets his own motives” (Apter, 1982, p. 39). The states are called metamotivational as 
they only determine something about motivation. 
10 These are telic-paratelic, negativism-conformity, autic-alloic, and sympathy-mastery (Apter, 
1982; Kerr, 1990). It is beyond the scope of this Introduction and overview to elaborate on these 
metamotivational states. 
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decrease arousal. However, as there does not appear to be an obvious theoretical reason for 
proposing that pleasant feelings about one’s level of arousal should lead to better performance 
(Woodman & Hardy, 2001), reversal theory does not seem to offer a great deal in terms of 
explaining how and why anxiety might affect human motor performance. 
Drive theory, the inverted-U hypothesis and to a lesser extent reversal theory are based 
upon unidimensional conceptualisations of arousal and anxiety. As a result of dissatisfaction 
with this conceptual limitation, researchers reverted to Spielberger’s (1966) state-trait 
approach (Jones, 1995a). 
General anxiety-based approaches 
Spielberger (1966) argued that for a theory of anxiety to be adequate, it must differentiate 
between anxiety as a mood state and as a personality trait. His state-trait theory of anxiety 
differentiates between state anxiety and trait anxiety, where the former is defined as an 
emotional state “characterized by subjective, consciously perceived feelings of apprehension 
and tension, accompanied by or associated with activation or arousal of the autonomic 
nervous system” (p. 17), and the latter—trait anxiety—is defined as “a motive or acquired 
behavioral disposition that predisposes an individual to perceive a wide range of objectively 
nondangerous circumstances as threatening and to respond to this with state anxiety reactions 
disproportionate in intensity to the magnitude of the objective danger” (p. 17). 
Anxiety typically has been measured with self-report questionnaires, such as the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Luchenne, 1970). Often the state 
version of the STAI was used as a measure of a generalized, undifferentiated anxiety state 
leading to the conclusion that both high and low levels of state anxiety interfere with 
performance (Spielberger, 1989). This notion of optimal anxiety states strongly resembles that 
of optimal arousal theory (inverted-U hypothesis), and it is often difficult to distinguish the 
two (Jones, 1995a). 
Hanin’s (1980, 1989, 2000; Raglin & Hanin, 2000) zone of optimal functioning (ZOF) 
hypothesis represents further work on optimal anxiety states.11 It questions the basic 
assumption of the inverted-U hypothesis that a moderate level of anxiety (arousal) results in 
best performance. Hanin states that an individual’s best performance occurs within a zone of 
optimal state anxiety, which differs across individuals. This individual-specific bandwidth of 
anxiety can be identified via repeated observations of his or her performance levels and 
associated anxiety levels. As such, Hanin’s theory emphasizes within-subject variation and 
makes relatively precise predications about anxiety levels at which optimum performance is 
likely to occur (Jones, 1995a), thus providing a practical tool for helping athletes determine 
                                                 
11 In later works, the ZOF hypothesis is labelled as ‘individualized zones of optimal functioning’, 
or IZOF (Gould, Greenleaf, & Krane, 2002). 
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their optimal levels of anxiety. 
Limitations of the ZOF-hypothesis include (a) the absence of an explanation of the 
processes involved in the anxiety-performance relationship (Jones, 1995a), and (b) the 
unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualisation of anxiety, even though 
Gould, Tuffey, Hardy, and Lochbaum (1993) and Woodman, Albinson, and Hardy (1997) 
examined ZOFs by using a sport-specific multidimensional state anxiety measure. Whether 
the ZOF-hypothesis provides a viable theory for explaining the anxiety-performance 
relationship remains unclear. For instance, Turner and Raglin (1996) found support for the 
theory, whereas Randle and Weinberg (1997) failed to find support, and others only found 
partial (Prapavessis & Grove, 1991; Woodman et al. 1997), or weak support (Russell & Cox, 
2000). 
Multidimensional anxiety-based approaches 
The multidimensional models (Martens et al., 1990) and the cusp catastrophe model (Hardy, 
1990, 1996) of anxiety and performance arose from dissatisfaction with existing explanations 
of the anxiety-performance relationship that was based on a predominantly unitary 
conceptualisation of anxiety. Researchers saw more promise in a multidimensional 
conceptualisation of anxiety and they acknowledged that anxiety has at least two 
dimensions—that is, cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety. This distinction was introduced 
by Borkovec (1976) and Davidson and Schwartz (1976), building on the earlier distinction of 
Liebert and Morris (1967) between the emotionality and worry components of anxiety. 
Cognitive anxiety can be defined as “negative expectations and cognitive concerns about 
oneself, the situation at hand, and potential consequences” (Morris, Davids, & Hutchings, 
1981, p. 541). Somatic anxiety can be conceptualised as the perception of one’s bodily 
symptoms of automatic reactivity such as butterflies in the stomach, sweating, shakiness, 
increased heart rate, and tense muscles (Davidson & Schwartz, 1976; Martens et al., 1990). 
The multidimensional conceptualisation of anxiety culminated in the development of the 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2)12 (Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & 
                                                 
12 The Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI) is a sport-specific anxiety scale, which was 
developed by Martens, Burton, Rivkin, and Simon (1980). It is a modified version of the Spielberger 
State Anxiety Inventory. As the CSAI is insensitive to separate cognitive and somatic anxiety, Martens 
et al. (1982, 1990) developed the CSAI-2, which measures both cognitive and somatic anxiety in the 
sports context. Although the CSAI-2 was originally designed to measure the cognitive and somatic 
components of (competitive) state anxiety, during the development of the questionnaire a third factor 
emerged, which was later identified as ‘self-confidence’. Self-confidence may be conceptualised as 
one’s belief in meeting the challenge of the task to be performed; it is a realistic expectation about 
achieving success (Martens, 1987). Since the mid-1980s of the twentieth century, the CSAI-2 has been 
the most used tool in the sport psychological field of research (e.g., Cerin, Szabo, Hunt, & Williams, 
2000). See for a critical discussion of the CSAI-2, Jones and Uphill (2004) and Lane, Sewell, Terry, 
Bartram, and Nesti (1999). 
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Smith, 1990), which has figured prominently in anxiety research. Although the separation of 
anxiety into cognitive and somatic components has been subject to criticism (e.g., Landers, 
1994), a body of literature has supported the usefulness of distinguishing cognitive and 
somatic anxiety components (Jones, 1995a). In the sport psychological literature, the notion 
that anxiety has both cognitive and somatic components is referred to as multidimensional 
anxiety theory (Martens et al., 1990). 
In multidimensional anxiety theory a series of two-dimensional relationships between 
cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, self-confidence (see also Footnote 12) and performance 
are proposed: Cognitive anxiety is supposed to have a negative linear relationship with 
performance; somatic anxiety is supposed to have an inverted-U shaped relationship with 
performance, and self-confidence is supposed to have a positive linear relationship with 
performance (Woodman & Hardy, 2001). Burton (1988) provided support for these three 
predictions, however, a number of other studies provided weak or, at best, moderate support 
for the CSAI-2 predictions (Burton, 1998; Raglin, 1992; Woodman & Hardy, 2001). 
Multidimensional anxiety theory attempts to explain the potentially complex four-
dimensional relationships among cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, self-confidence, and 
performance in a series of independent two-dimensional relationships. Hardy (1990; Hardy & 
Parfitt, 1991) identified this as one of the major shortcomings of multidimensional anxiety 
theory. In their view, the anxiety components must work together in some interactive way to 
affect performance. As a result of their dissatisfaction with extant explanations of anxiety-
performance relationships, they developed and proposed the cusp catastrophe model of 
anxiety and performance. The cusp catastrophe model attempts to describe the effects of 
anxiety upon performance in terms of an interaction between self-confidence, cognitive 
anxiety, and the body’s physiological response to anxiety (Hardy, 1990, 1996; Jones & 
Hardy, 1989), providing elegant predictions regarding anxiety-performance relationships. 
Probably because of the complexity of the model, a number of issues need to be addressed 
before it can be designated as the model of anxiety and performance. For a recent critical 
elaboration and empirical investigation of the cusp catastrophe model, the reader is referred to 
Cohen, Pargman, and Tenenbaum (2003).13
Preview 
New conceptions of anxiety were instrumental in the further clarification of the relationship 
between anxiety and performance. In particular, the anxiety concept was refined so as to 
include not only the intensity of the anxiety state, but also the frequency of the anxiety 
reactions (e.g., Swain & Jones, 1993), as well as the direction of the anxiety as perceived by 
                                                 
13 See also and Tenenbaum and Becker (2005), and Woodman and Hardy (2005). 
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the performer (e.g., Jones, Swain, & Hardy, 1993; Swain & Jones, 1996). 
Despite these developments, theorizing in anxiety research remains hampered by the 
absence of consistent experimental findings regarding the effect of anxiety on human motor 
performance (Jones, 1995a; Kleine, 1990). One of the reasons for this state of affairs is 
probably the prevalence of product-oriented approaches in pertinent research, which, by 
definition, ignore that the effect of anxiety on performance is mediated by a wide variety of 
processes. To better understand this mediation, and thus to help disentangle the multifaceted 
relationship between anxiety and performance, this thesis systematically investigated the 
effects of anxiety on perceptual-motor behaviour, or as mentioned earlier, on perceiving, 
selecting and realizing affordances. Pursuing, in so doing, an ecological-psychological 
approach the anxiety-performance relationship is studied at the level of human action and a 
process-oriented rather than a product-oriented approach is adopted. In addition, the 
traditional definition of anxiety is adopted, that is, one “that refers to the construct as a 
negative, cognitive and perceived physiological response to uncertain appraisals of coping 
with the demands of a stressful situation (e.g., competition)” (Hanton, Mellalieu, & Hall, 
2004, p. 480). 
At the outset it was important to find an adequate and expedient way to manipulate 
anxiety, and it was anticipated that climbing on a climbing wall would provide a good context 
for achieving that goal (see also Chapters 2-4). Anxiety was manipulated in novice climbers 
by asking them to perform a climbing task low on the wall—thus creating a low-anxiety 
condition—and the ‘same’ task higher on the wall—corresponding to a high-anxiety 
condition. Hence, the research reported in the present thesis is not about climbing behaviour 
as such, but it exploits climbing behaviour as a suitable experimental paradigm to gain further 
insight into the anxiety-performance relationship in human motor performance. 
To better understand the intricate relationship between anxiety and performance, a process-
oriented rather than a product-oriented approach was adopted in Chapters 2 and 3. The studies 
in question were conducted in order to identify the effects of anxiety on physiological, 
psychological, and behavioural processes underwriting task performance, rather than task 
performance per se (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 focuses on the changes in movement execution to 
gain further insight into the relations between anxiety, performance, and movement 
behaviour. Chapters 2 and 3 are closely related and demonstrate both that a process-oriented 
approach may help to disentangle the anxiety-performance relationship. 
As a consequence of the adopted process-oriented approach, one is almost inevitably 
confronted with the largely neglected role of perceptual processes in the literature on anxiety 
and performance. Taking Gibson’s (1979) ecological psychology as a starting point, in 
Chapter 4 three experiments are reported on the relationship between anxiety and perception 
in the context of climbing (Chapter 4). The results seemed to indicate that anxiety plays a role 
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in the selection of action possibilities as afforded by the environment. Chapter 5 reports an 
attempt to generalize the conclusions of Chapter 4 regarding the relationship between anxiety 
and perception to another state variable—namely fatigue. Manipulating that state variable 
offers more possibilities to induce extreme changes in mood state than manipulating the state 
variable anxiety (which for humanitarian and ethical reasons has its limitations), and, thus, to 
change participants’ action capabilities (for reaching) to a considerable larger magnitude. 
Chapter 6 (Epilogue) summarizes and highlights the implications of the thesis’ main 
experimental findings for theory development about the relationship between state variables 
such as anxiety and fatigue and perceptual-motor behaviour. The upshot of this discussion is 
that ‘states’ like anxiety and fatigue affect a plenitude of physiological, subjective, perceptual 
and motor processes that contribute differentially, and probably interactively, to the resulting 
performance. Consequently, it is impossible to provide an encompassing theoretical account 
for the relationship between anxiety and performance without addressing the complexity of 
these mediating processes. 
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 Chapter 2 
Anxiety-performance relationships 
in climbing: 
A process-oriented approach 
 
Chapter 2 
Abstract 
Two experiments were conducted to investigate manifestations of anxiety at the 
subjective and physiological level of analysis (Experiment 1), and behavioural 
level of analysis (Experiment 2). Anxiety was manipulated in novice climbers by 
using a climbing wall with routes defined at different heights (low and high). We 
measured self-reported state anxiety, heart rate (Experiments 1 and 2), blood 
lactate concentration and muscle fatigue (Experiment 1), and climbing time and 
fluency of movements (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, climbing times were 
standardised. At the level of subjective experience we found that when participants 
climbed a route high on a climbing wall they reported significantly more anxiety 
than when they traversed an identical route low on the climbing wall. At the 
physiological level, they exhibited significantly higher heart rates, more muscle 
fatigue, and higher blood lactate concentrations. Experiment 2 showed that state 
anxiety also affected participants’ movement behaviour, which was evidenced by 
an increased geometric index of entropy and by longer climbing times. It was 
concluded that anxiety indeed manifested itself at all three levels, and anxiety may 
induce a temporary regress to a form of movement execution that is associated 
with earlier stages of motor learning. 
 
______________________________ 
 
Based on: Pijpers, J. R., Oudejans, R. R. D., Holsheimer, F., & Bakker, F. C. 
(2003). Anxiety-performance relationships in climbing: A process-oriented 
approach. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 4, 283-304. 
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Introduction 
In the eyes of coaches, trainers, sport psychologists, and athletes it is important to control 
anxiety in sport situations in order to optimise performance. Too much anxiety, fear, or stress, 
may impair sport performance. Not surprisingly, many people within the world of sport are 
intrigued by competitive anxiety and how it can be controlled either by reducing it or by 
learning to cope with it when facing competition. 
Although the relationship between anxiety and performance in sport has received 
considerable research attention (for overviews see for example Gill, 1994; Gould & Krane, 
1992, Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1993; Jones, 1995b; Landers & Boutcher, 1998; Raglin, 
1992; Raglin & Hanin, 2000; Smith, Smoll, & Wiechman, 1998, and Weinberg, 1989, 1990), 
“research findings have proved equivocal, with little evidence of the predicted relationships” 
(Jones, 1995a, p. 461). The frequent use of global performance measures (e.g., win or lose; hit 
or miss) is proposed as one of the possible reasons for the disappointing results to find support 
for the theoretical predictions. These outcome scores—denoting a product-oriented 
approach—may be too insensitive to detect significant anxiety effects (e.g., Parfitt, Jones, & 
Hardy, 1990; Weinberg, 1990). So far only few studies directly examined the processes by 
which performance mediation may take place (Collins, Jones, Fairweather, Doolan, & 
Priestley, 2001; Collins, Priestley, & Jones, 1996; Jones, Collins, & Doolan, 1998; Mullen & 
Hardy, 2000). 
A process-oriented approach of the study of the relationship between anxiety and 
performance would not only consider changes in outcome but also changes in the execution of 
movements that might or might not lead to changes in outcome (Gould & Krane, 1992; 
Weinberg, 1989). In the present study we take such a process-oriented approach and 
investigate movement behaviour of participants placed in a threatening situation. We follow 
the general idea that an emotion, and hence anxiety, may manifest itself at three levels, 
namely, the level of subjective experience, the physiological level, and the behavioural level 
(e.g., Eysenck, 1975; Frijda, 1986; Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1993; Hanin, 2000; Lazarus, 
2000; Vallerand & Blanchard, 2000).1 For a full understanding of the effects of anxiety on 
performance it is important to gain insight at these three levels. However, there has been 
hardly any research taking all three levels into account. Especially the (movement) 
behavioural aspects remain under-exposed (see also, Hanin, 2000). In the current study we 
                                                 
1 Other categorisations are possible, for instance, the well-known division of anxiety in cognitive 
and somatic anxiety and self-confidence (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990), or Hanin’s (2000) 
classification into seven components (cognitive, affective, motivational, bodily-somatic, motor-
behavioural, performance, and communicative). We consider the division in the subjective, 
physiological and behavioural level most appropriate for the purposes of the current study. The 
distinction between cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence does not capture the 
behavioural level, and most of Hanin’s rather detailed seven components are captured by the three 
more general levels used in this study. 
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examined the manifestations of anxiety at the three levels. In Experiment 1 we focussed on 
the subjective experience of anxiety and on concomitant physiological changes, both in 
autonomic variable heart rate and in muscle fatigue. In Experiment 2 we took a first step in 
investigating whether and how these covert manifestations of anxiety are accompanied by 
changes in participants’ overt movement behaviour. 
In the literature there has been little attention for the consequences of state anxiety on 
movement execution, pre-eminently the level of interest for athletes, coaches, physical 
educators, sport psychologists, and others. Notable exceptions in this regard are the studies by 
Weinberg (1978; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976), Allmer (1983), Beuter and Duda (1985; Beuter, 
Duda, & Widule, 1989), and the more recent studies by Collins et al. (1996, 2001), Jones et 
al. (1998), and Mullen and Hardy (2000). These studies were aimed at investigating the 
processes that underlie performance affected by anxiety either by measuring the 
electromyographic (EMG) activity of the muscles (Weinberg, 1978; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976), 
by studying movement characteristics such as the angle between upper leg and upper body 
(Allmer, 1983), by examining kinematic characteristics of a particular movement (Beuter & 
Duda, 1985; Collins et al., 1996, 2001; Jones et al., 1998; Mullen & Hardy, 2000), or by 
making kinetic analyses of movements (Beuter et al., 1989). 
The results of the studies just cited support the contention that changing an individual’s 
state (i.e., making him or her more anxious) can alter the characteristics of movement. For 
instance, anxiety is accompanied by movements that are less smooth, less efficient in terms of 
time and energy, and less variable (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976). As 
indicated by Gould and Krane (1992), specifying the changes occurring in the execution of 
movements under high-anxiety conditions may provide insight into the question when 
performance may be impaired under the influence of anxiety and when no effects on 
performance may be expected. Therefore, one of the aims of the present study was to address 
anxiety-related changes in movement behaviour. 
Thus far, the anxiety and motor performance research has specifically centred around the 
paradoxical performance effect or ‘choking under pressure’, that is, “... the occurrence of 
inferior performance despite individual striving and situational demands for superior 
performance.” (Baumeister, 1984, p. 610). Several attentional models have been put forward 
to explain debilitating effects of anxiety on performance such as the ‘distraction’ model 
(Wine, 1971) and the ‘self-focus’ model (Baumeister, 1984). Especially the self-focus model 
has recently received empirical support (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997). It 
states that pressure raises self-consciousness about performing correctly, and that the 
increased attention to skill execution together with the subsequent step-by-step control is 
thought to disrupt the normal processing of the task (see also, Jones, 1990; Lewis & Linder, 
1997; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). Masters (1992, 2000) explicated the role of explicit and 
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implicit knowledge in the disruption of the automaticity of a skill under pressure. According 
to Masters (1992, 2000), increased state anxiety and explicit knowledge about task 
performance may induce conscious control that disrupts the normal, automatic processing of 
the task at hand. The studies of Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996) and Mullen and Hardy 
(2000) produced evidence supporting Masters’ (1992) ‘conscious processing hypothesis’. 
In these studies the renewed conscious control under pressure is seen as a temporary 
regress to a lower skill level—that is, to an earlier stage of learning, an idea that links back to 
stages of perceptual-motor learning introduced by Fitts and Posner (1967). After the cognitive 
and associative phases of learning, movement execution in the final autonomous phase is 
nearly fully automated (Fitts & Posner, 1967). Cognitive control of movements is no longer 
necessary. In fact, it is widely accepted that such cognitive control may be detrimental to 
skilled performance as it interferes with the well-learned automatisms of the skill. Thus, in 
going through these stages of learning the cognitive involvement in perceptual-motor control 
slowly diminishes. Following these ideas, a temporary regress to an earlier stage of motor 
learning would have to incorporate a reinvestment of cognition in perceptual-motor control, 
similar to the arousal-induced conscious control in Master’s (1992, 2000) conscious 
processing hypothesis. 
To not only investigate a rather dramatic end product of the inability to cope with 
anxiety—choking—we follow Masters’ (1992) suggestion to also examine the processes 
underlying anxiety-related performance decrements and to search for behavioural 
concomitants of anxiety. In this search we set out from the hypothesis that anxiety results in a 
movement execution that is also associated with movements found at a lower skill level. 
What can we expect to find at the behavioural level? Early in the process of mastering a 
perceptual-motor skill, performance is slow, irregular, and requires much effort. A common 
experience when starting to learn a new skill is that parts of the body, or sometimes even the 
whole body, are held rigid (think of your first dancing lessons). Bernstein (1967) called this 
the freezing of excessive biomechanical degrees of freedom necessary to turn the motor 
apparatus into a controllable, yet inefficient, system. It results in errors and inconsistent 
performance (Magill, 1998) with jerky, clumsy, and erratic movements (den Brinker & van 
Hekken, 1982; Vincken & Denier van der Gon, 1985; Whiting, Bijlard, & den Brinker, 1987). 
Learning a task may be characterized by a gradual release of the rigid couplings between parts 
of the body, that is, by a release of the degrees of freedom. This ‘freeing’ of degrees of 
freedom turns the motor apparatus into a controllable and efficient system, which would result 
in smoother and more fluent movements (Vereijken, van Emmerik, Whiting, & Newell, 
1992). 
Recently, the evolution from irregular, jerky movements to regular, smooth movements has 
also been studied from the perspective of dynamical systems theory, a branch of mathematics 
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concerned with the analysis and formal modelling of complex time series. A key notion in this 
theory is that of dimensionality, that is, the number of active dynamical (i.e., as opposed to 
biomechanical) degrees of freedom2 that are required to portray or model a system’s 
trajectory or succession of states. For instance, to identify the state and future trajectory of an 
ordinary second-order mass-spring system two active degrees of freedom are required: 
position and velocity; if these are known, the acceleration of the system follows uniquely 
from the laws of motion. For more complex trajectories, such as a movement trajectory, the 
number of active degrees of freedom is unknown a priori, but may be estimated using a 
variety of analytical tools. Mitra, Amazeen, and Turvey (1998) applied one of these 
techniques (Abarbanel’s phase-space reconstruction method) to movement trajectories 
obtained during intermediate learning of a bimanual rhythmic coordination task. They found 
that intermediate learning gradually and monotonically reduces the number of active degrees 
of freedom of the learned coordination dynamics, implying a reduction in dimensionality. 
There are parallels between the movement characteristics of early learning and those of 
performance under pressure. Just as in the beginning of the learning process, under the 
influence of anxiety performance is also characterized by rigid and jerky movements, and a 
stiffening of the body that resembles the freezing of biomechanical degrees of freedom as 
described by Bernstein (1967) in early learning, and that is probably accompanied by an 
increase in the number of active degrees of freedom in the sense of dynamical systems theory. 
Movement behaviour accompanying anxiety is tense resulting from “generalized muscular 
tension, wholly or partly independent of overt movement” (Frijda, 1986, p. 40). A rigid 
posture and jerky movements are discernible characteristics of this tenseness, just as early in 
learning. 
In the present study we will focus on effects of anxiety using psychological, physiological 
(Experiment 1), and behavioural measures (Experiment 2). Because we expect performance 
under anxiety to be tense, in Experiment 1, apart from changes in heart rate, we also 
investigated whether there is a difference in muscle tension in anxious and non-anxious 
movement execution. To obtain an indication of muscle tension, we used muscle fatigue 
                                                 
2 Newell and Vaillancourt (2001) described the distinction between biomechanical degrees of 
freedom and active dynamical degrees of freedom as follows: 
 
In the tradition of mechanics and physics we use the term degrees of freedom as the number of 
independent coordinates required to uniquely describe the configuration of the system. 
Therefore, the term degrees of freedom is reserved for the potential configurations of the many 
physical components at each level of analysis of the system. In contrast, dimension is used to 
capture what has been called the number of active or dynamical degrees of freedom that are 
required to model the attractor dynamics of the movement system. There is often no obvious 
correspondence between the physical degrees of freedom of a system and the dimension of an 
attractor (…). (p. 696) 
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(blood lactate concentration and EMG) because a higher muscle tension would have to result 
in more muscle fatigue (Vincken & Denier van der Gon, 1985). In Experiment 2 we ask 
whether the expected muscle tension at the physiological level has repercussions for the 
smoothness of movement execution at the behavioural level as measured with the ‘geometric 
index of entropy’ (Cordier, Mendès France, Bolon, & Pailhous, 1993; Cordier, Mendès 
France, Pailhous, & Bolon, 1994), a variable we will explain in the introduction to 
Experiment 2 and that may be connected conceptually to the notion of active dynamical 
degrees of freedom introduced before. As a result of the higher muscle tension we expected 
jerkier, more rigid movements in anxiety provoking than in anxiety-neutral situations, and, 
therefore, a higher geometric index of entropy. 
A crucial aspect of studying the effects of anxiety on movement behaviour is the way in 
which anxiety is manipulated. The common approach to manipulate anxiety is to use the 
‘cognitive ego stressor method’: Via several steps of giving negative feedback on 
performance anxiety is provoked (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Beuter et al., 1989; Bootsma, 
Bakker, van Snippenberg, & Tdlohreg, 1992; Mullen & Hardy, 2000; Weinberg, 1978; 
Weinberg & Hunt, 1976; Weinberg & Ragan, 1978). There are, however, some disadvantages 
to this method. First, negative feedback may compel participants to change their movement 
behaviour in a way they did not prefer initially. The change in movement behaviour may lead 
to a decrease in performance and to the wrong conclusion that anxiety impaired performance 
(Bakker, 1981). Second, most studies using the ego-stressor method managed to provoke only 
mild forms of anxiety that are below those typically found during competition (Williams & 
Elliott, 1999). Third, the ego-stressor method can cause an inward focus of attention that may 
in itself result in disruption of the automatism of the skill (Masters, 1992, 2000). 
In the present study, we manipulated anxiety in a natural way by using a climbing wall 
where different heights provided different anxiety conditions. Some authors would rather 
speak of fear in this case, because of the presence of real physical danger (Morris, 1997; 
Spielberger 1966). Apart from the presence or absence of physical danger fear and anxiety 
have similar characteristics. Therefore, in this study we considered fear and anxiety as 
synonyms, which fits with the broad definition of anxiety given by Schwenkmezger and 
Steffgen (1989): 
Anxiety can be regarded as a broad concept for a number of very complex emotional and 
motivational states and processes that occur as a result of threat. This threat is related to 
the subjective evaluation of a situation, and concerns jeopardy to one’s self-esteem 
during performance or social situations, physical danger, or insecurity and uncertainty 
(pp. 78-79). 
Thus, the climbing wall provides an ecologically valid environment for the execution of 
climbing movements, and hence, an attractive location for studying the relationships between 
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anxiety and performance (Jones & Hardy, 1990). Participants were asked to perform a 
climbing task in a threatening condition, that is, high on the climbing wall, and in a non-
threatening condition, low on the wall3. 
Although the climbing task was new to the participants when they entered the experiments, 
the climbing route was very easy and readily learned before actual testing started. In this 
regard, Fitts (1964) remarked that for simple skills the earliest learning phase may be of very 
short duration “covering only the time required to understand instructions, to complete a few 
preliminary trials, and to establish the proper cognitive set for the task” (p. 262). Therefore, 
and because performance decrements under pressure may occur irrespective of skill level and 
ability (Baumeister, 1984), we considered this task (the execution of which may not have 
been fully automated) suitable for testing our hypotheses. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Thirteen participants, 5 male and 8 female, aged 20 to 30 years, volunteered to participate in 
the experiment. The participants, mainly college students, had no experience in climbing, and 
were naive to the purposes of the experiment. They were paid a small fee for their 
participation. 
As a standard check, the Dutch version of the A-Trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI)4 was used to measure trait anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; 
van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 1979). The mean trait anxiety score for the male 
participants was 36.4 (SD = 10.62), and for female participants 31.8 (SD = 4.94). The mean 
score of male participants was comparable with the mean score for Dutch male college 
students reported by van der Ploeg, Defares, and Spielberger (1980), [mean (M) = 36.1, t = 
0.06, ns, t test between a sample and a population mean, Thomas & Nelson, 1996]. The 
female participants were significantly less trait anxious compared to Dutch female college 
students (M = 37.7, van der Ploeg et al., (1980), t(7) = 3.38, p < .05, t test between a sample 
                                                 
3 Jones (1995b; Swain & Jones, 1996) claims that direction of anxiety—whether anxiety is 
perceived as debilitative or facilitative—should also be taken into account when studying the effects of 
anxiety. However, Jerome and Williams (2000) argue that the results concerning this issue are 
equivocal. In addition, in the current study the focus is on changes as a result of anxiety either for 
better or worse. Therefore, in this study we did not consider direction of anxiety. 
4 The STAI A-Trait scale is a self-report questionnaire that measures anxiety proneness, that is, the 
tendency to respond to situations perceived as thrilling with an elevation in state anxiety intensity. 
Scores range from a low of 20 to a high of 80 (van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 1979). 
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and a population mean). The results indicate that the participants had no extraordinary 
tendency to respond to situations perceived as threatening with an elevation in state anxiety 
(e.g., Smith et al., 1998). 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on a 10o inclined artificial wall (width: 3.5 m; height: 7.0 m; see Figure 
2.1), which was placed in a large experimentation room. The wall consisted of 9 laminate 
panels with a grey grainy texture for friction. Holds of varying shape and size could be bolted 
almost anywhere on the wall. 
On the wall, two identical, horizontal routes (so called ‘traverses’, built by a professional 
route designer) were mounted (see Figure 2.1). Each traverse consisted of five footholds and 
six handholds of varying size and shape, all suitable for novice climbers. The traverses could 
be easily mastered within minutes of practice. The mean height of the five footholds of the 
low traverse was 0.3 m (low condition); the mean height of the five footholds of the high 
traverse was 5.1 m (high condition). To be able to start with the high traverse in the same 
physical condition as in the low traverse, a movable platform, 5.0 m above the floor, was 
placed 1.2 m in front of the climbing wall. 
All participants wore well fitting climbing shoes (Enduro 954, La Sportiva). In the high 
condition, participants wore an integral harness (Edelrid), connected to a climbing rope. A 
standard protection technique was used to ensure the safety of the participants. One of the 
experimenters served as belayer. The use of chalk was permitted. 
To determine the manifestations of anxiety at the level of subjective experience we used
the ‘anxiety thermometer’ validated by Houtman and Bakker (1989). The anxiety
thermometer is a 10-cm continuous scale on which participants were asked to rate their
anxiety feelings at a particular moment, ranging from 0 (not anxious at all, the left end) to 10 
(extremely anxious, the right end). Individuals had to place a cross on the 10 cm scale to 
indicate how they felt at a particular moment. The distance between the left end and cross (in
cm) was used as a measure of the reported anxiety. Consequently, it is a quick way to
measure state anxiety, in contrast to the often-used Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 
(CSAI-2, Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990), which would be unsuitable for our purposes. In
this regard it should be noted that the anxiety thermometer does not take into account the
distinction between cognitive and somatic anxiety as measured with the CSAI-2. Anxiety 
thermometer scores appear to correlate equally with cognitive anxiety scores and somatic
anxiety scores on the CSAI-2, on average r = .59 and r = .62, respectively (Bakker, Vanden 
Auweele, & Van Mele, 1996). For each measurement, a separate anxiety thermometer was 
used. 
During climbing we recorded heart rate values every 5 seconds using a Sporttester (Polar
Electro-3000). Afterwards, for every climb the mean heart rate was calculated. The blood
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lactate concentration of capillary blood samples (10 µl) was determined using
photospectrometry (Dr. Lange, Mini 8). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Front view and side-view of the climbing wall used in Experiments 1 and 2. In
Experiment 2 the climbing wall was placed perpendicular. 
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To measure muscular fatigue we followed the guidelines of Petrofsky, Glaser, Phillips, Lind, 
and Williams (1982) using the decrease of the median frequency of the power spectrum of the 
EMG-signal of the ‘hand-grip muscles’ (see also Gamet & Maton, 1989). Participants 
performed an isometric contraction on a handgrip dynamometer (Lafayette Instrument Co., 
ranging from 0 to 100 kg with the distance between the palm of the hand and the phalanxes 
being adjustable to hand size). During this contraction the electrical activity of the flexor 
muscles in the forearm was measured (surface EMG). The placement of the two bipolar 
silver-silver-chloride surface electrodes (Medi-trace, ECE 1801) was on the diagonal line 
from the medial epicondyle of the humerus to the styloid of the ulna, at one third proximal. 
The interstice of the electrodes measured 2.5 cm. A reference electrode was placed on the 
lateral condyle of the humerus. The EMG was measured by a differential amplifier (DISA, 
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type 15C01, Skovlunde, Denmark) using a bandwidth of 10-200 Hz. The signal was sampled 
by a 12 bits A/D-convertor at 1000 Hz, and stored in a computer. The median frequency of 
the power spectrum of the EMG-signal was calculated by using a Fast Fourier 
Transformation. 
The size of the grip of the dynamometer was adjusted for each participant (second joint of 
the middle finger of the hand holding the dynamometer was bent at a 90o angle). The 
participants sat at a table with their arm resting on the table; the arm was bent at about 90o 
angle and supinated. Maximal grip strength was determined beforehand (see Procedure) by 
having the participants squeeze the dynamometer with their preferred hand with maximal 
force. This was done three times. The best score was taken as the final result. During the 
experiment participants were asked to squeeze the dynamometer with 50% of their maximal 
force for at least 3 s. This was done twice in each condition, namely, before and after 
climbing. We took 50% of the maximal voluntary contraction (MVC) to ensure that for all 
squeezes the same force was generated. This guaranteed honest comparisons of muscle 
activity between the low and high conditions. During the isometric contractions the EMG 
activity was recorded. The median frequency before climbing and the median frequency after 
climbing were calculated and the difference in both median frequencies was used as index of 
muscle fatigue. Petrofsky et al.’s (1982) investigation showed that this is “... a good non-
invasive index of muscle fatigue” (p. 221). As mentioned in the Introduction, together with 
blood lactate concentration we used this index of muscle fatigue as indirect measure of 
muscle tension. 
Procedure 
For each participant (tested individually) the experiment was spread over three days. Day 1 
was intended to familiarize participants with the procedure of the experiment and to learn the 
task they had to perform. Participants were first informed in general terms about the aims and 
procedure of the experiment. Next they signed a statement of informed consent and completed 
the Dutch version of the STAI A-Trait scale (van der Ploeg et al., 1979). Then the maximal 
voluntary grip strength was determined (left or right hand by choice). Three minutes later 
participants practised the traverse five times back and forth in the low condition ensuring that 
they could easily execute the task (at least in the low condition). 
On Day 2 (three to ten days after Day 1) participants received a more detailed explanation 
of the procedure. Subsequently, the electrodes to measure EMG activity and the Sporttester 
were placed, and participants put on their climbing shoes and harness. 
Seven minutes before climbing participants performed an isometric contraction with their 
preference hand on a handgrip dynamometer, during which the EMG activity was recorded. 
Six minutes before climbing participants took a seat either on the floor or on the platform. 
One minute before climbing participants filled out the anxiety thermometer (Houtman & 
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Bakker, 1989). Then, starting at the right side of the wall participants climbed the traverse 6.5 
times in the high or in the low condition (counterbalanced) with a set traverse time of 20 
seconds. Hence, the total climbing time was 2 minutes 10 seconds. In the high condition the 
belayer lowered the participant using a standard technique to safely bring back participants to 
the floor. After climbing, participants immediately took a seat. They were asked to recall how 
anxious they had felt during climbing and to record this on the anxiety thermometer scale. 
The mean of the two anxiety scores in each condition was used as an anxiety score for that 
condition. After 1.5 minutes participants again performed an isometric contraction on the 
handgrip dynamometer during which the EMG was recorded. Three minutes after climbing a 
blood sample was obtained from the participants’ thumb and the blood lactate concentration 
was measured. 
On Day 3 (three to ten days after Day 2) the procedure of Day 2 was repeated. The order of 
the conditions, however, was reversed. 
Statistical analysis 
The effects of Height (low condition, high condition) and Day (Day 2, Day 3) were tested 
with four two-factor within-subject analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with repeated measures 
on either anxiety thermometer scores, muscle activity indices, blood lactate concentrations, or 
heart rates. Eta squared (η2) assessed the explained variance in the ANOVA models. Pair-wise 
comparisons were made to identify specific mean differences when appropriate. In these cases 
the Bonferroni method (Kinnear & Gray, 2000) was used requiring the alpha level to be 
adjusted to .008. 
Results 
The mean maximal voluntary grip strength of the participants was 43.4 kg (SD = 11.67), 
which is a normal grip strength for non-climbers (cf. Grant, Hasler, Davies, Aitchison, 
Wilson, & Whittaker, 2001; Grant, Hynes, Whittaker, & Aitchison, 1996). 
Subjective experience of state anxiety 
The ANOVA performed on the anxiety thermometer data revealed that participants reported 
significantly more anxiety in the high condition (M = 4.3, SD = 2.39) than in the low 
condition (M = 1.5, SD = 1.28), F(1, 12) = 28.03, p < .001, η2 = .70. Scores did not differ 
significantly between Day 2 and Day 3. Also the interaction was not significant. 
State anxiety at a physiological level 
Heart rate 
The mean heart rate was significantly higher in the high condition (M = 164.8, beats per 
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minute, bpm, SD = 14.06) than in the low condition (M = 146.1 bpm, SD = 18.07), F(1, 12) = 
101.69, p < .001, η2 = .89. There was also a significant interaction between Height and Day, 
F(1, 12) = 6.26, p < .05, η2 = .34. In the low condition on Day 2 (M = 143.9 bpm, SD = 
17.76), the mean heart rate was significantly lower than in the low condition on Day 3 (M = 
148.4 bpm, SD = 19.17), t(12) = 2.08, p < .006). In the high condition the mean heart rate on 
Day 2 was 165.8 bpm (SD = 13.06) and on Day 3 163.8 (SD = 15.36). This difference was not 
significant (p > .008). The significant difference between Day 2 and Day 3 in the low 
condition was probably due to day-to-day heart rate fluctuations (see Table 2.1). Of particular 
relevance here is that the mean heart rate in the high condition was significantly higher than in 
the low condition. 
Table 2.1. Heart ratea (mean and standard deviation) for the conditions in Day 2 and Day 3 
(Experiment 1). 
 Day 2  Day 3 
 Condition  Condition 
 Low anxiety High anxiety  Low anxiety High anxiety 
Starting in low-anxiety 
condition 
133.9 
(15.45) 
(n = 7) 
158.3 
(11.80) 
(n = 7) 
 160.9 
(12.19) 
(n = 6) 
174.5 
(11.62) 
(n = 6) 
Starting in high-anxiety 
condition 
155.5 
(13.00) 
(n = 6) 
174.6 
(8.50) 
(n = 6) 
 137.6 
(17.87) 
(n = 7) 
154.7 
(12.15) 
(n = 7) 
Mean 143.9 165.8  148.4 163.8 
SD 17.76 13.06  19.17 15.36 
aIn bpm. 
Muscle tension 
Visual inspection during the experiment made clear that participants were able to accurately 
squeeze the handgrip dynamometer at 50% of their MVC with minimal variations only. No 
further records of the squeeze accuracies were made. 
The index of muscle fatigue and the blood lactate concentration were influenced by the 
height of climbing. The index of muscle fatigue was significantly higher in the high condition 
(M = 8.2, SD = 5.76) than in the low condition (M = 4.8, SD = 6.74), F(1, 12) = 6.64, p < .05, 
η2 = .36, as was the blood lactate concentration (high condition: M = 7.2 mmol/l, SD = 1.91; 
low condition: M = 6.0 mmol/l, SD = 1.26), F(1, 12) = 6.42, p < .05, η2 = .35. No other 
significant effects were found. 
Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate manifestations of anxiety at the level of 
subjective experience and at the physiological level by means of heart rate, muscular activity, 
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and blood lactate concentration. Self-report scores indicated that participants felt more 
anxious in the high condition than in the low condition. By comparison, the height of the 
scores suggests that participants felt more anxious than students who are about to enter a 
written examination (Houtman & Bakker, 1989); they felt about as anxious as novice teachers 
just before a lecture (Houtman, 1990); and they were less anxious than youth speed skaters 
prior to the start of a 1500 m race at a national championship (Bakker, Vanden Auweele, & 
Moormann, 1992). In addition to the subjective experience, heart rate appeared to be higher 
high on the wall than low on the wall. We found that these manifestations of anxiety went 
hand in hand with more muscle fatigue and a higher blood lactate concentration indicating 
more muscle tension as would also be expected when there is a renewed freezing of degrees 
of freedom. 
An issue to pursue is whether these subjective and physiological changes associated with 
anxiety have repercussions at a (movement) behavioural level, the remaining level at which 
anxiety may manifest itself (e.g., Frijda, 1986). We addressed this issue in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
A possible explanation for performance decrements coinciding with anxiety may be a regress 
to earlier stages of motor learning (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Hardy, 1999; 
Masters, 1992, 2000; Mullen & Hardy, 2000) characterized by higher muscle tension, and 
rigid and jerky movements. In Experiment 1 we showed that anxiety is accompanied by more 
muscle fatigue indicating a higher muscle tension. In Experiment 2 we examined whether 
anxiety is also accompanied by rigid and jerky movements as would be expected if a regress 
to lower skill levels occurs. In order to do so we measured the fluency of participants’ 
climbing movements by using a ‘geometric index of entropy’ (Cordier et al., 1993, 1994). Just 
as the complexity of a spatial-temporal trajectory may be assessed by means of its 
dimensionality, the geometric index of entropy (in short, ‘entropy’) can be used to assess the 
complexity of a spatial trajectory, or path (Cordier et al., 1993, 1994). In sport climbing the 
entropy can be defined as the fluency of the curvature that arises from the displacement of the 
body centre of gravity when climbing a route (Cordier et al., 1993, 1994; see Figure 2.2). 
Mathematically entropy (H) is described by the following equation (see Cordier et al., 1993, 
1994): 
 H = logn(2L/c) 
where L is the length of a curve, and c the convex hull of that curve (see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2. Front view of the climbing wall with the marker curve. The low and high
traverses were identical. The principle of assessing the index of geometric entropy is shown
below the picture of the wall (cf. Cordier et al., 1993, 1994). (See text for more details.) 
Cornier et al. (1993, 1994) argued that there is a clear-cut correlation between the smoothness 
of a climber’s trajectory and the climber’s expertise. The more skilled a climber is, the more 
fluent the shape of his or her trajectory, and the lower the entropy of the trajectory. The
authors indeed showed that entropy decreases as learning progresses, which is consistent with
the decrease in dimensionality of spatiotemporal trajectories observed by Mitra et al. (1998) 
for intermediate learning. In Experiment 2 we use entropy and its mathematical components
to empirically investigate the idea that performance decrements associated with anxiety can
be explained by a temporary regress to a movement execution associated with earlier stages 
of motor learning. If such a regress occurs, less fluent movements are expected, and hence,
entropy should increase. Both a larger L and a smaller c will contribute to a higher entropy. 
Because we expected more rigid, jerky movements when anxious, we hypothesised that L
would be larger, for the movement trajectory would be noisier. Due to a stiffening of the
body, with movements of the centre of gravity taking place in a smaller motor work space, we
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also expected c to be smaller in the threatening condition than in the non-threatening 
condition. An increase in entropy as a result of anxiety would be consistent with the idea of a
regress to earlier learning (Cordier et al., 1993, 1994). 
Method 
Participants 
Seventeen college students, 11 male and 6 female, aged 19 to 26 years, volunteered to 
participate in the experiment. None of them participated in Experiment 1 and none had 
experience in climbing. All participants were naive to the purposes of the experiment. 
The mean trait anxiety score for the male participants was 30.3 (SD = 2.49) and for the 
female participants 33.2 (SD = 4.79). The mean score of male participants was significantly 
different from the mean score for Dutch male college students (M = 36.1) obtained by van der 
Ploeg et al. (1980) [t(10) = 7.73, p < .05, t test between a sample and a population mean, 
Thomas & Nelson, 1996]. The mean score of the female participants was comparable with the 
mean score for Dutch female college students reported by van der Ploeg et al. (1980) (M = 
37.7), (t = 2.30, ns, t test between a sample and a population mean, Thomas & Nelson, 1996). 
The results indicate that the participants had no extraordinary tendency to respond to 
situations perceived as threatening with an elevation in state anxiety (e.g., Smith et al., 1998). 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants again climbed on the climbing wall in a high and low condition. This time the 
wall was not inclined but vertical and no time constraints were imposed. Again two identical, 
horizontal routes (traverses) were mounted on the wall each consisting of six handholds and 
five footholds (see Figure 2.2). As in Experiment 1, the mean height of the footholds of the 
low traverse was 0.3 m (low condition). The mean height of the footholds of the high traverse 
was not as high as in Experiment 1 because at this height (5.1 m) it was not possible to make 
the required video recordings to determine entropy. Therefore, the mean height of the 
footholds of the high traverse was 3.7 m (high condition). To enable participants to start 
climbing in the high condition a large stepladder was used. The stepladder had a small 
platform that allowed the participants to rest after having climbed it and to start the high 
traverse in the same physical condition as in the low traverse. 
As in Experiment 1 participants wore well fitting climbing shoes and an integral harness 
connected to a climbing rope. The same security procedure as in Experiment 1 was used, but 
now this was done in both the high and the low condition to ensure similarity of the 
conditions (apart from the height, of course). This is especially relevant in this experiment 
because the presence of the security rope might, in principle, have an effect on the entropy, 
the most relevant dependent variable. All climbs were recorded using an S-VHS camcorder 
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(sampling rate of 50 Hz) placed 12 m in front of and perpendicular to the climbing wall at a 
height of 2 m. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and on a single day. The experiment lasted 
approximately two hours. The entire procedure was explained to each participant. Participants 
were then asked to read and sign a statement of informed consent and to fill out the Dutch 
version of the STAI A-Trait scale (van der Ploeg et al., 1979). 
After participants had put on their climbing shoes and harness, and placed the Sporttester, 
they practised climbing on the wall (low traverse). Climbing advice was given to participants 
when needed. Practice periods lasted from 5 to 10 minutes and stopped when participants 
were able to successfully complete the traverses on the wall. In this way it was ensured that 
participants had mastered the task and that an eventual failure of a participant to complete the 
task in either condition would not be due to lack of experience with the task. After practising 
participants were allowed 20 minutes to fully recuperate. 
Five minutes before each condition, the participant was positioned in front of the wall, 
either on the floor or the stepladder. Two minutes before the climb participants were asked to 
indicate how anxious they were at that moment by filling out the anxiety thermometer 
(Houtman & Bakker, 1989). Then, the participant was connected to the rope. Use of chalk 
was permitted. The participant was instructed to begin when ready by taking the starting 
position on the wall. Participants were in the starting position when they had placed their right 
hand on Hold 6 (see Figure 2.1), their left hand on Hold 7, their right foot on Hold 1, and their 
left foot Hold 2. In the high condition, as soon as the participant had taken this position, the 
stepladder was removed to make sure that in the event of a fall he or she would not hit it. 
The participants resumed the same position after they had climbed the traverse two times. 
Hence, participants climbed the traverse from the right to the left (ending with right hand on 
Hold 10, left hand on Hold 11, right foot on Hold 4, and left foot on Hold 5; see Figure 2.1), 
and back to the right again. Immediately after the climb, the participants were asked to recall 
how anxious they had felt during climbing and to record this on the anxiety thermometer. The 
mean of the two anxiety scores (before and after the climb) was used as an anxiety score for 
that climb (and thus, for that condition). 
After a recuperation time of about one hour the procedure was repeated, but now 
participants climbed in the other condition (high if they had started low; low if they had 
started high). The order of high and low conditions was reversed with every new participant. 
Dependent variables 
Trait and state anxiety and heart rate were measured in the same way as in Experiment 1. As 
explained in the introduction to Experiment 2 we used the geometric index of entropy 
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(Cordier et al., 1993, 1994) to measure participants’ fluency of movements. To calculate the 
entropy, a marker was mounted at the participant’s back (see Figure 2.2). The marker was 
attached to a belt that was secured around the participant’s waist. Afterwards, the position of 
the marker was determined from video (using WINanalyze software package, version 1.4 3D 
by Mikromak GmbH) so that the length of the marker line, the convex hull, and the entropy 
could be calculated. 
Because climbing time was not standardised as in Experiment 1 we also determined 
climbing time from video to determine whether anxiety had an effect on the speed of 
climbing. It was defined as the sum of the time needed to climb the two traverses (from the 
right to the left, and back) in each of the two conditions. Time started as soon as participants 
released one of the holds in the starting position, thus, as soon as the first movement was 
initiated. When the participant had returned to the starting position after climbing the two 
traverses, the time was stopped. 
Statistical analysis 
The effects of Height (low condition, high condition) were tested using one-tailed paired t 
tests. Effect sizes of within factor (ESw) were calculated to provide an estimation of the 
meaningfulness of a difference between two means (Mullineaux, Bartlett, & Bennett, 2001; 
Thomas & Nelson, 1996). An effect size of 0.2 or less, about 0.5, and 0.8 or more, represents 
small, moderate, and large differences, respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
Results and Discussion 
Anxiety thermometer scores and heart rate 
Participants reported significantly more anxiety in the high condition (M = 4.6, SD = 1.72) 
than in the low condition (M = 2.1, SD = 1.13), t(16) = 10.10, p < .001, ESw = 2.19. The mean 
heart rate also differed significantly between conditions, t(15) = 6.29, p < .001, ESw = 0.99, 
being higher in the high condition (M = 130.4 bpm, SD = 18.75) than in the low condition (M 
= 112.4 bpm, SD = 18.24). Thus, despite a somewhat lower height of the traverse in the high 
condition compared to that of the high condition in Experiment 1, the results indicate that the 
anxiety manipulation was again successful. 
Entropy 
Table 2.2 displays the entropy, the length of the climbing trajectory (L), as well as the convex 
hull (c) per condition. The mean entropy was significantly higher in the high (M = 1.112) than 
in the low condition (M = 1.013), t(16) = 2.80, p < .01, ESw = 0.95, indicating a less fluent 
displacement of the centre of gravity under the influence of anxiety. Table 2.2 shows that 11 
of 17 participants demonstrated a lengthening of the climbing trajectory in the high condition 
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suggesting that the course of the body’s centre of gravity seems to be somewhat more erratic 
when climbing in the high condition though the difference in L between high and low 
conditions was only marginally significant, t(16) = 1.40, p = .09, ESw = 0.48. Moreover, the 
convex hull in the high condition appeared to be significantly smaller than in the low 
condition, t(16) = 5.60, p < .001, ESw = 0.97, further explaining the higher entropy. The 
smaller convex hull indicates that the climbing trajectory was flattened in the high condition 
compared to the low condition, while the climbing routes were identical. Thus, displacements 
of the centre of gravity covered a smaller motor work space high on the wall. 
Table 2.2. Geometric index of entropy (H)a, length of the climbing trajectory (L)a, and convex 
hull of the climbing trajectory (c) a for the conditions in Experiment 2. 
Participant Condition 
 Low anxiety  High anxiety 
 H L c  H L c 
1 0.97 5.9 4.5 0.99 6.4 4.7 
2 0.96 6.2 4.8 1.11 6.9 4.5 
3 1.15 7.3 4.7 1.16 7.2 4.5 
4 1.09 7.5 5.0 1.09 7.2 4.9 
5 0.95 6.4 5.0 1.09 7.2 4.8 
6 0.97 6.2 4.7 1.13 6.7 4.3 
7 0.94 6.7 5.2 1.07 7.0 4.8 
8 0.94 5.8 4.5 1.46 9.2 4.3 
9 0.87 5.8 4.9 0.87 5.6 4.7 
10 1.10 6.7 4.4 1.13 6.8 4.4 
11 1.30 9.0 4.9 1.15 7.0 4.4 
12 1.05 7.1 5.0 1.27 8.4 4.7 
13 1.03 7.1 5.1 1.04 6.8 4.8 
14 0.96 6.7 5.2 1.03 6.9 4.9 
15 0.91 6.4 5.2 1.14 7.4 4.8 
16 0.98 6.4 4.8 1.13 7.0 4.5 
17 1.07 7.0 4.9 1.05 7.0 4.8 
        
Mean 1.01 6.7 4.9  1.11 7.1 4.6 
SD 0.104 0.77 0.23  0.124 0.77 0.20 
aIn m. 
Climbing time 
Table 2.3 shows the climbing time per condition. It appeared that the average climbing time 
increased significantly and by almost 50% from 29.5 s in the low condition to 43.1 s in the 
high condition, t(16) = 5.59, p < .001, ESw = 2.02. Possible reasons why these climbing times 
were so much longer will be briefly discussed in the General Discussion. Note that the longer 
climbing time may partly explain the higher heart rates.  
Together, the results clearly indicate that participants’ climbing behaviour in the high 
condition differed from that in the low condition. 
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Table 2.3. Climbing timea for the conditions in Experiment 2. 
Participant Condition 
 Low anxiety  High anxiety 
1 24.8  29.1
2 26.9  36.4
3 42.6  43.3
4 32.5  37.0
5 35.4  59.6
6 43.8  58.1
7 24.4  38.4
8 27.8  68.1
9 19.2  23.3
10 32.3  58.7
11 30.1  46.7
12 28.4  46.7
13 19.8  35.0
14 25.3  36.2
15 28.8  44.4
16 33.1  40.6
17 26.9  31.3
    
Mean 29.5  43.1 
SD 6.72  12.11 
aIn s. 
General Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to examine the relationship between anxiety and motor 
performance. More specifically, we investigated the processes underlying the often-noticed 
impairment of performance associated with anxiety. To examine anxiety-performance 
relationships we investigated possible manifestations of anxiety at three levels, the level of 
subjective experience, the physiological level, and the behavioural level. Based on the 
literature on anxiety (e.g., Hardy, 1999; Masters, 1992; Mullen & Hardy, 2000), we argued 
that anxiety might disrupt movements leading to a type of movement behaviour characteristic 
of earlier stages of learning that would be characterized by stiffening of the body, and more 
rigid and jerky movements. 
To manipulate anxiety we used height on a climbing wall. This manipulation offered a way 
to test participants in a natural, ecologically valid situation that is both safe and frightening 
(Baddeley, 1972; Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1987). In Experiment 1 we showed that with this 
manipulation, anxiety manifested itself both at the level of subjective experience as indicated 
by the higher anxiety scores, and at the physiological level as indicated by the higher heart 
rates, higher blood lactate concentrations, and more muscle activity. Because climbing times 
were standardised these changes could not be the result of, for instance, faster climbing 
(earlier fatigue) or slower climbing (e.g., with longer grasping of the holds and more fatigue). 
Thus, participants seemed to perform the climbing task in the threatening condition with more 
muscle tension than in the non-threatening condition. 
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In Experiment 2 we addressed the question whether the physiological changes found in 
Experiment 1 were also manifest in participants’ overt movement behaviour. To examine this 
question we determined the fluency of the climbing movements by measuring the entropy. 
We found a higher entropy of climbing trajectory when participants climbed high on the 
climbing wall indicating a less smooth displacement of the body’s centre of gravity that is 
also characteristic of less skilled climbing behaviour (Cordier et al., 1993, 1994). The higher 
entropy appeared to be the result of a somewhat longer climbing trajectory of the body’s 
centre of gravity (L, see Figure 2.2) and, especially, a smaller convex hull (c, see Figure 2.2). 
Together these results show a noisier movement pattern and the use of smaller motor 
workspace to climb an identical route. 
In addition, when no time constraints were imposed (Experiment 2), climbing time 
appeared to be no less than 46% longer in the high condition than in the low condition. Thus, 
apart from spatial changes, the temporal patterning of climbing movements changed as well. 
Other than noticing that a longer climbing time fits well with a more rigid, jerkier and less 
efficient movement pattern, it is difficult, with the variables measured in this study, to explain 
why this change in climbing time occurred. With entropy we investigated the movements of 
the centre of gravity but our results remained mute about the movements made with the limbs. 
Did participants make more limb movements, for instance? Did they grasp the holds longer? 
Or did they move slower from hold to hold? To gain further insight into the anxiety-
performance relationship we investigated these questions in a follow-up study (Pijpers, 
Oudejans, & Bakker, 2005; see also Chapter 3 of this thesis). The preliminary results 
indicated that there were more explorative hand and foot movements—in part, this might 
explain the increase in entropy—, and that movements from one hold to another were actually 
slower in the high-anxiety condition than in the low-anxiety condition. These findings may 
partly explain the longer climbing times under anxiety provoking conditions. Additional 
research is required into the relation between entropy changes as found here and the changes 
in limb movements as found in our follow-up study. 
All in all, the results support our hypotheses so that we can conclude that anxiety manifests 
itself at the level of subjective experience, at the physiological level as well as at the 
behavioural level. Furthermore, because anxiety resulted in an increase in muscle tension, 
longer climbing times, and an increase in entropy, we can also conclude that the physiological 
and movement behavioural changes displayed under anxiety conditions reflect a regress to a 
movement execution also characteristic of earlier stages of skill acquisition. 
Our results are in line with those of Weinberg (1978; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976), and Beuter 
and Duda (1985; Beuter et al., 1989) who also found spatio-temporal changes in movement 
patterns under the influence of anxiety. In addition, the results are in accordance with the self-
focus model of choking (Baumeister, 1984) or the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 
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1992; Mullen & Hardy, 2000) in which anxiety is assumed to evoke an inward focus of 
attention on the step-by-step execution of the movement. Consequently, movement control 
involves more cognitive processes.5 As a result, just as when learning a new skill, parts of the 
body, or sometimes even the whole body, are held rigid. Or, in Bernstein’s (1967) terms, one 
could say that excessive biomechanical degrees of freedom are frozen. From a dynamical 
systems perspective one could argue that more active dynamical degrees of freedom are 
required to describe the resulting spatial trajectory. Most important for now, it seems that 
performing a learned task in a threatening situation can be considered as performing a ‘new’, 
unfamiliar task for which a new solution has to be found. 
This idea provides a simple explanation as to why repeated exposure to anxiety provoking 
situations results in a decrease in the effects of anxiety on performance (e.g., Frijda, 1986). 
Apart from habituation (less anxiety) one learns to execute the task under the influence of 
anxiety. In the beginning anxiety provides a new condition for which a new perceptual-motor 
solution has to be found. After repeated exposure one not just learns to execute the task, but 
one learns to execute the task under those specific conditions, that is, under the influence of 
anxiety. This would explain the well-known phenomenon that even experienced artists before 
coming on stage and experienced athletes before an important match or race are still very 
anxious, even though this normally does not impair their performance. They have learned to 
perform well under conditions of anxiety. Performing under pressure is no longer new and 
unfamiliar. 
As a final point, the role of perceptual processes, not investigated so far, should be taken 
into consideration in the anxiety-performance research as well. Williams and Elliott (1999) 
noted that “successful performance in sport requires skill in perception, as well as the efficient 
and accurate execution of movement patterns” (p. 362). These authors found with respect to 
karate that high levels of anxiety increased the rate of visual scanning and the number of 
fixations on opponents’ arms and fists, and as such their research is exemplary for the role of 
perception in anxiety-performance relationships. Hardy and Hagtvet (1996) alluded to this 
possible role of perception in the anxiety research by asserting that realistic attempts to model 
the anxiety-performance relationship need to consider the changes in perceptual processes that 
may accompany anxiety and underlie performance effects. However, only a few studies have 
assessed the effects of anxiety on perceptual processes in general, and almost no previous 
research has examined the effects of anxiety on perceptual processes in sport (Williams & 
Elliott, 1999). 
In conclusion, research into anxiety-performance relationships may profit from the use of 
                                                 
5 As an aside, these processes might perhaps also contribute to the longer climbing times, as 
performance involving these processes will take more time than a more automated execution of the 
task. 
 44
Anxiety-performance relationships 
process measures. The use of outcome measures may provide indirect support for the idea that 
performance is affected by anxiety, but it does not allow conclusions as to why and how 
anxiety affected the actual movement execution (e.g., Bennett, 2000). Insight into these latter 
issues may have consequences for designing anxiety-reducing techniques. Thus, to answer the 
question why anxiety may impair sport performance it does not suffice to just explore the 
effects of anxiety on one’s global performance. Instead, the intermediate steps between 
heightened anxiety and the eventual performance should also be investigated. In this respect, 
much work remains to be done in order to obtain a thorough insight into anxiety-performance 
relationships in sport. 
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Anxiety-induced changes in movement 
behaviour during the execution of a 
complex whole-body task 
 
Chapter 3 
Abstract 
We investigated the impact of anxiety on movement behaviour during the execution 
of a complex perceptual-motor task. Masters’ (1992) conscious processing 
hypothesis suggests that under pressure an inward focus of attention occurs, 
resulting in more conscious control of the movement execution of well-learned 
skills. The conscious processes interfere with automatic task execution hereby 
inducing performance decrements. Recent empirical support for the hypothesis has 
focused on the effects of pressure on end performance. It has not been tested so far 
whether the changes in performance are also accompanied by changes in 
movement execution that would be expected following Masters’ hypothesis. In the 
current study we tested the effects of anxiety on climbing movements on a climbing 
wall. Two identical traverses at different heights on a climbing wall provided 
different anxiety conditions. In line with the conscious processing hypothesis we 
found that anxiety had a significant effect on participants’ movement behaviour 
evidenced by increases in climbing time and the number of explorative movements 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and by longer grasping of the holds and slower movements 
(Experiment 2). These results provide additional support for the conscious 
processing hypothesis and insight into the relation between anxiety, performance, 
and movement behaviour. 
______________________________ 
 
Based on: Pijpers, J. R., Oudejans, R. R. D., & Bakker, F. C. (2005). Anxiety-
induced changes in movement behaviour during the execution of a complex whole-
body task. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58A, 421-445. 
Reprinted by kind permission of the Experimental Psychological Society. 
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Introduction 
When the pressure is high, performance becomes less predictable. In sports, for example, 
some top athletes thrive under the pressure while others miserably fail, especially at these 
crucial moments of, for instance, a decisive penalty shot in soccer or a match point in tennis. 
What does it mean to execute perceptual-motor skills under high pressure? Why do some 
seem to benefit from stressful situations while others seem to suffer under those 
circumstances? In what way are movements different when they are executed in anxiety-
provoking situations compared to more neutral situations? To answer the question why 
anxiety may influence expert performance it does not suffice to just explore the effects of 
anxiety on one’s global performance (the ‘end result of a motor act’, Weinberg & Hunt, 
1976). Instead, also the mechanisms affecting the performance should be considered such as 
changes in the execution of movements (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Collins, Jones, 
Fairweather, Doolan, & Priestley, 2001; Janelle, 2002; Martens, 1971; Mullen & Hardy, 
2000; Schmidt, 1982; van Loon, Masters, Ring, & McIntyre, 2001; Weinberg, 1978). The 
(pioneering) work of Weinberg (1978; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976) and Beuter and Duda (1985; 
Beuter, Duda, & Widule, 1989) illustrated the importance of examining anxiety and 
accompanying changes in movement pattern. These authors demonstrated differences in co-
ordination patterns suggesting less efficient movements in high-anxiety conditions. 
Obviously, insight into the relation between anxiety and movement behaviour may have 
implications for designing techniques to control anxiety in order to optimise performance on 
perceptual-motor skills in several domains such as sports (e.g., Gould, & Udry, 1994), dance 
(e.g., Wilson, 2002), making music (e.g., Stanton, 1994), police work (e.g., Anderson, 
Litzenberger, & Plecas, 2002; Le Scanff & Taugis, 2002), work of fire fighters (e.g., Ryan, 
Ployhart, Greguras, & Schmit, 1998), and armed forces (e.g., Arthur, Young, Jordan, & 
Shebilske, 1996). 
Before we turn to the relation between anxiety and movement behaviour, we will define 
‘arousal’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘stress’, terms that are surrounded by considerable confusion in the 
literature (e.g., Janelle, 2002; Landers & Arent, 2001; Landers & Boutcher, 1998; Woodman 
& Hardy, 2001). Landers and Arent (2001) recommend not using these terms interchangeably 
and to conceptually distinguish the terms as follows. Arousal refers to “ … a nondirective 
generalized bodily activation (…) and is thought to range from a comatose state to a state of 
extreme excitement as might be manifested in a panic attack” (p. 129). In contrast to arousal, 
which is nondirective, having either beneficial or detrimental effects on performance (e.g., 
Wann, 1997), anxiety is seen as directional in that it is an unpleasant emotional state (e.g., 
Woodman & Hardy, 2001). In other words, “anxiety is by definition a negative feeling state” 
(Jones & Hanton, 2001, p. 393). Anxiety occurs as a result of threat (Schwenkmezger & 
Steffgen, 1989) and this threat is “related to the subjective evaluation of a situation, and 
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concerns jeopardy to one’s self-esteem during performance or social situations, physical 
danger, or insecurity and uncertainty” (Schwenkmezger & Steffgen, 1989, pp. 78-79). Thus, 
anxiety has a mental element (e.g., worry, apprehension), which is called cognitive anxiety, 
and a physiological element that matches the construct of arousal as defined above and is 
called somatic anxiety (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) or physiological arousal 
(Woodman & Hardy, 2001). Finally, stress is seen as a result of demands placed on the 
individual that are perceived to exceed available coping abilities (e.g., Janelle, 2002; Selye, 
1976). Depending on one’s interpretation of the environmental demands stress will be 
conceived as positive, negative, or neutral. The negative form of stress is called distress or 
anxiety and can have detrimental effects on performance (Wann, 1997). 
In the present study we will focus on the impact of anxiety on movement behaviour to gain 
further insight into the anxiety-performance relationship and to explore the mechanisms 
underlying this relationship. To explain the (debilitative) effects of anxiety and the relation 
between anxiety and movement behaviour, research has resorted to the underlying attentional 
mechanisms: Influences of state anxiety on performance are assumed to be related to changes 
in attention and concentration (Janelle, 2002; Landers, 1980; Nideffer, 1976, 1981). 
Consequently, in the course of time, several attentional models have been put forward in the 
literature. The models are based on the assumption that for successful performance one should 
attend to task-relevant information while ignoring task-irrelevant information (Lewis & 
Linder, 1997). Broadly, the models can be classified in either distraction models or self-focus 
models (see Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). 
Distraction models propose that some stimuli (e.g., anxiety) shift attention away from task-
relevant information to distracting, task-irrelevant cues (either externally or internally), 
thereby decreasing performance (see Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Mullen & 
Hardy, 2000). For example, Wine’s (1971) distraction model draws upon a difference in 
attentional focus of high- and low-(test-)anxious persons during task performance to explain 
(debilitating) effects of anxiety on performance. Highly test-anxious persons often divide their 
attention between task-irrelevant (i.e., self-evaluative worry) and task-relevant variables 
whereas low-test-anxious persons focus their attention more fully on the task. 
The self–focus models state that pressure and anxiety raise self-consciousness and evoke 
an inward focus of attention (Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 1992). The increased inward 
attention might induce a conscious step-by-step control of movement execution disrupting the 
normal, automatic processing of the task at hand and leading to a decrease in performance 
(Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997). Masters (1992) called this 
the ‘conscious processing hypothesis’ (see also Masters, 2000; Masters, Polman, & 
Hammond, 1993). The proposed anxiety-induced renewed conscious control may reflect a 
temporary regress to a lower skill level or an earlier stage of learning (Baumeister, 1984; 
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Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002; Masters, 1992, 
2000; Mullen & Hardy, 2000; Pijpers, Oudejans, Holsheimer, & Bakker, 2003). Such a 
regress implies more cognitive control of movements, as is also found in earlier stages of 
learning (Fitts & Posner, 1967). This is supposed to be detrimental to skilled performance as 
it interferes with the well-learned automatisms of the skill. 
In the present study, we will mainly draw upon Masters’ (1992) conscious processing 
hypothesis as it holds some promise with respect to explaining influences of anxiety on 
movement behaviour.1 The last decade, several research groups have provided empirical 
support for the conscious processing hypothesis, especially with respect to golf putting 
(Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002; Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002; Hardy, 
Mullen, & Jones, 1996; Lewis & Linder; 1997; Masters, 1992; Mullen & Hardy, 2000), but 
also the more continuous task of soccer dribbling (Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002). However, so 
far these studies concerned the testing of the relationship between pressure and performance 
(Beilock & Carr, 2001; Hardy et al., 1996; Lewis & Linder; 1997; Masters, 1992; Mullen & 
Hardy, 2000) as well as between the proposed attentional mechanisms and performance (as 
end product; Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002). Research into the relation between anxiety and 
movement behaviour is scarce. 
Following the conscious processing hypothesis it is assumed that under the influence of 
anxiety movement behaviour will have characteristics that are typically found in early stages 
of motor learning. Movements in early learning are uncertain, confused, and clumsy 
(Bernstein, 1996). More specifically, learning a skill is accompanied by irregular, jerky, less 
fluent, and slow movements requiring much effort (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock, Carr, et 
al., 2002; den Brinker & van Hekken, 1982; den Brinker, Stäbler, Whiting, & van Wieringen, 
1986; Magill, 1998; Masters, 1992; Vereijken, van Emmerik, Whiting, & Newell, 1992; 
Vincken & Denier van der Gon, 1985; Whiting, Bijlard, & den Brinker, 1987). In addition, 
movements in early learning are found to be restricted in amplitude (den Brinker et al., 1986; 
Vereijken, Whiting, & Beek, 1992). 
Beuter and Duda (1985), Collins et al. (2001), and Weinberg and Hunt (1976) provided 
evidence that under the influence of anxiety performance was characterized by less fluent 
movements. In a previous study we investigated the effects of anxiety on movement 
behaviour of participants executing a complex whole-body task, namely, climbing a traverse 
on an artificial climbing wall (Pijpers et al., 2003; see also Chapter 2). By building traverses 
at different heights on the wall anxiety was manipulated in an ecologically valid situation that 
                                                 
1 In this regard, the ‘processing efficiency theory’ (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), popular in recent sport 
scientific literature (e.g., Hardy & Jackson, 1996; Janelle, 2002; Mullen & Hardy, 2000; Smith, 
Bellamy, Collins, & Newell, 2001; Woodman & Hardy, 2001), seems less suitable as its main 
emphasis is on the relation between anxiety and performance outcome, rather than movement 
behaviour. 
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was both safe and frightening (Baddeley, 1972; Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1987). We could 
hereby examine anxiety effects ‘in-event’ (Collins et al., 2001), while applying an 
intraindividual design to enhance power to identify changes in the dependent variable of 
interest (i.e., movement performance) (Jones, 1995a). We found that high on a climbing wall 
(i.e., under high-anxiety conditions), participants climbed less efficiently than low on the wall 
(Pijpers et al., 2003). In addition, we found longer climbing times and a less fluent 
displacement of the body’s centre of gravity when participants were anxious, as would be 
expected on the basis of the conscious processing hypothesis. 
Although longer climbing times were expected, the results of our study (Pijpers et al., 
2003) remained mute as to why participants’ climbing times increased so much (by almost 
50%) and about what exactly happened with participants’ limb movements underlying the 
decrease in fluency of the displacement of the body’s centre of gravity. For instance, did 
participants make more limb movements? Did they grasp the holds longer? Did they move 
slower from hold to hold? In the present study we investigated these questions with two 
experiments to further test Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis and gain more 
insight into the anxiety-performance relationship by focusing on changes in movement 
execution. 
Experiment 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine anxiety-induced changes in movement 
behaviour. We asked participants to perform a climbing task low (low-anxiety condition) and 
high (high-anxiety condition) on a climbing wall. No time constraints were imposed. 
Following the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992) we expected that participants 
would make more movements under anxiety conditions. Gibson (1988) distinguished 
‘exploratory actions’ and ‘performatory actions’, where exploratory actions are primarily 
information-gathering actions (e.g., when a climber just wants to find out whether he or she 
can reach a particular hold). Performatory actions are executive actions meant to reach a 
certain goal (e.g., moving a hand from one hold to the next in order to use it as support). 
Because in early learning movements are more uncertain, and the learner executes more 
exploratory movements (e.g., Gibson, 1988; Gibson & Spelke, 1983; Newell & McDonald, 
1992; Von Hofsten, 1990), we also expected more exploratory movements when climbing 
high than when climbing low on the wall. In addition, as we expected that movements would 
have smaller amplitudes under anxiety conditions, we expected that participants would use 
more holds—that is, make more performatory movements—when climbing high on the wall 
than when climbing low on the wall. Therefore, compared to the traverse we used in our 
earlier study (Pijpers et al., 2003; see also Chapter 2), we now added two extra holds that 
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were not strictly necessary to perform the climbing task. Together, the expected anxiety-
related changes in the number of exploratory and performatory movements would at least 
partly explain the longer climbing times that were found by Pijpers et al. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 8 male participants, mean age 31.4 years (SD = 4.81) volunteered to participate in 
the experiment. The participants had no experience in climbing and were naive to the 
purposes of the experiment. 
The Dutch version of the A-Trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)2 was 
used as a standard check to measure trait anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; 
van der Ploeg et al., 1979). The mean trait anxiety score for the participants was 31.9 (SD = 
6.24) and was not significantly different from the mean score for Dutch male college students 
(M = 36.1) obtained by van der Ploeg, Defares, and Spielberger (1980), t(7)= 1.90, ns, t test 
between a sample and a population mean (Thomas & Nelson, 1996). The results indicate that 
the participants had no extraordinary tendency to respond to situations perceived as 
threatening with an elevation in state anxiety (e.g., Smith, Smoll, & Wiechman, 1998). 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on a vertical climbing wall (width: 3.5 m; height: 7.0 m; see Figure 3.1), 
which was placed in a gym-sized laboratory. The wall had a grey grainy texture for friction. 
Holds of varying shape and size could be bolted on the wall at relative distances of about 0.20 
m. 
On the wall, two identical, horizontal routes (so-called ‘traverses’, built by a professional 
route designer) were mounted (see Figure 3.1). Each traverse consisted of six footholds and
seven handholds of varying size and shape, which were all suitable for novice climbers. Holds
12 and 13 (see Figure 3.1) were labelled ‘additional holds’ because these holds were not
necessary to climb the traverse successfully as was shown in a previous study (Pijpers et al.,
2003). The mean height of the footholds of the low traverse was 0.4 m (low condition); the 
mean height of the footholds of the high traverse was 5.0 m (high condition). To be able to 
start with the high traverse in the same physical condition as in the low traverse, a movable
platform, 5.0 m above the floor, was placed 1.2 m in front of the climbing wall. 
                                                 
2 The STAI A-Trait scale is a self-report questionnaire that measures anxiety proneness—that is, 
the tendency to respond to situations perceived as thrilling with an elevation in state anxiety intensity. 
Scores range from a low of 20 to a high of 80. Normative data for the STAI A-Trait scale depict a 
mean score of 36.1 (SD = 8.4) for male college students and of 37.7 (SD = 8.4) for female college 
students (van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 1979). 
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Figure 3.1. Front view of the climbing wall used in Experiments 1 and 2. The additional
holds (Holds 12 and 13) used in Experiment 1 are indicated by ‘●’. The routes in the low and 
high condition are identical. 
The participants wore well-fitting climbing shoes (Enduro 954, La Sportiva). In both 
conditions participants wore an integral harness (Edelrid). We used the so-called ‘top-roping’ 
technique to ensure the safety of the participants. Top–roping involves ‘paired’ climbing 
(Skinner & McMullen, 1993)—that is, one end of the rope is tied onto participants’ harness, 
the safety rope runs up around a solid iron bar at the top of the climbing wall, and back to the 
ground. This end of the safety rope runs through the belay device on the belayer’s harness. 
The belayer is the person who is managing the safety rope and preventing and protecting 
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participants from falling down if they lose grip on the wall (Skinner & McMullen, 1993). 
State anxiety was assessed by means of the ‘anxiety thermometer’ validated by Houtman 
and Bakker (1989). The anxiety thermometer is a 10-cm continuous scale on which 
participants were asked to rate their anxiety feelings at a particular moment, ranging from 0 
(not anxious at all, the left end) to 10 (extremely anxious, the right end). Participants had to 
place a cross on the 10-cm scale to indicate how they felt at a particular moment. The distance 
between the left end and cross (in cm) was used as a measure of the reported anxiety. 
Consequently, it is a quick way to measure state-anxiety in contrast to the often-used 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2, Martens et al., 1990), which would be 
unsuitable for our purposes (see also Pijpers et al., 2003). For each measurement, a separate 
anxiety thermometer was used. 
During climbing we recorded heart rate values every 5 seconds using a Sporttester (Polar 
Electro-3000). Afterwards, for every climb the mean heart rate was calculated. 
Movements of the participants were recorded using two S-VHS camcorders at a sampling 
rate of 50 Hz. One camcorder was placed on the floor to get an overall view of the 
experimental set-up and one (movable) was used to get a clear picture of the movements of 
hands and feet. Two experimenters handled the camcorders. The videotapes were copied, and 
a Vertical Interval Time code (VIT code, a unique time code) was added using an Alpermann 
& Velte Time Code 30 generator. We used a video frame grabber and a digitizing program to 
determine the climbing times. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and on one day. Participants were informed about the 
procedure of the experiment after which they signed a statement of informed consent. They 
completed the Dutch version of the STAI A-Trait scale (van der Ploeg et al., 1979) and filled 
out an anxiety thermometer (to familiarize them with the thermometer). 
To make participants familiar with the climbing task a videotaped example of an 
experienced climber was shown. The climber demonstrated an efficient way to climb the 
traverse. A Sporttester was placed, and participants put on their climbing shoes and harness. 
They then practised the (low) traverse until they were able to climb the traverse two times 
back and forth properly and easily. Practice periods lasted from 5 to 10 minutes. After 
practising participants were allowed 15-20 minutes to fully recuperate. 
Subsequently, participants were asked to take position on the wall: Participants placed their 
right hand on Hold 1 (see Figure 3.1), left hand on Hold 2, right foot on Hold 7, and left foot 
on Hold 8 (‘starting position’). As soon as participants had taken position on the wall in the 
high condition the platform was quickly removed to prevent the risk of striking the platform. 
In the low condition, participants were instructed not to start climbing immediately, but to 
wait just as long as it would have taken to relocate the platform (less than 10 s). In both 
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conditions participants started climbing at a sign from one of the experimenters. 
In each condition, participants climbed two times. Starting at the right side of the wall 
participants climbed to the left side of the wall and then returned to the right side of the wall 
followed by a five-minute break. After climbing in the high condition, participants stepped 
back on the platform. Next, participants climbed the other condition (high if they had started 
low, low if they had started high). Participants were then allowed a recuperation time of 20 
minutes. Then the procedure of the first two climbs was repeated. Whether participants started 
low or high changed with every new participant. After each time participants had climbed, 
they had to rate their feelings of anxiety by means of the anxiety thermometer. Participants 
were asked to recall how anxious they had felt during climbing. The mean of the two anxiety 
scores (after the first and second climb in a condition) was used as an anxiety score for that 
condition. Participants were asked to climb as fast yet as safe as possible. It was emphasised 
that participants’ first goal should be to complete the climbing task without falling. None of 
the participants fell during the experiment. In total, only six times did a participant slip from a 
foothold, without further consequences as the participants could recover easily from these 
slips. Three slips were made in the low-anxiety condition and three in the high-anxiety 
condition. 
One of the experimenters served as belayer. In the low condition, the belayer acted as 
insurance that both conditions were similar for the climber. Participants were informed before 
beginning the climb in the low condition (mean height of the footholds: 0.4 m) that, despite 
the belayer, if they slipped they should break their fall themselves, as the safety procedure 
would not be effective so low above the ground. 
Dependent variables 
Per condition the following dependent variables were determined from the videotapes: 
1. Number of explorative movements, defined as the number of times a hold was touched 
without it being used as support. 
2. Number of performatory movements—that is, the number of movements made during 
climbing; a movement was defined as releasing a hold and making contact with another hold 
and using that hold as support. 
3. Use of additional holds, defined as the number of times the additional holds (Holds 12 
and 13; see Figure 3.1) were used during climbing. 
 
Participants’ movements were viewed by two independent raters for accurate 
determination of the dependent variables mentioned above. In all cases the raters agreed on 
the number of performatory movements, the number of explorative movements, and the 
number of times the additional holds were used. 
4. Climbing time was also registered for each condition; it was defined as the sum of the 
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time needed to climb the first and second climb in a condition. As soon as participants 
released one of the holds in the starting position, time started. When participants had returned 
to the starting position, the time was stopped. 
Statistical analysis 
The effect of height (low condition, high condition) was tested using several paired t tests 
(one-tailed) for the dependent variables mentioned above. Effect sizes of within factor (ESw) 
were calculated to provide an estimation of the meaningfulness of a difference between two 
means (Mullineaux, Bartlett, & Bennett, 2001; Thomas & Nelson, 1996). An effect size of 
0.2, 0.5, and greater than 0.8, represents small, moderate, and large differences, respectively 
(Cohen, 1988). 
Results 
State anxiety and heart rate 
To determine whether the anxiety manipulation was successful we performed a paired t test 
on the anxiety thermometer data. Averaged over the two climbs participants reported 
significantly higher anxiety scores in the high condition than in the low condition, t(7) = 3.46, 
p < .005, ESw = 4.72; the mean score on the anxiety thermometer in the high condition was 
2.7 (SD = 1.90), and in the low condition 0.7 (SD = 0.43). 
Averaged over two climbs per condition the mean heart rate differed significantly between 
conditions, t(7) = 3.69, p < .05, ESw = 1.45, heart rate being higher in the high condition (M = 
157.3 beats per minute, bpm, SD = 14.63) than in the low condition (M = 143.3 bpm, SD = 
9.66). Both measures pointed to a successful manipulation of anxiety—that is, in the high 
condition participants were more anxious than the low condition. 
Behavioural variables 
Table 3.1 shows the dependent variables for the low and the high condition. It appeared that 
climbing time increased significantly and by more than 50%, from 56.6 s in the low condition 
to 89.5 s in the high condition, t(7) = 3.55, p < .05, ESw = 0.96. There were large individual 
differences in climbing time causing the large standard deviations. In the low condition 
climbing time ranged from 28 to 141 s, and in the high condition from 30 to 182 s. Note that 
the longer climbing time may partly explain the higher heart rates. 
The number of explorative movements was significantly higher in the high condition than 
in the low condition, t(7) = 1.99, p < .05, ESw = 1.58. The longer climbing time cannot be 
explained by a significant increase in number of performatory movements since the number of 
performatory movements did not statistically differ between the low and high condition, t(7) = 
0.71, p = .25. Furthermore, no significant difference was found between the low and high 
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condition for use of additional holds, t(7) = 0.27, p = .40. 
 
Table 3.1. Climbing timea, number of explorative movements, number of performatory 
movements, and use of additional holds for the conditions in Experiment 1. 
 Condition
 Low anxiety High anxiety
Variable M SD M SD
Climbing time 56.6 34.18 89.5 46.51
Number of explorative movements 2.5 2.45 6.4 4.70
Number of performatory movements 54.1 9.52 56.6 7.34
Use of additional holds 4.4 2.99 4.7 2.69
aIn s. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1 we investigated manifestations of anxiety in movement behaviour via 
changes in number of exploratory movements, the number of performatory movements, and 
the use of additional holds. In addition, we calculated climbing time. The differences in 
climbing time in the low and high condition clearly revealed that participants’ movement 
behaviour differed in both conditions. The increase in climbing time could be explained in 
part by an increase in the number of explorative movements, but not by an increase in the 
number of performatory movements or by the use of additional holds. 
The substantially longer climbing time in the high-anxiety condition seems to be a robust 
finding as it replicates the results of our previous study (Pijpers et al., 2003; see also Chapter 
2). Together with the increase in explorative movements the longer climbing time showed that 
anxiety indeed changed participants’ movement behaviour, which is in line with Masters’ 
(1992) conscious processing hypothesis as well as with earlier results of Weinberg (1978; 
Weinberg & Hunt, 1976), Beuter and Duda (1985; Beuter et al., 1989), and Collins et al. 
(2001) who also found changes in movement behaviour associated with anxiety. 
Anxiety had no significant effects on the total number of performatory movements made 
and on the number of times the extra holds were used. In retrospect, the number of holds on 
the wall probably did not leave enough room for many alternatives—that is, for an increase in 
the number of holds used. The number of holds constrained the number of possible movement 
solutions too much to find differences in the number of movements between conditions. It 
also appeared that in the low condition participants also made use of the additional holds 
making extra use in the high condition hardly possible. 
Note that, although statistically significant between conditions, the average anxiety scores 
were rather low. In both conditions the current scores were about half the scores of Pijpers et 
al. (2003) who used the same climbing wall and about the same traverse (see also Chapter 2). 
In the present experiment, participants had to climb twice in each condition. After the first 
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climb in the high condition, participants stepped back on the platform and returned to the 
floor area. This procedure had a considerable diminishing impact on the average anxiety 
scores as participants experienced that nothing seriously happened to them. This is reflected 
in the anxiety thermometer scores: The first time participants had climbed in the high 
condition the average score on the anxiety thermometer was 3.5 (SD = 2.46), the second time 
only 2.0 (SD = 1.84). 
An issue to pursue is where the substantially longer climbing time in the high condition 
than in the low condition comes from as the increase in the number of explorative movements 
can only explain a small part of the longer climbing time. We addressed this issue in 
Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
In search for an explanation for the considerably longer climbing time in the high condition, 
in Experiment 2 we not only measured the number of exploratory and performatory 
movements, but also the temporal aspects of these movements—that is, how long participants 
grasped the holds in both conditions and how fast they moved from hold to hold. Temporal 
changes in movement patterns may point to an anxiety-induced renewed conscious control of 
movements as is to be expected from the conscious processing hypothesis (Masters, 1992; 
Mullen & Hardy, 2000). Recall, that in this model anxiety is assumed to evoke an inward 
focus of attention on the execution of movements. This inward focus of attention and 
subsequent step-by-step control of movements is proposed to slow down the execution of 
sensorimotor skills (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002; Mullen & Hardy, 
2000). As the cognitive processes involved will take more time than a more automated 
execution of the task, we expected a longer preparation of movements (i.e., longer contact 
times with the holds) as well as slower execution of the movements (i.e., slower movements 
from hold to hold) under high-anxiety compared to low-anxiety conditions. 
The design and procedure of Experiment 2 were largely similar to those of Experiment 1. 
However, two major methodological changes had to be made. First, to give us the opportunity 
to investigate the temporal aspects of movement execution, special technical adjustments to 
the holds were made (for more details, see Method of Experiment 2). Second, in each 
condition participants had to climb the traverse two times back and forth without a break 
instead of with a break as was done in Experiment 1. We considered the break to be too 
harmful for our anxiety manipulation (see Discussion of Experiment 1). Given the main 
purpose of Experiment 2, it was important that participants completed four traverses in the 
low as well as the high condition to obtain sufficient data to make statistical analysis sensible. 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 15 participants, 13 male and 2 female, mean age 20.7 years (SD = 2.22), 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. None of them had participated in Experiment 1. 
The participants, all college students, had no experience in climbing. 
The mean trait anxiety score for the male participants was 35.8 (SD= 10.98), and for the 
(two) female participants 33.5 (SD= 3.54). The mean score of the male participants was 
comparable with the mean score for Dutch male college students (M = 36.1) obtained by van 
der Ploeg et al. (1980), t(12) = 0.10, ns, t test between a sample and a population mean 
(Thomas & Nelson, 1996). The two female participants were less trait anxious compared to 
Dutch female college students (M = 37.7, the 95% confidence interval ranges from 36.5 to 
38.7, van der Ploeg et al., 1980). As in Experiment 1, the results indicated that the participants 
had no extraordinary predisposition to respond across many situations with high levels of 
state anxiety (e.g., Smith et al., 1998). 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on the same climbing wall as in Experiment 1 in a low and high 
condition. Again, two identical, horizontal routes (traverses) were mounted on the wall, each 
consisting of five footholds and six handholds (see Figure 3.1). We removed the additional 
holds (Holds 12 and 13) used in Experiment 1, as including them did not provide additional 
information with respect to participants’ movement behaviour. Due to the equipment needed 
to register the contact time between a hand and a hold and between a foot and a hold (see 
below) it was necessary to slightly change the positions of the holds. The mean height of the 
five footholds of the low traverse was 0.3 m (low condition); the mean height of the five 
footholds of the high traverse was 4.9 m (high condition). To enable participants to begin the 
climb on the wall in the same physical condition as in the low traverse, again the movable 
platform was used. The platform was positioned at a distance from the wall calculated as 1.5 
times the length from a participant’s arm. Tests prior to the experiment established that if 
participants fell while climbing the high traverse, this was a distance at which they were at no 
risk of striking the platform. Therefore, it was not necessary to replace the platform, and 
participants could start climbing when they were ready. Participants in the high condition 
were assisted in crossing over this platform prior to climbing, and they were held by one of 
the experimenters until they indicated that they were ready to start. In the low condition this 
situation was simulated by asking participants to begin from behind a line marked clearly on 
the floor. The line was positioned at the same distance from the wall as the platform in the 
high condition. In the low condition it was not considered necessary to support the 
participants. Instead, an experimenter stood behind them and indicated that they should begin 
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when they were ready. 
Each hold on the climbing wall was equipped with on/off switches (see Figure 3.2).
Vertical pressure from the climber’s foot activated the switch (threshold 2-5 N). The 
handholds could be activated in the vertical as well as horizontal direction. Pressure from the 
participant’s foot or hand activated a signal to the personal computer. Releasing pressure from
the hold resulted in deactivating the switch. This equipment made it possible to determine the
time of hand-hold contact and the time of foot-hold contact and, hence, the time participants 
moved from one hold to the other, as well as the total climbing time, with an accuracy of 1-5 
ms (see also later under Dependent Variables). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Model of (hand)hold-time registration mechanism. All holds on the climbing wall 
were equipped with such a time registration mechanism. The hold was connected with a bar
that went through the climbing wall (see right panel). Pressure from participant’s hand or
foot activated one of the switches, causing a signal to the computer. The handholds could be 
activated in the vertical as well as horizontal direction (see left panel), the footholds only in
vertical direction. Releasing pressure from the hold resulted in deactivating the switch. 
As in Experiment 1 participants wore well-fitting climbing shoes and an integral harness 
connected to a climbing rope. The same security procedure as that in Experiment 1 was used.
The wall was screened from public view by black plastic sheeting. At the top, the sheeting
was connected to the movable platform and extended outward and downward to the floor in
the shape of a tent, approximately 3 m from the wall. All climbs were videotaped using an S-
VHS camcorder (sampling rate of 50 Hz). In the low condition, the camcorder was in a fixed
position behind and above the climber. The fixed position monitored all the hand- and 
footholds. Participants’ hand and foot movements were clearly visible. In the high condition,
an experimenter standing on the elevated platform held the camcorder and moved with 
participants to record participants’ movements. State and trait anxiety and heart rate were
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measured in the same way as in Experiment 1. 
Task Execution 
As in Experiment 1 participants were asked to climb as fast yet as safe as possible but it was 
stressed that participant’s first goal was to complete the climbing task without falling. They 
were told that a fall would immediately end the experiment. During the experiment, none of 
the participants fell. In case of a fall, the trial would neither be completed nor re-run, but the 
participant would be excluded from the experiment and experimental analyses. When 
participants make a fall, they experience that they run no risk. Consequently, climbing the 
high traverse once more would be experienced as much less anxiety provoking. One 
participant almost fell during the fourth traverse in the high condition but could recover 
without support from the safety rope and complete the task. Two participants once slipped off 
a foothold with one foot, both in the low condition. 
Procedure 
Before the day of the experiment, all participants completed the STAI A-Trait inventory in the 
presence of one of the experimenters. Participants were tested individually on the next day. 
Their total involvement in the experiment was approximately two hours. The entire procedure 
was explained to each participant. Participants were then asked to read and sign a statement of 
informed consent. Participants were not informed that climbing time was one of the variables 
being measured. 
After changing into sport clothing, each participant was fitted with climbing shoes and 
given the opportunity to practise on the wall. As debriefing sessions in Experiment 1 made 
clear that the videotaped climbing example was not very helpful in task execution we only 
gave verbal instructions in Experiment 2. When necessary general, non-technical instructions 
were given to participants, for example ‘use your legs’ to prevent them becoming too tired 
and not being able to complete the climbing task. No specific instructions were given on how 
to climb faster or to execute movements. Practice periods lasted from 5 to 10 minutes and 
stopped when participants were able to successfully complete the traverse on the wall four 
times without a pause (see also below). This opportunity to practise prior to the experiment 
was given to all participants. It allowed the experimenters to be confident that a participant’s 
failure to complete the task in either condition would not be due to lack of experience with the 
task. 
Following the practice period, the Sporttester was placed. The watch indicating the 
recorded number of beats was attached to the belt behind participants’ back to prevent it from 
being read by the participant. Participants were then taken outside the screened off area and 
allowed 30 minutes to fully recuperate. 
Approximately 10 minutes before each condition (high and low conditions were 
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counterbalanced), participants were brought back to the wall and seated, either on the 
platform or the floor, depending on condition. Two minutes before the climb participants were 
asked to indicate how anxious they were at that moment by completing the anxiety 
thermometer (to familiarize them with the thermometer). Then, participants were led to the 
wall and connected to the rope. The Sporttester was switched on, and participants were 
instructed to begin when ready. The computer began recording when participants had both 
hands and both feet on the wall (right hand on Hold 1, left hand on Hold 2, right foot on Hold 
7, and left foot on Hold 8, see Figure 3.1). This was the starting position. Time was stopped 
when participants had resumed the starting position after participants had climbed the traverse 
four times—that is, starting at the right side of the wall the participants climbed to the left side 
(first traverse), then returned to the right side (second traverse), again to the left side (third 
traverse), and again back to the right side of the wall (fourth traverse). 
Immediately after each condition, participants were asked to recall how anxious they had 
felt during climbing and to record this on the anxiety thermometer scale. This was used as 
anxiety score for that condition. 
Participants were allowed a recuperation period of between 30 and 40 minutes before 
starting the second condition. During this period, they were brought outside the screened area 
and offered refreshments. They were not encouraged to talk about the climb. If participants 
mentioned the experience, one of experimenters would respond in a general way to the remark 
and then endeavour to change the subject. No information about the recordings that were 
taken was given to the participants. If they asked questions, they were told that on completion 
of the experiment all questions would be fully answered. The second condition was executed 
in a similar fashion as the first, but now participants climbed in the other condition (low if 
they had started high, high if they had started low). 
Dependent variables 
The equipment used in this experiment made it possible to determine with great accuracy a 
number of dependent variables. To visualize the movement patterns of each participant, all the 
participant’s climbing movements were coded on a sheet (for an example, see Figure 3.3). 
This made it easier to determine the number of movements, when a particular movement 
started and ended, how long a hold was grasped, and so on. 
First, to make a direct comparison with the results of Experiment 1 possible, the dependent 
variables climbing time (and two dependent variables related to climbing time, namely 
traverse time and rest between traverses), number of explorative movements, and number 
performatory of movements were determined. 
 
1. Climbing time was defined as the time needed to climb the traverse four times. Time 
started as soon as participants had left the starting position and stopped as soon as participants 
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had resumed the starting position after climbing the traverse four times. 
2. Traverse time was defined as the time needed to climb one traverse—that is, for the first 
and third traverse the period between releasing one of the Holds 1, 2, 7, or 8 (starting 
position) and making contact with Hold 6 (left hand), Hold 5 (right hand), Hold 11 (left foot), 
and Hold 10 (right foot; end position; see Figure 3.1). The time to climb the second and fourth 
traverse was defined as the period between releasing one of the Holds 5, 6, 10, or 11 and 
returning to the starting position at the right side of the wall. 
3. Rest between traverses was defined as the duration of the breaks between traverses: thus, 
from reaching the starting position or end position until initiation of the first movement away 
from that position. 
4. Number of explorative movements and number of performatory movements (see 
Experiment 1 for a definition of these variables). The time constraint for an exploratory 
movement was that it had to last at least 500 ms—that is, the hold from where it started had to 
be released minimally 500 ms before the hand or foot returned to this hold again (with or 
without touching another hold). Otherwise it was not considered an exploratory movement. 
 
Second, we calculated the total contact times with the holds (total contact time) as well as 
those for feet and hands separately (total contact time feet and total contact time hands, 
respectively). In the first instance, this was done irrespective of movement pattern (i.e., which 
holds were used and in which sequence), which could, of course, have been different in the 
high and low conditions. Total contact time was defined as the sum of all contact times of all 
holds for each participant (thus, total contact time feet + total contact time hands). 
Third, we determined the average movement times from hold to hold (average movement 
time) both for the feet (average movement time feet) and the hands (average movement time 
hands); again this was done irrespective of movement pattern. 
Fourth, we analysed contact time and movement time of a selected number of (sequences 
of) movements that were similar in the low and high condition, hereby correcting for possible 
differences in movement patterns that may have played a role in the other analyses. 
Statistical analysis 
As in Experiment 1 several paired t tests were executed. When necessary, two-factor repeated 
measures ANOVAs were used. Eta squared (η2) assessed the explained variance in the 
ANOVA models. Pair-wise comparisons using t tests were made using the Bonferroni 
correction procedure (Kinnear & Gray, 2000) to identify specific mean differences when a 
significant main effect was found. The p values that are reported on the basis of this 
Bonferroni method are scaled to the .05 alpha level, so that, as usual, p values smaller than .05 
indicate a significant effect. 
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Figure 3.3. Typical example of how the route was climbed. Shown here is the second traverse 
(low condition). The black squares indicate the positions of the holds. The times the movement 
started and stopped are indicated above or below the arrow (left: time the movement started, 
in ms; right: time the movement ended, in ms). The question mark at the end of Movement 9 
(left hand) indicates that it was not possible to determine the time Movement 9 ended because 
Hold 2 was already activated by the right hand (Movement 6). Likewise, it was not possible to 
determine the start of Movement 10 (also indicated by a question mark) because the left hand 
still activated Hold 2. 
Results 
Anxiety scores and heart rate 
Participants reported significantly higher anxiety scores in the high condition (M = 6.5, SD = 
2.38) than in the low condition (M = 3.4, SD = 1.96), t(14) = 5.24, p < .001, ESw = 1.60. The 
mean heart rate appeared to be higher in the high condition (M = 145.9 bpm, SD = 19.30) than 
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in the low condition (M = 126.3 bpm, SD = 18.37), t(13) = 4.01, p < .001, ESw = 1.07. (Due to 
a technical problem one of heart rate measurements was missing.) 
The results indicated that the anxiety manipulation was again successful: In the high 
co
ning climbing time, traverse time, rest between traverses, 
s of the variable rest between traverses produced no significant effect, t(14) = 
0.4
in the high condition than in 
the
ndition state anxiety was higher than in the low condition. 
Climbing time, traverse time, rest between traverses, 
number of explorative movements, and number of 
performatory movements 
An overview of the results concer
number of explorative movements, and number of performatory movements (hand and foot 
movements) is presented in Table 3.2. As in Experiment 1 and our previous study (Pijpers et 
al., 2003; see also Chapter 2), the climbing time in the high condition was significantly longer 
(about 22%) than in the low condition, t(14) = 4.59, p < .001, ESw = 1.17. A 2 (height: low 
condition, high condition) × 4 (traverse: Traverse 1-4) repeated measures ANOVA on the 
traverse time data also revealed a significant main effect of height, F(1, 14) = 26.00, p < .001, 
η2 = .65, confirming that the average traverse time was longer in the high condition than in the 
low condition. The main effect of traverse did not reach the 5%, but the 10%, significance 
level, F(3, 43) = 2.39, p < .10, η2 = .15. Participants tended to climb faster in the fourth 
traverse (M = 14.77 s, SD = 2.907) than in the first traverse (M = 16.43 s, SD = 3.759), second 
traverse (M = 16.48 s, SD = 2.820), and third traverse (M = 16.54 s, SD = 2.360). The 
Bonferroni t tests for making comparisons among the means of the traverse time data showed 
that participants climbed the fourth traverse significantly faster than the second traverse (p < 
.05). The interaction between height and traverse was not statistically significant, F(3, 42) = 
0.74, p = .54. 
The analysi
4, p =.33, hence the breaks between traverses did not contribute to the longer climbing 
times in the high condition. As in Experiment 1 the number of explorative movements was 
significantly higher in the high condition than in the low condition, t(14) = 1.87, p < .05, ESw 
= 0.66. Also, in line with the results of Experiment 1, the number of performatory movements 
was not significantly different in the low and high condition, t(14) = 0.86, p = .20. 
Investigating foot and hand movements separately, it appeared that more foot movements 
were made in the high condition than in the low condition, though the difference was not 
significant, t(14) = 1.75, p < .10, ESw = 0.36. The number of hand movements was not 
significantly different between conditions, t(14) = 0.92, p = .19. 
To summarize, again climbing time was considerably longer 
 low condition, which can partly be explained by more explorative movements and perhaps 
more foot movements. Participants did not take more rest between traverses, and the total 
number of performatory movements was not significantly different in both conditions. 
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Table 3.2. Climbing timea, traverse timea, rest between traversesa, number of expl
movements, number of performatory movements, number of foot movements, and number of 
orative 
hand movements for the conditions in Experiment 2. 
 Condition 
 Low anxiety  High anxiety 
Variable M M SDSD
Climbing time 1.9 76.09 62.13 1 87 11.032
  
Traverse time 
Traverse 2 14.16 
14.77
3.649 
3.282
18.81
18.32
3.541 
3.428
 
Rest between traverses 
 
umber of explorative movements 1.2 1.21 2.0 1.60
umber of performatory movements 
Hand movements 
49.6 
2
27.7
6.14 
3.58
50.3
2
27.3
4.11 
2.94
Traverse 1 
Traverse 3 
Traverse 4 
 
15.11 
 
13.30
 
3.603 
 
3.530
 
17.75 
 
 
16.23 
 
5.100 
 
3.320
 
4.81 1.374 4.98 2.017
 
N  
  
N
Foot movements 1.9 3.16 
 
3.0 
 
2.36 
aIn s. 
Contact times and movement times (irrespective of movement pattern) 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the time hands and feet made contact with the holds—that is, 
s 845 
ms
                                                
total contact time, total contact time feet, and total contact time hands irrespective of 
movement pattern (i.e., which holds were used and in which sequence). The total contact time 
in the high condition was significantly longer than in the low condition, t(14) = 5.40, p < .001, 
ESw = 1.23. In addition, total contact time feet, as well as total contact time hands, was 
significantly longer in the high condition than in the low condition, t(14) = 5.85, p < .001, ESw 
= 1.33, and t(14) = 4.86, p < .001, ESw = 1.13, respectively. Thus, participants made contact 
with the holds longer, both with their hands and with their feet when they were anxious. 
Overall, participants also moved slower from hold to hold in the high condition than in the 
low condition.3 The average movement time from hold to hold in the high condition wa
, which was significantly longer than the average movement time of 739 ms in the low 
condition, t(10) = 2.89, p < .05, ESw = 1.11. Again, these slower movements occurred both 
with feet and hands. The average movement time for feet was significantly longer in the high 
condition than in the low condition, t(10) = 2.27, p < .05, ESw = 0.82. The difference in 
average movement time for hands was not significant between high and low conditions, t(10) 
 
3 Movement time cannot be calculated if two feet or two hands touched the same hold at the same 
time. If this was the case switches remained activated when one of the hands or feet moved away, 
making it impossible to discriminate different movements. A total of 4 participants were not included 
in the movement time analyses as they touched a hold twice at the same time so often that not enough 
data were available to calculate average movement times. 
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= 1.80, p < .10, ESw = 0.76. 
To reiterate, in the high condition participants grasped the holds longer and they moved 
slower from hold to hold than in the low condition. Both longer contact times and slower 
mo
ditions in 
vements contributed to the longer climbing times in the high-anxiety condition. 
Table 3.3. Total contact timesa, and average movement timesb for the con
Experiment 2. 
 Condition 
 Low anxiety  High anxiety 
Variable M M SDSD
Total contact time 4 35.8187 1.7 239 
Total con
Total cont
tact time feet 25.2 18.7
act time hands 2 1 1
 time 1
8 1 1 2
ands 5 7 1
93 119 
95 2.0 19 7.5
Average movement 739 95.4 845 30.8
Average movement time feet 95 56.6 023 23.2
Average movement time h 43 4.01 599 22.4
Note: Movement patterns are
a
 not taken into account. 
Average movement times (for similar movements) 
ment patterns may lead to 
                                                
In s. 
bIn ms. 
In principle, the above-mentioned differences could have been due to differences in 
movement pattern that were not taken into account. Different move
different contact and movement times. Although averaged over all participants the number of 
performatory movements made did not significantly differ between the two conditions, there 
were large individual differences in climbing the low and high route. It might well be that the 
total contact times and the average movement times were the result of the use of different 
holds and different movement patterns rather than longer holding and slower movements. To 
correct movement times with respect to these possible movement pattern differences, we 
selected parts of traverses that were climbed in a similar way in both conditions.4 This 
allowed us to calculate the average movement time for feet and the average movement time 
for hands. Eventually, 196 pairs of similar movements in the low and high condition (107 foot 
movement pairs and 89 hand movement pairs) could be analysed (about 26% of the total 
number of movements, cf. Table 3.2). 
 
4 We also executed analyses with 28 whole traverses that were climbed high and low using similar 
movement patterns. As the configuration of the handholds did not enable participants to climb the 
traverse without using one of the handholds with two hands at the same time (making it often 
impossible to distinguish different hand movements), we had to restrict these analyses to the 
movements of the feet. Results were similar to the results of the analyses that did not take into account 
movement pattern. That is, in the high condition participants stood longer on the holds, and they 
moved significantly slower from hold to hold than in the low condition. As a result climbing time was 
significantly longer in the high condition than in the low condition. 
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It appeared that participants’ foot movements from hold to hold were significantly slower 
in the high condition (M = 964 ms, SD = 485.9) than were similar foot movements in the low 
co
xperiment 2 was to provide more insight into how motor performance 
ction of anxiety. We focused specifically on the temporal aspects of 
times and more exploratory movements. In addition, it appeared 
tha
udy was to examine anxiety-related changes in participants’ 
sight into the mechanisms through which anxiety may affect 
ndition (M = 847 ms, SD = 442.3), t(106) = 2.55, p < .05, ESw = 0.26. In addition, it 
appeared that the average movement time for hands was significantly longer in the high 
condition (M = 596 ms, SD = 297.0) than in the low condition (M = 529 ms, SD = 194.6), 
t(88) = 2.42, p < .05, ESw = 0.34. Thus, also when the movements were similar in both 
conditions, movement time of foot as well as hand movements appeared to be significantly 
longer in the high-anxiety condition than in the low-anxiety condition. 
Discussion 
The purpose of E
changes as a fun
movements. The results showed that anxiety was successfully induced. Self-report scores 
indicated that participants felt more anxious in the high condition than in the low condition. 
Compared to Experiment 1 participants reported substantially higher anxiety scores, 
indicating that our change in the procedure between experiments (from climbing twice in each 
condition to climbing once in each condition) was successful. Again, heart rate appeared to be 
higher high on the wall than low on the wall, which might self-evidently also be a reflection 
of the longer climbing times. 
As in Experiment 1, the higher self-report scores and the higher mean heart rate went hand 
in hand with longer climbing 
t participants also grasped holds longer, and on the whole they moved slower from hold to 
hold. These findings can largely explain the longer climbing times found under anxiety-
provoking conditions and are in agreement with Masters’ (1992) conscious processing 
hypothesis. In the General Discussion we will elaborate on this issue. 
General Discussion 
The main aim of the present st
movement behaviour to gain in
performance in various settings such as sports (e.g., serving for match point in tennis), dance 
(e.g., auditioning for ballet school or performing), musical performance (e.g., making one’s 
first appearance in a renowned orchestra), police work (e.g., shooting in the line of duty), 
work of fire fighters (e.g., rescuing people from the fire), and armed forces (e.g., flying a jet 
plane in war time). We set out from Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis that 
under pressure one may resort to renewed conscious control of movements that would 
normally be executed automatically. In keeping with this hypothesis we expected that the 
changes in movement control would be reflected in movement behaviour as was also already 
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found by Pijpers et al. (2003)—that is, longer climbing times in the high-anxiety than in the 
low-anxiety condition. In search for an explanation for these longer climbing times, we 
extended the investigation of the effects of anxiety on movement behaviour to (number of) 
limb movements and their temporal patterning. 
Although the findings are in line with the hypotheses (see below), three alternative 
explanations need to be considered first. Next to differences in anxiety there are three other 
fac
ent participants from habituating to the high-
 only have participants practise the low traverse. In principle, this 
 in the high condition 
wi
tors that may vary across conditions: the fact that participants practised low only, the 
difference in peripheral vision between conditions, and possible differences in task 
interpretation between conditions. 
Practising low only 
To guarantee a difference in anxiety and to prev
anxiety condition we could
could have given participants an advantage in this condition, leading to more efficient 
behaviour low on the wall and explaining the differences between conditions. However, we 
consider this option unlikely on the basis of two accounts. First, considering the principles of 
transfer of learning (e.g., Adams, 1987; Magill, 1998; Newell, 1981, 1985), there is no reason 
to believe that there was no positive transfer of practising the task low on the wall to 
performing the task high on the wall. The tasks in the low and high condition show large 
resemblances, making positive transfer very likely (see Magill, 1998). 
Second, to find out whether the results could have followed from practising low only, we 
compared (for Experiment 2) climbing time of the last two traverses
th those of the first two traverses in the low condition. Thus, we compared two traverses in 
the high condition that were executed after the first two high traverses (which could be 
considered as high ‘practice’), with the first two low traverses that were executed after the 
low-practice trials. This was done irrespective of the order of conditions (high-low, or low-
high). There was a significant effect of condition, with the high climbing times being longer 
than the low climbing times, t(14) = 3.90, p < .001, ESw = 0.79, even though there was a 
general tendency that the fourth traverse was climbed fastest (see Results of Experiment 2). 
As a final test we compared, for those who climbed low first and then high, climbing time of 
the first two low traverses (preceded by the low practice trials only) with the last two high 
traverses (preceded by the low practice trials, the low condition—four traverses—and the first 
two high traverses). One would expect that on these last two traverses at least a similar 
advantage of experience with the task would have been present. Again, climbing times were 
significantly longer in the high than in the low condition, t(7) = 2.03, p < .05, ESw = 0.64. 
Thus, even after some high practice the difference in movement execution between conditions 
remains, making it unlikely that practising the low traverse only was responsible for the more 
efficient performance in the low condition than in the high condition. 
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Difference in peripheral vision 
There is also a difference in the peripheral field of view in the low and high conditions, which 
might be responsible for the differences found in movement behaviour. But it is important to 
realize that this is part and parcel of our anxiety manipulation. The evoked anxiety in the high 
condition may partly follow from the modified peripheral vision. It is unclear how the 
changed peripheral vision itself would change task execution, especially since participants 
moved very close to the wall. As it is unlikely that peripheral vision outside the traverse 
contributes to the control of the climbing movements, it is also unlikely that the change in 
peripheral vision itself would explain the changes in movement behaviour. 
Task interpretation 
Another option is that participants may have approached the two traverses, high and low, 
differently, perhaps leading to different strategies in climbing and consequently to differences 
in behaviour. To exclude this possibility, the 11 participants of whom a complete dataset was 
available (see also Footnote 3) were divided in two ‘anxiety’ groups on the basis of their 
anxiety thermometer scores when climbing the high traverse: a ‘lower anxious’ group (M = 
5.0, SD = 1.53, n = 5) and a ‘higher anxious’ group (M = 7.7, SD = 0.86, n = 6), t(9) = 3.58, p 
< .05. If the high-low differences are attributable to anxiety, movement behaviour of the 
lower anxious group should be different from the movement behaviour of the higher anxious 
group when climbing high. If, however, high-low differences are due to strategic differences, 
no differences in movement behaviour are to be expected as all participants in this 
comparison received the same instruction and climbed in the same environment—that is, high 
on the wall. We did find significant differences between these two groups on most of the 
relevant variables: climbing time, traverse time, rest between traverses, number of 
performatory hand movements, total contact time, total contact time feet, and total contact 
time hand, ts > 1.90, ps < .05. It is difficult to interpret these differences as following from 
different task interpretations as the task and task environment were now identical for all 
participants in this comparison. 
The factor that remains as explanation for the differences found in movement behaviour is 
anxiety. It appeared that the longer climbing time in the high condition could be explained for 
a small part by an increase in the number of explorative movements, an indication of the 
uncertain (hesitant) movement behaviour that also characterizes the early learner. In 
Experiment 2 we also found that in the high-anxiety condition participants not only grasped 
the holds longer, but they also made slower movements from hold to hold, again changes in 
movement behaviour that may also be found when there is more conscious processing, due to 
an inward focus of attention to the step-by-step control of skill execution. Thus, when 
participants were anxious their movement behaviour resembled the movement behaviour that 
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can also be found in earlier stages of learning (see also, Baumeister, 1984; Beilock, Carr, et 
shot in football or 
ands. Performers who are about to execute that kind of 
 controlled processing: They are likely to think about what they are 
’s (1992) processing efficiency theory. These results suggest 
tha
al., 2002; Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002; Liao & Masters, 2002; Hardy et al., 1996; Mullen 
& Hardy, 2000; Pijpers et al., 2003). This generally confirms Masters’ (1992) conscious 
processing hypothesis. All in all, together with other findings in the recent literature (e.g., 
Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Mullen & Hardy, 2000) the (indirect) empirical 
support for the conscious processing hypothesis seems quite substantial. 
The conscious processing hypothesis seems fit to explain the well-known and dreaded 
phenomenon of choking under pressure (Baumeister, 1984), especially when one is executing 
a concrete task—for example, in sports when one takes a decisive penalty 
putt in golf under high situational dem
tasks venture to reinvest in
doing and what they have to do. Hence, despite individual striving, performance decreases. 
Thus, the conscious processing hypothesis seems to provide a plausible explanation for the 
relation between anxiety and performance especially when it concerns the execution of 
concrete tasks that are clearly ‘defined from start to end’, and that are self-paced, such as golf 
putting (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002; Hardy et al., 1996; Mullen & 
Hardy, 2000). Eysenck and Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency theory (see Footnote 1) 
seems to be more concerned with effects of anxiety on performance throughout an extended 
pattern of activities (e.g., an entire match or season) when performers often appear to maintain 
performance through additional effort. 
Whether changes in movement behaviour actually result in a deterioration of performance 
may also (next to the task itself) depend on task instruction. It may be the case that using the 
same task but providing different instructions may lead to support for either the processing 
efficiency theory or the conscious processing hypothesis. For instance, when participants were 
forced to climb traverses in a fixed preset time of 20 s (Pijpers et al., 2003, Experiment 1; see 
Chapter 2) it was found that anxiety went hand in hand with a maintenance of performance as 
well as with more muscle tension and a higher blood lactate concentration as would be 
predicted by Eysenck and Calvo
t with additional efforts participants were able to climb the high traverse in the same time 
as they did the low traverse. 
Thus, task domain (concrete task or continued activity), task instruction, and hence 
intention (does one strive for a personal best or just to complete the task without falling), 
seem to be important mediators of the anxiety-performance relationship. To account for the 
wide range of possibilities of the influence of anxiety on different aspects of performance in 
the fields of sports, dance, armed forces, and so on, it seems that the “best explanation 
currently available may be a combination of processing efficiency theory and the conscious 
processing hypothesis” (Edwards, Kingston, Hardy, & Gould, 2002, p. 14). Both process-
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oriented accounts of the anxiety-performance relationship may serve as a guide for future 
research to gain a better understanding of the multifaceted interaction between anxiety and 
performance. 
As for the practical implications a crucial question is how choking under pressure can be 
prevented. When a skilled performer is in a high-achievement setting it seems important to 
prevent the inward focus of attention and the accompanying attempts towards conscious step-
by
ar to be more effective than instructions that direct 
pe
s, placing (small) bets on performance, or practice contests, as 
lon
-step control of movement execution. While this is easier said than done, this may be 
feasible by applying sport psychological training techniques (Le Scanff & Taugis, 2002; 
Morris, 1997; Wann, 1997). In the long run it may be better for teachers and instructors to 
organize the learning environment of perceptual-motor skills in such a way that eventually 
performance is less susceptible to the phenomenon of choking under pressure. This idea is 
supported by research into the paradigm of implicit versus explicit learning of perceptual-
motor tasks (Hardy et al., 1996; Masters, 1992, 2000; Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2000; Wulf 
& Weigelt, 1997), which has demonstrated that preventing the development of explicit 
knowledge about task execution during the learning process may make performance less 
vulnerable to choking. This suggestion is corroborated by the studies into analogy learning in 
which only one explicit rule, rather than a large number of rules, guides the learning of the 
skill (Liao & Masters, 2001; Masters, 2000). Second, instructions that direct the learners’ 
attention to the effects of their movements on the environment (external focus) and, thus, 
away from movement execution, appe
rformers’ attention to their own movements and how to execute them (internal focus; Wulf, 
Höß, & Prinz, 1998; Wulf, McNevin, Fuchs, Ritter, & Toole, 2000; Wulf & Weigelt, 1997; 
for an overview, see Wulf & Prinz, 2001). Finally, next to the different ways of learning a 
skill (implicit vs. explicit, internal vs. external attention) the conditions in which learning took 
place appear to be crucial as well. Several studies show that when perceptual-motor skills are 
learned under conditions inducing self-awareness (Lewis & Linder, 1997), or self-
consciousness (Beilock & Carr, 2001), choking is inoculated. Thus, getting used to the 
pressure may prevent choking, which provides an argument for simulating pressure-filled 
learning and training environments, which can easily be accomplished with the presence of a 
camera or (expert) spectator
g as the stakes and, hence, self-consciousness and pressure, are increased. 
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The role of anxiety 
in perceiving and realizing affordances 
 
Chapter 4 
Abstract 
Three experiments were conducted to examine the role of anxiety in perceiving and 
realizing affordances in wall climbing. Identical traverses were situated high and 
low on a climbing wall to manipulate anxiety. In Experiment 1 participants judged 
their maximal overhead reachability and performed maximal reaches on the 
climbing wall. Anxiety was found to reduce both perceived and actual maximal 
reaching height. In Experiment 2 participants climbed from right to left and back 
again on the high and low traverses, which now entailed an abundance of holds. 
Consistent with the reduction of perceived and actual maximal reaching height 
found in Experiment 1, anxiety led to the use of more holds. Finally, in Experiment 
3 points of light were sequentially projected around the participants while they 
were climbing to measure attention. As participants detected less lights in the high-
anxiety condition, it was concluded that anxiety narrowed attention. In general, the 
results underscored that the actor’s emotional state plays an important role in 
perceiving and realizing affordances and that the perception of affordances 
changes as the accompanying action capabilities change. 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
Based on: Pijpers, J. R., Oudejans, R. R. D., Bakker, F. C., & Beek, P. J. (in 
press). The role of anxiety in perceiving and realizing affordances. Ecological 
Psychology. 
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Introduction 
When anxious, it is often difficult—quite literally—to keep things in perspective, as is 
illustrated by anecdotal evidence. In an attempt to conquer K2 (Karakorum Peak No. 2, 8616 
metres high, Pakistan), mountaineer Ronald Naar was faced with a small wall of ice. Usually, 
he would not have had any difficulty overcoming such an obstacle, but on this particular 
occasion—according to his auto report—he suddenly froze with fear and the ice wall seemed 
to him more problematical to surmount than the most horrifying key passages he had seen and 
conquered in his long career as a climber (Naar, 1996). Apparently, anxiety prevented Naar 
from detecting the relevant information and finding the correct solution to the motor problem 
confronted. Thus, anxiety may affect perception and, hence, the selection of actions. 
The anxiety-performance relationship has been studied extensively and is one of the most 
widely investigated and debated areas in sport psychology (e.g., Woodman & Hardy, 2001).1 
A number of models have been put forward to describe and explain the relationship between 
anxiety and performance, such as the inverted-U hypothesis (e.g., Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; 
Woodman & Hardy, 2001), the drive theory of Hull and Spence (Hull, 1943; Spence & 
Spence, 1966), Apter’s reversal theory (Apter, 1982; Kerr, 1997), Hanin’s individualized zone 
of optimal functioning (IZOF) hypothesis (e.g., Hanin, 2000), the multidimensional models 
(Martens et al., 1990), and the cusp catastrophe model (Hardy, 1990, 1996). It is beyond the 
scope of the current study to describe these models. Moreover, several excellent overviews of 
theories on anxiety and performance are available in the literature (e.g., Cox, 2002; Gould, 
Greenleaf, & Krane, 2002; Janelle, 2002; Jones, 1995; Landers & Boutcher, 1998; Raglin & 
Hanin, 2000; Weinberg, 1990; Woodman & Hardy, 2001). 
Most important for now is that, despite the evolution of these models, the mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between anxiety and performance are still poorly understood (e.g., 
Janelle, 2002; Mullen, Hardy, & Tattersall, 2005), as theorizing in anxiety research remains 
troubled by the absence of consistent experimental findings regarding the effect of anxiety on 
human motor performance (Jones, 1995; Kleine, 1990). One of the reasons for this state of 
affairs is probably the prevalence of product-oriented approaches in pertinent research, which, 
by definition, ignore that the effect of anxiety on performance is mediated by a wide variety 
of processes (e.g., Collins, Jones, Fairweather, Doolan, & Priestley, 2001). To better 
understand this mediation, and thus to help disentangle the multifaceted relationship between 
anxiety and human motor performance, the present study adopts a more process-oriented 
approach. Ecological psychology offers a conceptual framework for pursuing the latter kind 
of approach in the domain of interest, and as such provides, at least in our view, an expedient 
                                                 
1 Anxiety is conceived as a multidimensional construct having a cognitive component (i.e., worry, 
apprehension), and a physiological arousal component (i.e., the physiological response to anxiety-
inducing situations) (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990). 
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and promising theoretical framework for studying the influence of the actor’s state variables 
such as anxiety, fatigue, and anger on perception and action, even though, admittedly, 
attempts in this direction have been few and far. 
In ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979), perception is viewed as the active pick-up of 
information specifying ‘affordances’, that is, the behavioural possibilities offered by the 
environment (also called ‘action possibilities’ or ‘behavioral potential’ [Bhalla & Proffitt, 
1999; Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midget, 1995]). The theory of affordances provides a 
conceptual framework for understanding the interactions between ‘actors’ (humans and other 
animals) and their environment. It is founded on the premise that the environment is perceived 
in action-relevant terms, that is, in terms of what the actor can do with and in the 
environment. If the environment affords a particular action for a particular actor (human or 
animal), then that actor possesses certain properties that allow that particular action to take 
place in the environment. In ecological psychology, the latter properties are sometimes 
referred to as ‘effectivities’ (Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 1982; Turvey, 1992; Turvey & Shaw, 
1979). In that account, affordances and effectivities are seen as complementary dispositional 
properties, both of which are necessary conditions for the actor-environment system to exhibit 
an action (Turvey, 1992).2
If an actor is perceiving affordances while being engaged in a particular activity, he or she 
must be capable of perceiving the relation between environmental properties and the 
properties of his or her own action system. By implication, actions are ‘body-scaled’ (e.g., 
Warren, 1984, 1988). For example, to successfully reach for objects, people must scale the 
distance of the object in terms of their effective reach actions, which are constrained by 
geometric measures (e.g., arm length, leg length; see, e.g., Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel, 
Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Mark, 1987; Mark et al., 1997; Warren, 1984, 1988). Initial 
research on affordances was focused on these ‘invariable’ intrinsic anthropometric body 
measures such as leg length (Warren, 1984), or arm length (Carello et al., 1989). Konczak, 
Meeuwsen, and Cress (1992) emphasized that action capabilities are not exclusively defined 
by anthropometrics, but that most perceptual-motor tasks are also subject to additional 
biomechanical constraints such as strength, limb mobility, and joint flexibility. They 
demonstrated that the perception of affordances (judgment of climbability of stairs) needs to 
                                                 
2 In ecological psychology there is an ongoing debate about the concepts of affordances and 
effectivities (e.g., Chemero, 2003; Heft, 2003; Michaels, 2003; Stoffregen, 2000, 2003). For instance, 
Stoffregen (2003) argued that affordances should be defined as emergent properties at the level of the 
animal-environment system rather than as properties of the environment that require complementary 
properties of the animal, that is, effectivities. In this respect Stoffregen’s definition of affordances 
differs qualitatively from that of Turvey (1992). However, irrespective of one’s position in this 
discussion, it is important to identify and understand how properties of the animal-environment system 
constitute opportunities for action including the role of the actor’s emotional state in perceiving and 
realizing affordances. 
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be related to observers’ action capabilities, or, in Turvey’s (1992) terminology, effectivities 
(see also Cesari, Formenti, & Olivato, 2003; Choi & Mark, 2004; Oudejans, Michaels, 
Bakker, & Dolné, 1996; Oudejans, Michaels, van Dort, & Frissen, 1996; Pepping & Li, 
2000). 
So far the role of the actor’s emotional state (i.e., anxiety or fatigue) in perceiving and 
realizing affordances has only been addressed in a few studies. Proffitt and Bhalla (Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1995) conducted a series of experiments showing a relation 
between an actor’s state and the perceived steepness of hills. They found that as hills are 
harder to traverse when participants are exhausted, wear a heavy backpack, or are older, they 
look steeper. It seems that the capacity to traverse a hill changes the perception of the 
steepness of the hill despite the fact that the actual steepness remains the same. Thus, there 
seems to be a functional adaptation of perception of action possibilities to the actual action 
capabilities. 
Pijpers, Oudejans, and Bakker (in press; see also Chapter 5) confirmed such a relationship 
for overhead reachability, which they found to change as a function of exertion. On a 
climbing wall, participants repeatedly climbed series of trials resulting in increased levels of 
exertion. Before and during climbing participants judged their maximum reaching height, as 
well as perceived exertion. On a separate day, participants again climbed a number of trials 
while performing actual maximum reaches. Perceived maximal reaching height appeared to 
follow changes in action capabilities: When there were no changes in action capabilities—that 
is, no changes in actual maximal reaching height—no changes in perceived maximal reaching 
height occurred. Only when the actual maximal reaching height changed, this was reflected in 
perceptual changes. 
As far as we know, there is only one previous study that investigated the effects of anxiety 
on the perception of affordances. Bootsma, Bakker, van Snippenberg, and Tdlohreg (1992) 
asked participants to judge whether balls that passed laterally at varying distances were 
reachable. They found that anxiety did not influence the average judgment of maximum 
reachable distance. However, Bootsma et al. did not examine whether anxiety had an effect on 
the actual maximum reaching distance. The selected affordance scaled with a physical 
characteristic (i.e., maximum reach, mainly determined by arm length), and was thus assumed 
not to be affected by the anxiety manipulation. However, as acknowledged by Bootsma et al., 
if an experimental manipulation directly affects the action capabilities of an observer, then a 
change in the perception of reachableness of approaching balls might be expected. 
Thus, it seems that as long as participants’ behavioural potential (i.e., actual action 
capabilities or effectivities) is not influenced by a state variable such as anxiety (or fatigue), 
one would expect that the perception of action possibilities is not influenced either. However, 
when a state variable does induce changes in a participant’s behavioural potential, one would 
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expect accompanying changes in the perception of the action possibility in question. The first 
goal of the present study was to examine the role of anxiety in perceiving and realizing 
affordances. By using a climbing wall we determined perceived and actual maximal overhead 
reaching height under different anxiety conditions, which were created by placing the same 
climbing routes high and low on the wall (cf. Pijpers, Oudejans, & Bakker, 2005; Pijpers, 
Oudejans, Holsheimer, & Bakker, 2003). Overhead reaching and adequately perceiving 
overhead reachability are important to the performance of daily actions (e.g., grasping an item 
from the highest shelf in the supermarket), as well as in sports in which, for instance, a ball 
has to be caught or hit. Adequately perceiving overhead reachability is also essential in the 
task investigated in the present study—sport climbing—where misperception may lead to 
falling. In Experiment 1, the effect of anxiety on perceived as well as actual maximal reaching 
height was investigated to determine whether changes in perceived maximal reaching height 
were accompanied by changes in actual maximal reaching height. In Experiment 2 we 
explored whether increased anxiety and the accompanying changes in perceived and actual 
maximal reaching height also affected participants’ selection of action possibilities on the 
climbing wall. Finally, in Experiment 3 we investigated the impact of anxiety on attentional 
processes on the climbing wall. 
Experiment 1 
We expected that at higher levels of anxiety the actual maximal reaching height would 
decrease for two reasons. First, changing an individual’s state (i.e., becoming more anxious) 
induces changes in movement execution such as higher muscle tension and jerkier, more 
rigid, and slower movements (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985; Collins et al., 2001; Mullen & 
Hardy, 2000; Pijpers et al., 2005; Weinberg, 1978). Second, reaching out as far as possible 
involves a chain of sub-movements such as stretching out the arm as far as possible, rotations 
in hips, back and shoulders, stretching the legs, and standing on tiptoe, implying that any 
effect of anxiety on these sub-movements, however small, will result in a culmination of 
errors along an entire biokinematic chain, which enhances the possibilities for establishing 
anxiety effects on an outcome measure such as actual maximal reaching height (cf. Parfitt, 
Jones, & Hardy, 1990; Weinberg, 1990). In view of the theoretical considerations offered in 
the preceding, we further expected that the predicted decreases in actual maximal reaching 
height would be accompanied by decreases in perceived maximal height. 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 12 female participants, mean age 23.0 years (SD = 1.21), volunteered to participate 
in the experiment. The participants, for the greater part university students, had no experience 
in climbing and were naive with regard to the purpose of the experiment. They all provided 
written informed consent. 
The Dutch version of the A-Trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)3 was 
used as a standard check to measure trait anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; 
van der Ploeg et al., 1979). The mean trait anxiety score for the participants was 30.8 (SD = 
6.28), and was significantly lower than the mean score for Dutch female college students (M 
= 37.7, SD = 8.4) obtained by van der Ploeg et al. (1980) on a t test between a sample and a 
population mean (Thomas & Nelson, 1996), t(11) = 3.83, p < .05. The results indicated that 
the participants had no extraordinary tendency to respond to situations perceived as 
threatening with an elevation in state anxiety (e.g., Martens, 1982; Smith, Smoll, & 
Wiechman, 1998). 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on a vertical climbing wall (width: 3.5 m, height: 7.0 m; see Figure 4.1), 
which was set up in a large experimental room. The wall consisted of nine laminate panels 
with a grey grainy texture for friction. Holds could be bolted anywhere on the wall at relative 
distances of 0.24 m in horizontal direction, and 0.17 m in vertical direction. On the wall, two 
identical horizontal routes (so-called ‘traverses’, designed by a professional route designer) 
were mounted (see Figure 4.1). Each traverse consisted of six footholds and six handholds of 
varying size and shape, which were all suitable for novice climbers. The mean height of Holds 
3 and 4 (see Figure 4.1) of the low traverse (low condition) and high traverse (high condition) 
were 0.30 m and 3.60 m, respectively. (Participants were standing on these holds when 
judging maximal reachability; see Procedure.) 
                                                 
3 The STAI A-Trait scale is a self-report questionnaire that measures anxiety proneness—that is, 
the tendency to respond to situations perceived as thrilling with an elevation in state anxiety intensity. 
Scores range from a low of 20 to a high of 80 (van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 1979, 1980). 
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Figure 4.1. Front view of the layout of the climbing wall used in Experiment 1. Black squares
indicate the positions of the holds. The routes in the low and high condition are identical. The 
assessment hold (indicated by ▬ ) could be moved freely along the rail. Holds 1-4 indicate 
the position in which the perceptual judgements of maximum reaching height and actual
maximum reaches were made (see also text). 
One hold, the ‘assessment hold’ (the black rectangle, see Figure 4.1), was movable in vertical 
direction. This hold was used to estimate the upper limit that participants perceived they were 
able to reach (the dependent variable perceived maximum reaching height), and that 
participants could actually reach (the dependent variable actual maximal reaching height). 
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The assessment hold could be moved freely along a rail, which was placed between the 
laminate panels of the wall and extended the entire height of the climbing wall (see Figure 
4.1). The assessment hold was connected with ropes that could be used to pull the hold up or 
down. Reference points were removed by covering a part of the climbing wall (0.40 m on 
both sides of the rail) with black tape. (Post hoc interviews indicated that none of the 
participants made use of reference points when making their assessments.) A flexible tape 
measure was used to measure the distance between the assessment hold and Hold 4 (see 
Figure 4.1) after each assessment, in order to determine perceived and actual maximal 
reaching height. Hold 4 was chosen as it provided a ‘natural’ basis from which the 
investigated reaching action (perceived or actual) took place, especially since reaching was 
done with the left arm (see Procedure). 
To enable participants to make assessments in the high condition a large stepladder was 
used. The stepladder had a small platform that allowed participants to rest after having 
climbed it and to start the high traverse in the same physical (i.e., non-fatigued) condition as 
in the low traverse. 
The participants wore well-fitting climbing shoes (Enduro 954, La Sportiva). In both 
conditions participants wore a climbing harness (Singing Rock). We used the so-called ‘top-
roping’ technique to ensure the safety of the participants. Top–roping involves ‘paired’ 
climbing (Skinner & McMullen, 1993)—that is, one end of the rope was tied onto the 
participant’s harness, and the safety rope ran up around a solid iron bar at the top of the 
climbing wall, and back to the ground. This end of the safety rope ran through the belay 
device on the belayer’s harness. (The belayer is the person who is managing the safety rope 
and preventing and protecting participants from falling down if they lose grip on the wall.) If 
properly applied, using the top-roping technique reduces the risk of a considerable fall to zero. 
State anxiety was assessed by means of the ‘anxiety thermometer’ validated by Houtman 
and Bakker (1989). The anxiety thermometer is a 10-cm continuous scale on which 
participants were asked to rate their anxiety feelings at a particular moment in time, ranging 
from 0 (not anxious at all, the left end) to 10 (extremely anxious, the right end). Participants 
had to place a cross on the 10-cm scale to indicate how they felt at a particular moment. The 
distance between the left end and cross (in mm) was used as a measure of the reported 
anxiety. Consequently, the anxiety thermometer provided a quick method for measuring state-
anxiety in contrast to the often-used Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (Martens et al., 
1990; for a critical discussion of the CSAI-2, see Jones & Uphill [2004], and Woodman & 
Hardy [2001]), which would be unsuitable for our purposes (see also Pijpers et al., 2003). The 
validity and reproducibility of the anxiety thermometer are fair with correlation coefficients 
ranging between .60 and .78. Based on these data, the anxiety thermometer is deemed an 
appropriate instrument for measuring anxiety in a threatening real-life situation (Houtman & 
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Bakker, 1989). For each measurement, a separate anxiety thermometer was used. 
During the assessments of perceived maximal reaching height, we recorded heart rate 
values every 5 s using a Sporttester (Polar Electro-3000). Afterwards, mean heart rate was 
calculated per condition. All assessments were videotaped using an S-VHS camcorder 
(sampling rate 50 Hz), allowing us to check specific aspects of the experiment if such a need 
would arise. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually on a single day. Their total involvement in the 
experiment was approximately one hour. Participants were informed about the procedure of 
the experiment, and then asked to read and sign an informed consent statement. They 
completed the Dutch version of the STAI A-Trait scale (van der Ploeg et al., 1979) and filled 
out an anxiety thermometer in order to familiarize them with this measuring device. 
Participants were then briefed in detail about what was meant by maximal reaching 
whereupon they had to base their estimates of maximal reaching height. For the purposes of 
this study, the maximal reaching height was defined according to the following reaching 
action (for the numbering of the holds low on the wall, see Figure 4.1): Participants placed 
their left foot on Hold 4, right foot on Hold 3, right hand on Hold 1, and left hand on Hold 2, 
and imagined that they would stretch upwards as far as possible (keeping both feet on the 
holds; standing on tiptoe was allowed) using the left hand to grasp the assessment hold in 
such a way that it would be possible to hang on to it and to use it for climbing. Participants 
were not allowed to actually execute the reaching action. 
Each participant was fitted with climbing shoes and harness, as well as a Sporttester. Prior 
to making the assessment of the perceived maximal reaching height participants were given 
the opportunity to practice on the wall as brief hands-on experience with the task may yield 
perceptual information about climbing actions having a substantial impact on participants’ 
estimations of maximal reaching height (Pijpers et al., in press). 
Subsequently, participants were asked to take position on the wall. The assessment hold 
(see Figure 4.1) was either lowered from about 1.5 m above Hold 2 (descending assessment) 
or pulled up from about 1.5 m below Hold 2 (ascending assessment), during which the 
participants had to verbally indicate when the assessment hold would just be reachable in the 
prescribed manner. Participants could fine-tune their judgments by telling the experimenter to 
move the assessment hold either up or down until they were confident that the assessment 
hold was at the perceived maximal reaching height. Then, by means of the tape measure the 
distance was determined to the nearest millimetre; for accuracy reasons, we always read off 
the tape measure at eye level. The descending and ascending assessments were presented in 
alternating order. One trial consisted of one descending and one ascending assessment. 
Consistent with previous research on perceptual judgment tasks using the method of limits 
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(e.g., Mark, 1987; Mark, Balliett, Craver, Douglas, & Fox, 1990; Pufall & Dunbar, 1992), the 
average of the three descending/ascending combinations (i.e., three trials) was used as 
measure of perceived maximal reaching height for a given condition. Participants received no 
feedback about the accuracy of their assessments. 
Perceptual judgments were made in a similar way high and low on the wall (high and low 
conditions were counterbalanced). In each condition participants performed three descending 
and three ascending trials. Immediately after each condition, participants were asked to rate 
their feelings of anxiety by means of the anxiety thermometer. Participants were asked to 
recall how anxious they had felt during the assessments and to record this on the anxiety 
thermometer scale. This was used as anxiety score for the condition in question.4
Participants were allowed a recuperation period of about 10 minutes after each condition. 
After the two perceptual judgment conditions participants’ actual maximal reaching height 
was determined: In both ‘actual’ conditions, participants stood on the footholds (right foot on 
Hold 3, left foot on Hold 4), grasped with their right hand Hold 1 (see Figure 4.1), and 
stretched out as high as possible with their left hand while the experimenter positioned the 
assessment hold in such a way that hanging onto it was just possible. The height of the 
assessment hold was measured. This procedure was repeated once; just as with the perceptual 
judgments, the mean of the (two) assessments was the participants’ maximal reaching height 
for the condition in question. 
One of the experimenters served as belayer. In the low condition, the belayer acted so as to 
insure that both conditions were similar for the climber. Participants were informed before 
starting the climb in the low condition (mean height of the footholds, 0.4 m) that, despite the 
belayer, if they slipped they should break their fall themselves, as the safety procedure would 
not be effective at that climbing height. 
Statistical analysis 
The effect of height (low-anxiety condition, high-anxiety condition) was tested using one-
tailed paired t tests. Effect sizes (ES), indicating how many standard deviations the means 
under consideration differed, were calculated by taking the ratio of the difference between the 
two means and the mean within cell standard deviation of the means (Mullineaux, Bartlett, & 
                                                 
4 In retrospect, it may have been better if we had also asked participants to rate their feelings of 
anxiety briefly after performing the maximal reaches. However, as perceptual assessments and actual 
reaches were executed within the brief time span of about 25 minutes we had (and still have) no reason 
to believe that participants’ anxiety would have been different during the actual reaches in comparison 
to the perceptual assessments. Moreover, we found significant differences in anxiety between the high 
and low conditions on this climbing wall in all the climbing experiments that we performed (e.g., 
Pijpers et al., 2003, 2005). Even if participants had to climb high on the wall twice in the same 
experiment anxiety was still significantly higher than low on the wall during the second time high on 
the wall (Pijpers et al., 2005). 
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Bennett, 2001; Thomas & Nelson, 1996). An effect size of 0.2 or less, about 0.5, and 0.8 or 
more, represents small, moderate, and large differences, respectively (Cohen, 1988). When 
necessary, two-factor repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used. 
Maughly’s test of sphericity was used to determine whether there were any violations to 
sphericity for the repeated measures. If violations occurred, they were corrected according to 
the Huynh-Feldt procedure before determining whether the differences of interest were 
significant (Kinnear & Gray, 2000). Eta squared (η2) assessed the explained variance in the 
ANOVA models. Pair-wise comparisons using t tests were made using the Bonferroni 
correction procedure (ibid.) to identify specific mean differences when a significant main 
effect was found. The p values that are reported on the basis of this Bonferroni method are 
scaled to the .05 alpha level, so that, as usual, p values smaller than .05 indicate a significant 
effect. 
Results 
State anxiety and heart rate 
To determine whether the anxiety manipulation was successful, we performed a paired t test 
on both the anxiety thermometer data and the heart rate data. Participants reported 
significantly higher anxiety scores in the high condition (M = 4.5, SD = 2.52) than in the low 
condition (M = 1.7, SD = 1.57), t(11) = 3.96, p = .001, ES = 1.35. In addition, the mean heart 
rate (beats per minute or bpm) was significantly higher in the high condition (M = 119.1 bpm, 
SD = 16.62) than in the low condition (M = 108.9 bpm, SD = 16.97), t(11) = 2.87, p = .008, 
ES = 0.61. Thus, according to both measures the manipulation of anxiety was successful—
that is, in the high condition participants were more anxious than in the low condition, 
implying that the high and low condition indeed represented a high-anxiety and a low-anxiety 
condition, respectively. 
Actual maximal reaching height 
The average actual maximal reaching height was lower in the high condition than in the low 
condition (see Table 4.1). This difference was marginally significant, t(11) = 1.77, p = .052, 
ES = 0.20, indicating that higher levels of anxiety seemed to have affected participants’ actual 
maximal reaching. 
Perceived maximal reaching height 
A 2 (height: low-anxiety condition, high-anxiety condition) × 3 (trial: Trial 1-3) repeated 
measures ANOVA on the perceived maximal reaching height data (see Table 4.1) revealed a 
significant main effect of height, F(1, 11) = 8.73, p = .013, η2 = 0.44, ES = 0.34, indicating 
that the average perceived maximal reaching height was significantly lower in the high-
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anxiety condition than in the low-anxiety condition. The main effect of trial and the 
interaction between height and trial were not statistically significant (Fs < 1). 
Table 4.1. Actual maximal reaching heighta and perceived maximal reaching heighta for the 
conditions in Experiment 1. 
 Condition 
 Low anxiety  High anxiety 
Variable M SD M SD
Actual maximal 
reaching height 
 
209.4
 
11.43
 
207.1 
 
10.48
  
Perceived maximal 
reaching height 
 
207.6
 
11.36
 
204.0 
 
11.34
Trial 1 
Trial 2 
Trial 3 
207.8 
207.6 
207.5
11.35 
12.13 
11.34
204.6 
204.1 
203.2 
10.13 
11.00 
10.98
aIn cm. 
Discussion 
Self-reported scores indicated that participants felt more anxious in the high condition 
(anxiety thermometer score: 4.5) than in the low condition (anxiety thermometer score: 1.7). 
A score of 4.5 on a 10-point scale might be taken to imply that the anxiety was relatively low. 
However, a score of 4.5 indicates that participants felt more anxious than students who are 
about to enter a written examination (Houtman & Bakker, 1989), about as anxious as novice 
teachers just before a lecture (Houtman, 1990), and less anxious than youth speed skaters 
prior to the start of a 1500 m race at a national championship (Bakker, Vanden Auweele, & 
Moormann, 1992). In addition to the subjective experience, heart rate appeared to be 
significantly higher high on the climbing wall than low on the climbing wall. Thus, despite 
the fact that we selected a low trait anxious sample of females, the results clearly indicated 
that the anxiety manipulation was successful. 
The results showed that in the high-anxiety condition participants’ actual maximal 
reaching height was lower than in the low-anxiety condition, although the difference just 
failed to reach the 5% significance level. The decrease in actual maximal reaching height was 
accompanied by a decrease in perceived maximal reaching height. This finding is consistent 
with the theoretical expectation that the perception of affordances only changes as the 
accompanying action capabilities change (Bootsma et al., 1992; Gibson, 1979). The decrease 
in actual maximal reaching height is also in keeping with anxiety-induced changes in 
movement execution, such as more muscle tension and jerkier and slower movements (Pijpers 
et al., 2003, 2005; Weinberg, 1978; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976). 
Note that the absolute difference between the low-anxiety condition and the high-anxiety 
condition was (only) 2.3 cm for the actual maximal reaching height and 3.6 cm for the 
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perceived maximal reaching height. However, in both cases the range over which changes are 
to be expected is small. As for actual maximal reaching height, the values are comparable to 
loss in stature due to spinal shrinkage. Values of spinal shrinkage due to circadian variations 
as well as spinal compression that are reported in the literature vary from a few mm up to over 
one cm or up to 1% (see van Dieën & Toussaint, 1993), implying a reduction of about 1.7-1.8 
cm for 1.7 m tall persons, the mean height of our participants (SD = 0.04). In light of these 
numbers an average momentary reduction of actual maximal reaching height of 2.3 cm due to 
anxiety can be considered substantial. Regarding perceived maximal reaching height, as 
participants’ height was on average 1.7 m, it is highly unlikely that participants judged their 
maximal reach lower than 1.7 m. The range over which the judgments were made was 
maximally 40 cm, and probably even less. As such, the observed difference of 3.6 cm may 
also be viewed as substantial. 
The question remains whether the anxiety-induced changes in perceived and actual 
maximal reaching height also lead to changes in the realization of action possibilities. For 
example, if one perceives a particular hold on the climbing wall as just reachable in a neutral 
condition but as no longer reachable when anxious, does that also lead to the selection of a 
hold that is safely within reach if such a hold is available? In Experiment 2 we addressed this 
question by examining whether anxiety and accompanying changes in perceived and actual 
maximal reaching height also affected participants’ selection of action possibilities on the 
climbing wall, and consequently movement behaviour. 
Experiment 2 
We asked participants to climb a horizontal traverse in two anxiety conditions, low (low-
anxiety condition) and high (high-anxiety condition) on the climbing wall. To ensure that 
participants had the opportunity to select more holds than strictly necessary to climb the 
traverse an abundance of holds (30) was used in building the traverse (see Figure 4.2). 
Previous studies (Pijpers et al., 2003, 2005) had demonstrated that a traverse consisting of 11 
holds sufficed to climb from left to right on the same climbing wall. As the same hold could 
be used multiple times in climbing a traverse, we operationalized the selection of action 
possibilities by counting the number of movements made to climb the traverse. In doing so, 
we distinguished between performatory movements and exploratory movements (Gibson, 
1988). Performatory movements are meant to reach a certain goal, for instance, moving a 
hand or foot from one hold to the next in order to use it as support for further climbing 
actions. Exploratory movements are primarily information gathering movements, for 
example, when a climber wants to explore whether a hold is within reach. We predicted that 
the participants would make both more performatory and exploratory movements in executing 
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the climbing task in the high-anxiety condition than in the low-anxiety condition. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 12 participants, 6 male and 6 female,5 mean age 20.8 years (SD = 3.57) volunteered 
to participate in the experiment. None of them had participated in Experiment 1. The 
participants, all college students, had no experience in climbing and were naive to the purpose 
of the experiment. All provided informed consent. 
The mean trait anxiety score for the male participants was 34.8 (SD = 4.26), and was not 
significantly different from the mean score for Dutch male college students (M = 36.1, SD = 
8.4) obtained by van der Ploeg et al. (1980) on a t test between a sample and a population 
mean (Thomas & Nelson, 1996), t(5) = 0.73, ns. The mean trait anxiety score for the female 
participants was 34.0 (SD = 5.66), and was not significantly different from the mean score for 
Dutch female college students (M = 37.7, SD = 8.4; van der Ploeg et al., 1980), t(5) = 1.60, ns. 
The results indicated that the participants had no extraordinary predisposition to respond 
across many situations with high levels of state anxiety (e.g., Smith et al., 1998). 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on the same climbing wall as that used in Experiment 1. Again, two 
identical horizontal routes were mounted low and high on the wall, each consisting of 15 
footholds and 15 handholds (see Figure 4.2). The mean height of the footholds of the low 
traverse was 0.36 m (low-anxiety condition) while that of the high traverse was 3.69 m (high-
anxiety condition). To enable participants to start climbing in the high condition the 
stepladder was again used. 
As in Experiment 1, participants wore well-fitting climbing shoes and a climbing harness 
connected to a climbing rope. The same security procedure as in Experiment 1 was used. All 
climbs were videotaped using an S-VHS camcorder (sampling rate of 50 Hz); participants’ 
hand and foot movements were clearly visible. We used a stopwatch to determine climbing 
time (see Dependent Variables for a definition of this variable). 
State and trait anxiety were measured in the same way as in Experiment 1. We decided not
to use heart rate as a measure of state anxiety, because a higher heart rate in the high
condition is also a reflection of physical strain. Increased climbing time in the high-anxiety 
condition is a consistent and robust finding in these kinds of studies (cf. Pijpers et al., 2003,
                                                 
5 In both Experiments 2 and 3 mixed samples of males and females were tested. We checked 
whether there were significant differences between males and females on the state anxiety scores as 
well as the performance measures reported in Experiments 2-3. No significant effects involving gender 
were obtained. 
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2005). 
 
Figure 4.2. Front view of the climbing wall used in Experiment 2. The routes in the low and
high condition are identical. The positions of the holds are indicated by black squares. Holds
1-4 indicate the starting position. See text for explaining Holds 5-8. 
3.5 m
7.0 m
1
2
3
4
identical routes
56
78
Task Execution 
Participants were instructed to climb as fast and as safely as possible but it was stressed that 
the participant’s first goal should be to complete the climbing task without falling. They were 
told that a fall would immediately end the experiment, and that the participant would be 
excluded from the experiment and subsequent analyses. During the experiment, none of the 
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participants fell. No instructions were given as to how to climb faster, or which holds to use. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually on a single day. They were informed about the procedure 
mbing on 
the
 recuperate. Three minutes prior to 
run
ion period of at least half an hour the procedure was repeated, but now 
pa
of the experiment after which participants signed an informed consent statement. They 
completed the Dutch version of the STAI A-Trait scale (van der Ploeg et al., 1979). 
After participants had put on their climbing shoes and harness, they practised cli
 climbing wall. As the number of holds was more than sufficient to climb from the right 
side of the climbing wall to the left side and back again to the right side, all participants were 
able to successfully complete the practice task within a few minutes. As a consequence, the 
experimenters were confident that a participant’s failure to complete the task in either 
condition was not due to lack of experience with the task. 
After practice, participants were allowed 15 minutes to
ning each condition, participants were positioned in front of the wall, either on the floor or 
the stepladder depending on the condition in question. Two minutes before the climb 
participants were asked to indicate how anxious they were at that moment by filling out an 
anxiety thermometer in order to familiarize them with the thermometer. Then, participants 
were connected to the safety rope. The camcorder was switched on and participants were 
instructed to begin when ready by assuming the starting position on the wall. They were 
considered to be in the starting position when they had placed their right hand on Hold 1, their 
left hand on Hold 2, their right foot on Hold 3, and their left foot on Hold 4 (see Figure 4.2). 
As soon as participants had assumed the starting position in the high condition, the stepladder 
was quickly removed. In the low condition, participants were instructed not to start climbing 
immediately, but to wait just as long as it would have taken to relocate the stepladder in the 
high condition (less than 10 s). In both conditions participants started climbing at a sign from 
one of the experimenters. Participants resumed the same position after they had climbed the 
traverse two times. Hence, participants climbed the traverse from the right to the left (ending 
with the right hand on Hold 5, left hand on Hold 6, right foot on Hold 7, and left foot on Hold 
8; see Figure 4.2), and back to the right again. Immediately after the climb, the participants 
were asked to recall how anxious they had felt during the climb and to record this on the 
anxiety thermometer. This anxiety score was used as an anxiety score for that climb (and thus, 
for that condition). 
After a recuperat
rticipants climbed in the other condition (high if they had started low; low if they had 
started high). The order of high and low conditions was reversed with every new participant 
(balanced over male and female participants). 
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Dependent variables 
For each condition the following dependent variables were determined from the videotapes: 
1. Number of performatory movements, defined as the number of movements during which 
a hold is released and contact is made with another hold, which is then used as support. 
2. Number of exploratory movements, defined as the number of times a hold was touched 
without it being used as support. 
Participants’ movements were viewed by two independent raters for accurate 
determination of the dependent variables mentioned above. There was a 100% inter-observer 
agreement regarding performatory as well as exploratory movements. 
3. Climbing time was also registered for each condition; it was defined as the sum of the 
time needed to climb the two traverses (from the right to the left, and back). As soon as 
participants released one of the holds in the starting position, time started. When participants 
had returned to the starting position, the time was stopped. 
Statistical analysis 
See Experiment 1. 
Results 
State anxiety 
Participants reported significantly higher anxiety scores in the high condition (M = 4.8, SD = 
1.81) than in the low condition (M = 2.2, SD = 1.98), t(11) = 5.32, p = .0001, ES = 1.33, 
indicating that the anxiety manipulation was again successful. 
Behavioural variables 
Table 4.2 presents an overview of the results concerning number of performatory movements 
(hand and foot movements), number of exploratory movements, and climbing time. The 
number of performatory movements was significantly higher in the high condition than in the 
low condition, t(11) = 3.00, p = .006, ES = 1.08. Investigating hand and foot movements 
separately, it appeared that significantly more performatory hand movements were made in 
the high condition than in the low condition, t(11) = 3.90, p = .001, ES = 1.21, as well as 
significantly more performatory foot movements, t(11) = 2.11, p = .029, ES = 0.76. Also the 
number of exploratory movements was significantly larger in the high condition than in the 
low condition, t(11) = 2.76, p = .009, ES = 1.14. Both the number of exploratory hand 
movements and the number of exploratory foot movements were higher in the high-anxiety 
condition than in the low-anxiety condition, t(11) = 2.47, p = .016, ES = 1.59, and t(11) = 
2.80, p = .009, ES = 0.75, respectively. 
It appeared that climbing time increased significantly from 45.8 s in the low condition to 
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78.8 s in the high condition, t(11) = 5.62, p < .0001, ES = 1.73. There were large individual 
differences in climbing time causing the large standard deviations. In the low condition 
climbing time ranged from 27 to 69 s, and in the high condition from 54 to 143 s. 
Table 4.2. Number of performatory movements, number of exploratory movements, and 
climbing timea for the conditions in Experiment 2. 
 Condition 
 Low anxiety  High anxiety 
Variable M SD M SD
Number of performatory movements 
Hand movements 
Foot movements 
40.0 
20.9 
19.1 
5.80 
3.18 
3.75
47.5 
24.8 
22.7 
7.97 
3.30 
5.69
Number of exploratory movements 
Hand movements 
Foot movements 
1.3 
0.9 
0.4
2.10 
1.44 
1.00
6.3 
5.1 
1.3 
6.67 
5.74 
1.22
Climbing time 46 12.8 79 25.4
aIn s. 
Discussion 
As expected, in the high-anxiety condition the abundance of alternatives to climb the traverse 
(provided by more holds) resulted in more movements, both performatory and exploratory. 
This indicates that a person’s internal state plays a role in perceiving and realizing action 
possibilities: across anxiety conditions, participants selected different action possibilities from 
the plethora of action possibilities afforded by the environment. 
In Experiment 1 it was found that changes in perceived and actual maximal reaching height 
occurred due to anxiety. These changes may partly account for the effects observed in 
Experiment 2. However, it is questionable whether the differences in perceived and actual 
reachability, which were in the order of magnitude of several centimetres, can fully explain 
why participants made so many more (performatory and exploratory) movements in the high-
anxiety condition than in the low-anxiety condition. Note that using more holds implies shifts 
in grasping distance of (at least) 17 cm as the holds were 17 cm apart in vertical direction and 
24 cm in horizontal direction, while changes in perceived and actual abilities were ‘only’ a 
few centimetres. It may be that on top of the changes in perceived and actual maximal 
reaching height, anxiety induced changes in participants’ detection of relevant information for 
climbing, that is, in attention. Shifts in attention have been identified as one of the key 
mechanisms underlying changes (mostly decrements) in performance due to anxiety 
(Baddeley, 1972; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Janelle, Singer, & Williams, 1999; Landers, Wang, 
& Courtet, 1985; Liao & Masters, 2002; Mullen et al., 2005; Weltman & Egstrom, 1966; 
Weltman, Smith, & Egstrom, 1971). As attentional mechanisms might underlie the anxiety-
induced changes in perception and realization of action possibilities that were found in 
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Experiments 1 and 2, a third experiment was conducted to examine the relationship between 
anxiety and attention in the climbing task. 
Experiment 3 
Two major accounts have been suggested in the literature to explain changes in attention due 
to anxiety (see Beilock & Carr, 2001; Janelle et al., 1999; Moran, Byrne, & McGlade, 2002). 
First, Easterbrook’s (1959) cue-utilization theory states that as one experiences greater 
anxiety, the attentional field narrows (cf. Bacon, 1974; Janelle et al., 1999; Williams & 
Elliott, 1999). As a result, performance on central tasks will first be facilitated at the expense 
of performance on peripheral tasks, as peripheral (irrelevant) information will be blocked. At 
even higher anxiety levels, this funnelling effect may also prohibit attention to the information 
sources relevant for the central task, resulting in a decrement in performance on this central 
task. Second, performance decrements under stressful conditions can also be explained by the 
notion that anxious people are more easily distracted (Eysenck, 1992; Janelle et al., 1999). 
Within the distraction models it is proposed that some stimuli shift attention away from task-
relevant information to task-irrelevant cues, thereby decreasing performance (see also Moran, 
1996). It is assumed that increased pressure will cause individuals to focus on distracting 
stimuli either externally (e.g., crowd noise) or internally (e.g., worries) instead of focusing on 
task execution per se. 
Although originating from an information-processing approach, attentional narrowing and 
distraction are not necessarily inconsistent with an ecological perspective. In ecological terms, 
attentional narrowing would imply missing less useful or non-specifying information6 when 
anxiety increases. When anxiety increases further one might even start missing task-specific, 
specifying information as a result of which the performance of the main task would be 
hampered. Distraction would imply changes in the degree to which useful and less useful 
information draw the actor’s attention. In terms of ecological psychology, there are changes in 
the ‘attensity’ of information surrounding the actor with ‘attensity’ defined as “a measure of 
the attraction that an area of information has for a perceiver.” (Michaels & Carello, 1981, p. 
71). 
Based on the results of Experiments 1 and 2, one would expect that of these two 
mechanisms particularly attentional narrowing would play a role high on the climbing wall. 
                                                 
6 A non-specifying information source may be related to a to-be-perceived property, but it is not 
specific to it as its value does not under all circumstances reliably predict the value of the to-be-
perceived property (Beek, Jacobs, Daffertshofer, & Huys, 2003). Specifying information sources are 
specific to (to-be-perceived) properties of the environment. This means that detecting a certain 
information source that specifies a property of the environment allows the observer to make reliable 
judgments about this property (ibid.). 
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Therefore, in Experiment 3 we again asked novices to perform a climbing task in a low-
anxiety and high-anxiety condition. In both conditions participants now simultaneously had to 
respond as quickly as possible to the appearance of a series of red lights projected on the 
climbing wall. If, as expected, attentional narrowing would occur participants would focus 
more on the primary climbing task and consequently detect fewer projected lights in the high-
anxiety condition than in the low-anxiety condition, or they would at least respond slower to 
the detected lights if the number of detected lights remains the same. If, contrary to our 
expectations, (external) distraction would prevail (implying enhanced susceptibility to 
peripheral distracters, Williams & Elliott, 1999), one would expect that in the high-anxiety 
condition participants detect the same number or more projected lights with the same or a 
quicker response time than in the low-anxiety condition. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 17 participants, 5 male and 12 female, mean age 21.4 years (SD = 2.42) volunteered 
to participate in the experiment. The participants, all college students, had no experience in 
climbing and were naive to the purpose of the experiment. None of them had participated in 
Experiments 1 or 2. All provided informed consent. 
The mean trait anxiety score for the male participants was 28.6 (SD = 4.93), and was 
significantly lower than the mean score for Dutch male college students (M = 36.1, SD = 8.4) 
obtained by van der Ploeg et al. (1980) on a t test between a sample and a population mean 
(Thomas & Nelson, 1996), t(4) = 3.40, p < .05. The mean trait anxiety score for the female 
participants was 33.8 (SD = 7.52), and was not significantly different from the mean score for 
Dutch female college students (M = 37.7, SD = 8.4, van der Ploeg et al., 1980), t(11) = 1.80, 
ns. The results indicated that the participants had no extraordinary predisposition to respond 
across many situations with high levels of state anxiety (e.g., Smith et al., 1998). 
Task Execution 
Participants were instructed to climb as fast and as safely as possible; however, their primary 
goal was to complete the climbing task without falling. They were told that a fall would 
immediately end the experiment, and that the participant would be excluded from the 
experiment and subsequent analyses. Participants had to climb the traverse four times—that 
is, starting at the left side of the wall the participants climbed to the right side (Traverse 1), 
then returned to the left side (Traverse 2), back again to the right side (Traverse 3), and back 
again to the left side of the wall (Traverse 4). It was also emphasized that participants should 
say out loud “Yes” as quickly as possible when they observed a red light that was projected 
on the climbing wall. Participants were informed that both tasks were equally important in 
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terms of the overall performance score. 
During the experiment, none of the participants fell. No instructions were given with 
respect to how to climb faster, or which holds to use. 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on the same climbing wall as that used in Experiments 1 and 2. Again, 
two identical horizontal routes were mounted low and high on the wall, each consisting of 
five footholds and six handholds (see Figure 4.3). The mean height of the footholds of the low 
traverse was 0.34 m (low-anxiety condition) while that of the high traverse was 3.68 m (high-
anxiety condition). To enable participants to start climbing in the high condition the 
stepladder was again used (see Experiments 1 and 2). 
For the peripheral light detection task, laser lights were projected on the climbing wall in 
the vicinity of the participants while they were climbing the traverse. For this purpose we 
developed a so-called ‘laser pointer system’ (LP-system) (see Figure 4.4). The LP-system 
consisted of a box with five laser pointers attached to it. There were four peripheral pointers 
and one central pointer. The LP-system was placed on a tripod, 1.31 m high, and at a distance 
of 7 m from the climbing wall. The laser pointers could be moved around a ball-and-socket 
joint to adjust the direction of the light beam and hence the projection of the lights on the 
climbing wall. With a handle attached to the LP-system the central laser pointer (labelled as 
‘ML’, i.e., marker light; see Figure 4.4) could be moved up and down, and from the right to 
the left making it possible to direct it continuously on a marker on participant’s back while he 
or she was climbing on the wall. Consequently, the four peripheral laser pointers projected 
their lights at (almost) the same distances from the participants irrespective from their 
climbing actions. In the high condition, the LP-system was directed upwards, and the angles 
of the lasers beams were adjusted in order to keep the positions of the lights relative to the 
participant identical as in the low condition. 
The locations of the peripherally projected lights were (see Figure 4.4): right from the right 
shoulder (labelled ‘RS’), left from the left shoulder (labelled ‘LS’), right from the right hip 
(labelled ‘RH’), and left from the left hip (labelled ‘LH’). The LP-system was connected with 
a PC. By means of a specially developed software program (LabVIEW, National Instruments) 
it was possible to set the frequency, duration, and order of light activation of the laser 
pointers. During Traverses 1 and 3, the order of the lights projected on the climbing wall was 
set as follows: RS, RH, LH, and LS. During Traverses 2 and 4 the order was LS, RH, LH, and 
RS. Every 3.5 s a light was projected on the wall for 500 ms. The windows in the laboratory 
were blinded so that the light intensity was constant during the testing period. A stickpin-
microphone (also connected to the computer) with a basic amplifier was used to pick up 
participants’ “Yes” in order to calculate their response time (see also Dependent Variables). 
The software also provided a graphical representation of the moments laser pointers were 
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switched on and off (and which laser pointer), and participants’ verbal response to the 
appearance of the lights (by means of whimsical bursts in the output signal). 
 
Figure 4.3. Front view of the climbing wall used in Experiment 3. The routes in the low and 
high condition are identical. The positions of the holds are indicated by black squares. Holds 
1-4 indicate the starting position. See text for explaining Holds 5-8. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants wore well-fitting climbing shoes and an integral 
harness connected to a climbing rope. The same security procedure as in Experiments 1 and 2 
was used. All climbs were videotaped using an S-VHS camcorder (sampling rate of 50 Hz). 
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The camcorder was placed next to the LP-system. State and trait anxiety were measured in the 
same way as in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Projection of the four peripheral lights on the climbing wall (LS = Left Shoulder, 
LH = Left Hip, RS = Right Shoulder, and RH = Right Hip). The central pointer (ML = 
Marker Light) was continuously directed at the marker on participant’s back. 
RS
RH
LS
LH
0.96 m
0.60 
laser pointer system
laser pointer
ML
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually on a single day. The entire procedure was explained to 
each participant, and questions concerning the experiment were answered. Participants were 
then asked to read and sign an informed consent statement. After they had completed the 
Dutch version of the STAI A-Trait scale (van der Ploeg et al., 1979), the microphone was 
placed, and participants put on their climbing shoes and harness. They then practised the low 
traverse until they were able to climb the traverse two times back and forth. Practice periods 
lasted about 5 to 10 minutes. Then the lights were presented on the climbing wall while the 
participant was standing on it to (1) familiarize participants with the procedure and (2) to 
make sure that the lights fell within his or her peripheral visual field, which was the case for 
all participants. After this, participants were allowed to pause for at least 15 minutes. 
Subsequently, the participants’ task was explained in detail: specifically, they were told 
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that the climbing task had to be carried out as fast and safely as possible, and that at the same 
time they had to say out loud “Yes” as quickly as possible each time they observed a red light. 
One minute before the climb participants were asked to indicate how anxious they were at that 
moment by completing the anxiety thermometer, again for the purpose of familiarization. 
They were then led to the climbing wall and connected to the rope. The camcorder was 
switched on, and participants were asked to take position on the wall: Participants placed their 
left hand on Hold 1, right hand on Hold 2, left foot on Hold 3, and right foot on Hold 4 
(‘starting position’), (see Figure 4.3). As soon as participants had assumed the starting 
position in the high condition, the stepladder was quickly removed. In the low condition, 
participants were instructed to not start climbing immediately, but to wait just as long as it 
would have taken to reposition the stepladder in the high condition (less than 10 s). In both 
conditions participants started at a sign from one of the experimenters. They then climbed the 
traverse four times. 
Immediately after each condition, participants were asked to recall how anxious they had 
felt during climbing and to record this on the anxiety thermometer scale. This was used as 
anxiety score for the condition in question. High and low conditions were counterbalanced. 
Participants were allowed a recuperation period of about 30 minutes before starting the 
second condition. No feedback about their performance was given. The second condition was 
executed in a similar fashion as the first, but now participants climbed in the other condition 
(low if they had started high, high if they had started low). 
Dependent variables 
For each condition the following dependent variables were determined. 
1. Number of detected lights, defined as the number of lights observed by the participants 
during climbing. 
2. Response time, operationalized as the time between switching on a laser pointer and 
participant’s verbal response to it. 
3. Climbing time, defined as the time needed to climb the traverse four times. Climbing 
time started as soon as participants had left the starting position and stopped as soon as 
participants had resumed the starting position after climbing the traverse four times. Climbing 
time was determined from videotape. 
Statistical analyses 
See Experiment 1. 
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Results 
State anxiety 
Participants had significantly higher anxiety scores in the high condition (M = 5.0, SD = 2.56) 
than in the low condition (M = 2.4, SD = 2.40), t(16) = 4.23, p = .0003, ES = 1.04. Thus, the 
manipulation of anxiety was again successful: participants were more anxious in the high 
condition than in the low condition. 
Performance on the climbing task 
As in our previous studies (Pijpers et al., 2003, 2005; see also Chapters 2 and 3), the climbing 
time in the high condition (M = 107.5 s, SD = 27.10) was significantly longer than in the low 
condition (M = 88.4 s, SD = 16.58), t(16) = 4.66, p < .0001, ES = 0.88. There were large 
individual differences in climbing time: In the low condition climbing time ranged from 69 to 
137 s, and in the high condition from 73 to 175 s. 
Performance on the light detection task 
Due to differences in the average climbing times, the average number of lights that could be 
detected was 26.9 (SD = 6.78) in the high condition and 22.1 (SD = 4.15) in the low 
condition. Nevertheless, participants detected, on average, significantly fewer lights in the 
high condition (M = 3.7, SD = 3.10) than in the low condition (M = 6.5, SD = 3.47), t(16) = 
3.51, p = .001, ES = 0.85. To diminish the confounding effect of climbing speed, we first 
determined which lights could have been detected by each participant. As the fastest 
participant needed 69 s to execute the task—that is, about 17 s per traverse—he or she could 
maximally have detected four lights per traverse. Therefore, we determined for each 
participant which lights were detected of the first four lights that were presented in Traverse 
1, Traverse 2, Traverse 3, and Traverse 4. Each participant, including the fastest, could, in 
principle, have detected these first four lights per traverse, thus, 16 in total. Also according to 
this analysis, participants detected significantly fewer lights in the high-anxiety condition (M 
= 2.2, SD = 1.64) than in the low-anxiety condition (M = 4.6, SD = 1.91), t(16) = 4.86, p < 
.0001, ES = 1.35. 
The 16 lights that could have been detected by all participants can be classified in lights 
that were presented in the direction of locomotion (the so-called ‘ahead’ detections), and 
lights that were presented in opposite direction (the so-called ‘detections). A 2 (Height: low 
condition, high condition) × 2 (Direction of locomotion: ahead, behind) repeated measures 
ANOVA on the detection data revealed a significant main effect of height, F(1, 16) = 23.57, p 
< .001, ES = 1.33, η2 = .60, and a significant main effect of direction of locomotion, F(1, 16) 
= 41.43, p < .001, ES = 1.43, η2 = .72, indicating that, on average, significantly more ‘ahead’ 
lights were detected (M = 2.6, SD = 1.59) than ‘behind’ lights (M = 0.8, SD = 1.05). The 
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interaction between height and direction of locomotion was not significant, F(1, 16) = 1.66, p 
= .22. 
The averaged response time was not significantly different between the high condition (M 
= 742 ms, SD = 217.5) and the low condition (M = 774 ms, SD = 242.7), t < 1. 
Discussion 
Findings generally confirmed the notion of attentional narrowing (Bacon, 1974; Easterbrook, 
1959; see also Murray & Janelle, 2003) in that participants detected fewer lights in the high-
anxiety condition than in the low-anxiety condition. Apparently, in the high-anxiety condition 
attention was more narrowly focused on information relevant for climbing, while information 
that was less relevant for climbing at that moment (projected lights) was overlooked.  
It should be noted that under anxiety the reduction in the number of lights detected 
occurred despite the fact that in the low-anxiety condition, the number of lights detected was 
already low (about 25%). In the analyses presented in the preceding that were based on 16 
lights (eight ‘ahead’ and eight ‘behind’ lights), 43% of the ‘ahead’ and 15% of the ‘behind’ 
lights were detected in the low-anxiety condition. This indicates that ‘merely’ climbing on the 
climbing wall is already attention consuming. In the high-anxiety condition only 23% of the 
‘ahead’ lights and 4% of the ‘behind’ lights were detected, showing that almost all of the 
lights projected ‘behind’ the climbers were missed while only a quarter of the lights projected 
in front of the climbers were detected. 
In short, the results point in the direction of attentional narrowing as more lights went 
undetected in the high-anxiety condition. However, as Janelle et al. (1999) remarked, the 
mechanisms of attentional narrowing and distraction could be operative simultaneously. 
Instead of focusing on task execution per se (climbing and detecting lights), participants may 
have been focusing on internally distracting stimuli such as worries and negative thoughts 
(also) leading to the detection of fewer lights. Visual search data may shed more light on the 
precise changes that occur under anxiety in visually attending to specific locations on the 
climbing wall (cf. Murray & Janelle, 2003; Williams & Elliott, 1999). 
General Discussion 
Gibson (1979) suggested that the environment is perceived in actor-relevant terms, that is, in 
terms of what an actor can do with and in the environment. In keeping with this notion, 
research has shown that changes in one’s potential to act influences the perception of action 
possibilities (e.g., Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1999; Pijpers et al., in press). Based 
on that idea, we assumed that changes in the actor’s emotional state that lead to changes in his 
or her action capabilities will also lead to changes in the perception of those action 
possibilities. Perception-action experiments on a climbing wall allowed us to investigate the 
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influence of the actor’s emotional state—anxiety—on perceiving and realizing affordances. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that anxiety reduced both perceived and actual maximal 
reaching height. Subsequently, in Experiment 2 and in line with the results of Experiment 1, 
anxiety was found to affect the realization of action possibilities, leading to the use of more 
holds on the same traverse. Experiment 3 particularly provided support for attentional 
narrowing as an additional underlying mechanism (on top of the reduction of perceived and 
actual maximal reaching height) of the anxiety-induced changes in realizing affordances as 
found in Experiment 2. Note that grasping holds that are easily within reach rather than at the 
maximum of one’s reachability is consistent with attentional narrowing. If attention narrows, 
one is bound to grasp those holds that are closer by and still within ones field of attention. Of 
course, these results do not discard the possibility that in Experiment 2 the use of more holds 
reflect a more conservative and safer climbing strategy independent of attentional narrowing. 
The findings of Experiments 1 and 3 indicate that anxiety affects the detection of 
information about the action possibilities in the environment, while the findings of 
Experiment 2 (and Experiment 1) suggested that anxiety constrains the realization of action 
possibilities. In our view, these findings suggest how, from an ecological point of view, the 
perception and realization of affordances might be understood in situations in which 
emotional processes are in play.  
As an entry point to discussing the theoretical implications, it is useful to first turn to the 
results of Jiang and colleagues (Jiang & Mark, 1994; Jiang, Mark, Anderson, & Domm, 1993) 
on the perception of gap crossability. They found that when individuals had to judge whether 
they could step over a gap, their estimates of crossable gap width decreased as gap depth 
increased. This finding seems to refer to a process similar to that addressed in the present 
study in that increased gap depth led to increased anxiety, which in turn affected the 
perception of gap crossing capability. However, Jiang and colleagues disputed that emotional 
processes were causing the more conservative assessments. They attempted to substantiate 
this claim by showing that estimates of gap crossing capability critically depended on where 
observers directed their gaze: when looking down into the gap, participants tended to 
underestimate their capabilities more than when they looked toward the horizon. This 
explanation, however, does not preclude the possibility that gaze direction and emotional 
processes co-varied (cf. Janelle et al., 1999; Murray & Janelle, 2003; Williams & Elliott, 
1999; Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002), that is, when participants looked down into the 
gap they may have felt some fear of the depth resulting from the increased risk to their safety. 
When they looked at the horizon participants may have felt no or less fear. Hence, anxiety 
might have played a role in the observed changes in the perception of gap crossability. 
In line with previous findings (e.g., Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al. (1995), we once 
more found support for the intricate relation between the perception and the realization of 
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action possibilities. An observer who is in a threatening environment will pick up information 
about that environment as well as information about his or her own (emotional) state. The 
latter will deviate from ordinary feelings, sensations et cetera, and the observer will behave 
accordingly. As such, the anxiety-induced bodily and physiological reactions are part and 
parcel of the properties of the animal-environment system in which affordances are perceived 
and realized. Many studies have reported all kinds of bodily changes under threatening 
conditions (e.g., Brooke & Long, 1987; Frijda, 1986; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976). Given the 
mutuality of observer and environment, it follows that changes in action capabilities will be 
detected, which will affect the individual’s perception of affordances. Using a similar set up 
as that used in the present study, Pijpers et al. (2003) demonstrated considerable and 
significant increases in blood lactate concentration and muscle fatigue under anxiety. 
Evidently, the environment affected the neuromuscular system and participants accounted for 
these effects when asked to judge their maximal reaching height in that environment. Hence, 
anxiety-induced changes in action capabilities closely corresponded to changes in the 
perception and realization of affordances. 
In conclusion, an actor’s emotional state affects the perception and realization of 
affordances in a manner that is consistent with the changes that accompany this emotional 
state, such as changes in attention and actual action capabilities. Rather than portraying this 
emotional state as a spooky and subjective variable this once more emphasizes the intricate 
relations between actor and environment and perception and action. 
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Changes in the perception of action 
possibilities while climbing to fatigue on a 
climbing wall 
 
Chapter 5 
Abstract 
In two experiments we investigated changes in the perception of action possibilities 
as a function of exertion. In Experiment 1, participants repeatedly climbed on a 
climbing wall in series of trials that progressively increased in number up to 10 
trials, resulting in increased levels of exertion. Before and during climbing 
participants judged their maximum reaching height, as well as perceived exertion. 
On a separate day, participants climbed another 10 trials while performing actual 
maximum reaches. Higher levels of perceived exertion were associated with 
decreases in perceived maximum reach while the actual reaches did not decrease. 
However, the perceptual changes were found early during task execution when 
participants were not yet fatigued. When exertion set in neither perceived nor 
actual maximum reaching appeared to be affected. In Experiment 2 we included 
exhaustion trials. The findings replicated the early changes in perception observed 
in Experiment 1, which may be accounted for by hands-on experience with the task. 
Furthermore, while climbing to exhaustion, perceptual judgements largely changed 
in keeping with changes in the actual maximum reach. Thus, there appeared to be 
a functional relationship between participants’ actual action capabilities, rather 
than their state of physical fatigue per se, and perceived action possibilities. 
 
______________________________ 
 
Based on: Pijpers, J. R., Oudejans, R. R. D., & Bakker, F. C. (in press). Changes in 
the perception of action possibilities while climbing to fatigue on a climbing wall. 
Journal of Sports Sciences. 
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Introduction 
In many sport settings there is an abundance of external and internal cues to yield relevant or 
irrelevant information that can be used to guide one’s actions. Several factors mediating the 
selection of information, such as task experience (e.g., Abernethy, 2001), and competitive 
anxiety (e.g., Moran, Byrne, & McGlade, 2002; Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999), have 
been studied extensively over the last few decades. However, the role of exertion in 
addressing the mechanisms by which (sport) performers pick up relevant information 
(Proffitt, Creem, & Zosh, 2001) has rarely been addressed. This is surprising as many 
competitive sports have a clear physical component often producing physical fatigue. Sports 
events are often decided in the dying minutes of the game when players are tired. 
The study reported here examined the influence of the level of exertion on a perceptual 
judgement task, namely, perceiving overhead reachability. We have chosen this task for two 
reasons. First, in a number of sports, the proficiency of adequately perceiving overhead 
reachability is essential to performance, for instance, when a ball has to be caught (e.g., 
baseball or basketball), hit (e.g., serving or blocking in volleyball), or punched above the head 
(e.g., by a soccer keeper), or when holds have to be grasped in sport climbing. Second, the 
actual maximum reaching height can be easily measured so that participants’ perception of 
their action possibilities can be related to their actual capabilities. 
Although scarce, some empirical evidence exists for the view that perceptual judgements 
of action possibilities are influenced by fatigue. Proffitt and Bhalla (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; 
Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995) conducted a series of experiments in which 
they showed that perceived steepness of hills is, in part, dependent on participants’ state of 
physical fatigue. When participants were exhausted they judged hills to be steeper than when 
they were not fatigued. The authors also demonstrated that the judgement of the inclination of 
the hills was inversely related to participants’ fitness level, and that elderly people were more 
prone to overestimate the steepness of hills than their younger counterparts. Moreover, 
participants who wore a heavy backpack verbally judged hills to be steeper than participants 
without a backpack. Thus, it seems that the capacity to traverse a hill changes the perception 
of the steepness of that hill even though its actual steepness remains the same. In other words, 
as hills are harder to traverse when participants are exhausted, wear a heavy backpack, or are 
older, they are perceived as steeper. In addition, since for biomechanical reasons hills are 
more difficult to descend than to ascend, hills look steeper when viewed from the top than 
from the bottom (Proffitt et al., 1995). Thus, there seems to be a functional adaptation of 
perception of action possibilities to the actual action capabilities. 
Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) and Proffitt et al. (1995, Experiment 5) studied the perception of 
action capabilities in a binary fashion—participants were exhausted or not, wore a heavy 
backpack or not, were physically fit or not, or were around 20 or above 60 years of age. 
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Hence, their results remained mute with regard to possible intermediate changes in perception 
and action. Insight into these intermediate changes might provide an answer to the question 
whether the adaptation of perception of action possibilities is a function of physical state per 
se or of changes in actual action capabilities also referred to as ‘behavioral potential’ by 
Proffitt and Bhalla (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1995). A brief discussion of 
Gibson’s (1979) theory of direct perception, also considered by Proffitt et al. (1995) as a 
suitable candidate to account for their findings on geographical slant perception, might 
underscore the relevance of this question. This theory also provides handles to distinguish the 
concept of physical state and that of behavioural potential or actual action capabilities. 
In Gibson’s (1979) theory of direct perception (see also Michaels & Beek, 1995), 
affordances are defined as the behavioural possibilities of an environmental layout taken with 
reference to a particular animal. “An affordance for a particular animal is a property of the 
environment that affords relevant behavior to the animal” (Jacobs, 2001, pp. 194-195). A ball 
affords—for example, throwing, hitting, catching, avoiding, or being hit in the head. The 
complement of an affordance as a property of the environment taken with reference to an 
animal is the property (or properties) of the animal with which that affordance can be realized. 
For instance, a certain arm length co-determines whether a cup on a table is reachable, and the 
size of the hand largely determines whether an object is graspable. Such properties, 
sometimes called ‘effectivities’ within the ecological approach (e.g., Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 
1982; Turvey, 1992), thus refer to the observer’s action capabilities or behavioural potential 
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1995). 
According to Gibson (1979), a particular affordance exists irrespective of the state or need 
of that person. In other words, a change in the need or state of the observer does not alter the 
affordance (Gibson, 1979, pp. 138-139). Bootsma, Bakker, van Snippenberg, and Tdlohreg 
(1992) presented support for this hypothesis in an experiment in which participants were 
asked to judge whether balls that passed laterally at a distance varying around arm length 
were reachable under two conditions: a control condition and an anxiety condition. Bootsma 
et al. found that anxiety did not influence the average judgement of maximum reachable 
distance. 
Bootsma et al. (1992) did not examine whether anxiety had an effect on the actual 
maximum reaching distance. The affordance of interest in their experiment was selected 
because it scaled with a physical characteristic (i.e., maximum reach, mainly determined by 
arm length), and was thus assumed not to be affected by the anxiety manipulation. However, 
as was also acknowledged by Bootsma et al., if an experimental manipulation directly affects 
the action capabilities of an observer (i.e., seriously fatiguing the arm muscles before making 
the judgements), then a change in the perception of reachableness of approaching balls might 
be expected. 
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Thus, it seems that as long as participants’ behavioural potential (i.e., actual action 
capabilities or effectivities)1 is not influenced by a state variable such as anxiety (or fatigue), 
one would expect that the perception of action possibilities is not influenced either. However, 
when a state variable does induce changes in participants’ behavioural potential, one would 
expect accompanying changes in the perception of the action possibility in question. 
The present study set out from the idea that there is a functional relationship between the 
perception of action possibilities and actual action capabilities, rather than just the observer’s 
state of physical fatigue, defined as a state that results from changes in skeletal muscles, the 
depletion of the energy stores, and accumulation of lactic acid, which reduce people’s 
performance capacity until they drop, or they can no longer put forth the required effort (e.g., 
Holding, 1983; Ulmer, 1989). Using a climbing task during which judgements of overhead 
reachability were made, we examined whether and how perceptual judgements change as a 
function of exertion and action capabilities, thereby extending the work of Proffitt and Bhalla 
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1995), who studied just the two extreme levels of 
exertion, namely, rested and exhausted. 
In Experiment 1 the level of exertion was systematically varied from rested to very 
fatigued. In Experiment 2 we also included exhaustion trials. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 participants executed a climbing task with progressively increasing levels of 
exertion. This was achieved by varying the number of times participants had to climb a route 
from right to left and back on an artificial climbing wall. At specific moments during 
climbing participants rated their perceived exertion using Borg’s (1970) Ratings of Perceived 
Exertion-scale (‘RPE scale’). Borg’s RPE scale is widely used to measure perceived exertion, 
exercise intensity, or fatigue (Chen, Fan, & Moe, 2002).2 At those moments participants also 
                                                 
1 An in-depth discussion of the complementary concepts of affordances and effectivities can be 
found in a collection of papers that appeared in Ecological Psychology (Chemero, 2003; Heft, 2003; 
Jones, 2003; Michaels, 2003; Stoffregen, 2003). Although the importance of the affordance concept is 
fully recognised, much debate remains with regard to its precise definition and the role of effectivities 
in the theory of affordances (cf. Stoffregen, 2003; Turvey, 1992). To circumvent this discussion, we 
have chosen to use the terms ‘action capabilities’ and ‘action possibilities’ in the remainder of this 
chapter. We will use the term ‘actual action capabilities’ (cf. Michaels, 2003) to contrast it with 
‘perceived action possibilities’. 
2 Noble and Robertson (1996) argued that the term ‘exertion’ has often been criticized as 
inappropriate or too specific to endurance-type activities, and that some have suggested using other 
terms such as ‘perceived fatigue’, ‘perceived effort’, or ‘perceived force’. They concluded, “Despite 
such suggestions, perceived exertion has become the term generally accepted for use with all types of 
human movement.” (p. 4). Therefore, we also use the term ‘perceived exertion’ throughout this 
chapter. 
 109
Chapter 5 
judged how far they could reach overhead. At the end of the climbing tasks, blood lactate 
concentrations were measured to obtain a confirmation of the level of exertion. To be able to 
relate participants’ perception of action possibilities to their actual action capabilities, we also 
determined participants’ actual maximum reaching height at different levels of exertion. This 
was done on a separate day (see under Method). 
We expected that the RPE scores, as well as blood lactate concentrations, would increase 
as the number of trials participants had climbed increased. Furthermore, as maximum 
overhead reaching involves stretching the whole body including the reaching arm, back, 
shoulders, the legs, and standing on tiptoe, we expected that at higher levels of exertion actual 
maximum reaching height would decrease. Finally, we expected that judgements of maximum 
reaching height would only decrease when the actual action capabilities are also affected, 
irrespective of the progressive increases in exertion. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 16 female participants (aged 19 to 31 years), mainly college students, volunteered 
to participate in the experiment. They had little or no experience in sport or rock climbing, 
and were naive to the purpose of the experiment. All participants signed a written informed 
consent, and were paid a small fee for their participation. The study’s protocol was formally 
approved by the Local Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Human Movement Sciences before 
the experiment was conducted. 
Design 
The experiment was spread over four days. On Day 1, the participants became familiar with 
the experiment by practising the climbing task, which consisted of climbing a horizontal route 
on a climbing wall (see Figure 5.1) from the right side of the wall to the left and back to the 
right again, defining a single trial. On Day 2, participants performed two series of trials. First 
they climbed one of a series of 4, 6, 8, or 10 trials. After a recuperation time of at least one 
hour, participants climbed another series of 4, 6, 8, or 10 trials, excluding the one they had 
already climbed. On Day 3, participants climbed the remaining two series of trials. Hence, 
ultimately the participants performed all four series of trials in order to induce a ‘continuum’ 
of exertion. Participants were never informed about which series of trials they were climbing 
to prevent that they would adjust their climbing speed to that particular series, which would 
render the exertion manipulation ineffective. With each new participant a new order of series 
was selected randomly (without replacement) from the 24 possible orders of the series. Before 
climbing, and after every second trial we measured perceived maximum reaching height and 
participants’ RPE. On Day 4, participants climbed 10 trials. On this day, we determined 
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participants’ actual maximum reaching height and their RPE before climbing, and after every 
second trial, thus providing a measure of the participants’ actual action capabilities as a 
function of exertion. 
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Figure 5.1. Front view of the layout of the climbing wall used in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
positions of the holds are indicated by ‘●’ symbols. The assessment hold (Hold 13, indicated
by a ‘■’ symbol) could be moved freely along the rail. Dotted lines and the rail indicate the
nine laminate panels. 
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Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on a 3º inclined (leading to backward hanging of the participants)
artificial climbing wall (width: 3.5 m, height: 7.0 m; see Figure 5.1), which was placed in a
large experimental room. The wall consisted of nine laminate panels with a grey grainy
texture for friction. Holds could be bolted anywhere on the wall at relative distances of 0.24
m in horizontal direction, and 0.17 m in vertical direction. On the wall, a horizontal route (or
‘traverse’), designed by a professional route designer, was created. The route consisted of 12 
holds (five footholds and seven handholds) of varying size and shape, all suitable for novice
climbers. The mean height of the five footholds was 0.3 m.  
One hold, the ‘assessment hold’ (Hold 13, see Figure 5.1), was movable in vertical 
direction. This hold was used to estimate the upper limit that participants perceived they were 
able to reach (the dependent variable perceived maximum reaching height). The assessment 
hold could be moved freely along a rail, which was placed between the laminate panels of the 
wall and extended the entire height of the climbing wall (see Figure 5.1). The assessment hold 
was connected with ropes that could be used to pull it up or down. Reference points in the 
vicinity of the assessment hold (i.e., attachment locations for the holds, irregularities on the 
wall, edges of the panels) were removed by covering a part of the climbing wall (0.4 m on 
both sides of the rail) with tape. (Post hoc interviews indicated that none of the participants 
had used reference points in making their assessments.) Movements of the assessment hold 
were recorded on video during climbing (Panasonic, type NV-M5E). Hence, no time was lost 
to measure the height of the assessment hold so that participants could immediately proceed 
with climbing after making an assessment. 
Photo spectrometry was used to measure the blood lactate concentration (Lange, 1991). A 
blood sample was taken from the thumb, which was first cleaned with alcohol and then a 
small puncture in the skin was made with a special sterile needle. Approximately 10 μl 
arterialised capillary blood was collected in a capillary tube and immediately analysed for 
blood lactate concentration using the Mini analyser (Lange, 1991). 
Participants’ perceived exertion was assessed during climbing by means of a Dutch version 
(Vanden Auweele, 1991) of the 15-graded RPE scale (Ratings of Perceived Exertion) (Borg, 
1970, 1982, 1985), rating the task from 6 (no exertion at all) to 20 (maximal exertion). The 
RPE scale measures participants’ subjective evaluation of the exercise intensity with adequate 
reliability and validity (Chen et al., 2002; Russell & Weeks, 1994; Schomer, 1987), and refers 
to “a general or overall perception of effort and exertion” (Borg, 1985, p. 6, see also Footnote 
2). Verbal anchors are placed as follows (Borg, 1985): 6 is labelled as no exertion at all, 
between 7 and 8 extremely light, 9 very light, 11 light, 13 somewhat hard, 15 hard (heavy), 17 
very hard, 19 extremely hard, and 20 maximal exertion. An A3-sized RPE scale was placed 
on the climbing wall (see Figure 5.1), allowing participants to rate their exertion while 
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standing on the holds. 
All participants wore well-fitting climbing shoes (Enduro 954, La Sportiva). Since the 
standard security procedure in climbing (e.g., Skinner & McMullen, 1993) would be 
ineffective so low above the ground, participants were not secured. 
Procedure 
Each participant was tested individually. On Day 1 participants were first informed in general 
terms about the procedure of the experiment. They also received a brief explanation of the 
RPE scale according to the guidelines of Borg (1985) and Noble and Robertson (1996)—that 
is, participants were told how perceived exertion was defined, how the perceptual range was 
anchored, the nature and use of the scale was explained, the differentiated ratings were 
explained, that there were no right or wrong answers, and, finally, possible questions were 
answered. Participants practised the traverse for a minimum of 10 trials. Although the 
climbing task was new to the participants when they entered the experiment, the climbing 
route was very easy and readily learned before actual testing started. 
On Day 2 (2 to 8 days after Day 1), prior to being warmed up and testing, participants were 
carefully instructed about what was meant by maximum reaching height. Maximum reaching 
height was defined according to the following reaching action (for numbering of the holds, 
see Figure 5.1): participants had to place their left foot on Hold 9, right foot on Hold 8, right 
hand on Hold 1, and left hand on Hold 2, and then imagine that while stretching out upwards 
as far as possible (keeping both feet on the holds; standing on tiptoe was allowed) the left 
hand would grasp the assessment hold in such a way that they could hang on it. Participants 
were not allowed to actually execute the reaching action. The verbal anchors of the 15-points 
RPE scale were recalled. Just before starting with a series of trials (4, 6, 8, or 10 trials) the 
assessment of the perceived maximum reaching height was performed twice. The assessment 
hold (see Figure 5.1) was lowered from halfway the wall and the participants had to verbally 
indicate when the hold would just be reachable in the prescribed manner. Corrections in 
upward or downward direction were allowed, until the hold was at the perceived maximum 
reaching height. Following each separate judgement, participants were asked to look straight 
ahead to the climbing wall, during which the assessment hold was repositioned to halfway the 
climbing wall. This procedure to assess the participant’s perceived maximum reaching height 
was repeated once. Participants were given no feedback on the accuracy of their assessments. 
After this, the perceived exertion was rated. Then, participants started climbing the traverse. 
During climbing the assessment of the perceived maximum reaching height and the rating of 
the perceived exertion were repeated after every second trial. After making the final 
assessments of a particular series of trials, participants returned to a seat and a blood sample 
was obtained to measure the blood lactate concentration. Blood samples were taken three 
minutes after climbing. 
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After the recuperation time of at least one hour (longer if participants indicated that they 
had not fully recovered), participants climbed another of the remaining three series of trials 
(for instance, if they had already climbed the 4-trial series they now climbed the 6-, 8-, or 10-
trial series). 
On Day 3 (one day after Day 2), the procedure of Day 2 was repeated. The remaining two 
series of trials were now performed (see also Design). 
On Day 4 (1 to 14 days after Day 3) participants’ actual maximum reaching height was 
determined before climbing, and after climbing 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 trials. Participants stood on 
the footholds (left foot on Hold 9, right foot on Hold 8), and grasped Hold 1 with their right 
hand (see Figure 5.1), stretching out as high as possible with their left hand while an 
experimenter immediately positioned the assessment hold in such a way that hanging on it 
was just possible. The assessment hold was then secured in that position and it was checked 
whether the participant could indeed just grasp the assessment hold. This procedure was 
repeated once. The positions of the assessment hold were again recorded on video so that 
afterwards participants’ maximum reaching height could be determined (see Experimental 
set-up). As with the perceptual judgements, each time after the actual maximum reaching 
height was established, the perceived exertion was rated. 
Data reduction 
To establish perceived and actual maximum reaching height a frame-grabber and digitising 
program (Welter, den Brinker, & van Balkom, 1996) were used to determine the image 
coordinates of the end position of assessment hold. Image coordinates were translated into 
real world coordinates using the DLT-method (Direct Linear Transformation; Miller, Shapiro, 
& McLaughlin, 1980; Shapiro, 1978). As indicated in the procedure, participants estimated 
their maximum reaching height twice on each occasion. The average of the two values was 
taken as perceived maximum reaching height. Similarly, actual maximum reaching height was 
the average of the two measurements that were taken. 
Statistical analysis 
Blood lactate concentrations were analysed using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with repeated measures on series (4, 6, 8, or 10 Trials). For each series of trials separately, 
differences in RPE scores, and perceived and actual maximum reaching height were analysed 
using one-way ANOVAs with repeated measures on number of trials (varying from ‘before 
climbing’ to ‘10 trials’). Mauchly’s test was used to determine whether there was a violation 
of the assumption of sphericity. If a violation occurred, it was corrected for using Huynh-
Feldt procedure before determining whether there were significant differences (Kinnear & 
Gray, 2000). Pair-wise comparisons using t tests were made to locate significant differences 
between means when a significant main effect was found. In these cases, we followed the 
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guidelines set forth by ‘Simple Interactive Statistical Analysis’ (SISA) (see 
http://home.clara.net/sisa/bonhlp.htm) for using the Bonferroni correction procedure (see 
Kinnear & Gray, 2002). In essence, SISA allows adding the mean correlation between the 
outcome variables as a parameter as it is to be expected that a set of Bonferroni adjusted 
variables will be correlated. This meets the criticism pointed out by for example Jaccard and 
Wan (1996) that the Bonferroni correction procedure is too conservative, especially when the 
number of comparisons is large. P values are reported on the basis of this SISA Bonferroni 
method. Effect sizes (ES), indicating how many standard deviations the means under 
consideration differed, were calculated by taking the ratio of the difference between the two 
means and the mean within cell standard deviation of the means (Mullineaux, Bartlett, & 
Bennett, 2001). An effect size of 0.2, 0.5, and greater than 0.8 represents small, moderate, and 
large differences, respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
Results 
Ratings of perceived exertion 
Table 5.1 shows the RPE scores before climbing and during climbing the 4-, 6-, 8- and 10-
trial series climbed on Days 2 and 3. The ANOVA performed on the 4-trial series revealed a 
significant main effect of number of trials, F(1.30, 19.53) = 45.50, p < .001, ES = 1.93. Pair-
wise comparisons revealed that the RPE score had increased significantly after every 2 trials 
(before climbing versus after 2 trials, and after 2 trials versus after 4 trials, both t(15)s > 5.5, 
both ps < .035, both ESs > 0.88. The analyses of the 6-, 8-, and 10-trial series also revealed 
significant main effects of number of trials, F(3, 45 = 115.08, p < .001, ES = 2.69, F(1.43, 
21.38) = 70.81, p < .001, ES = 3.64, and F(1.90, 28.55) = 89.18, p < .001, ES = 5.20, 
respectively. Pair-wise comparisons showed that the RPE score was significantly higher after 
every 2 trials for the 6-, 8-, and 10-trial series, all t(15)s > 5.0, all ps < .034, all ESs > 0.80. 
The RPE scores on Day 4, when the actual maximum reaching height was determined, are 
also shown in Table 5.1. (Due to illness, the RPE score of Participant 9 was missing.) The 
ANOVA performed on these scores revealed a significant main effect of number of trials, 
F(1.60, 22.43) = 100.03, p < .001, ES = 4.83. Pair-wise comparisons indicated that the RPE 
score was significantly higher after every 2 trials, all t(14)s > 5.9, all ps < .014, all ESs > 0.86. 
To verify whether participants were rested from preceding exertions when they started a 
new series of trials, we determined participants’ RPE before they climbed the first, second, 
third, and fourth series of trials, and analysed these data with a series (first series, second 
series) and day (Day 2, Day 3) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. No significant 
effects were found, confirming that the recuperation times had been sufficiently long, all Fs < 
1.82, all ps > 0.20. 
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Table 5.1. Means and standard deviations of the Ratings of Perceived Exertion (RPE scores) 
for the 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10-trial series on Days 2 and 3 (after the perceptual judgements of 
maximum reaching height), and for the 10-trial series on Day 4 (after the actual reaches; far 
right column); Reported are participants’ RPE score before climbing and after climbing 2, 4, 
6, 8, and 10 trials. 
 RPE scores 
After the perceptual judgements (Days 2 and 3) 
 RPE scores 
after the actual reaches 
(Day 4) 
 4-Trial 
series 
(n = 16) 
6-Trial 
series 
(n = 16) 
8-Trial 
series 
(n = 16) 
10-Trial 
series 
(n = 16) 
 10-Trial 
series 
(n = 15) 
Before 
climbing 
 
8.9 ± 2.1 
 
8.4 ± 1.8
 
8.6 ± 2.0
 
8.6 ± 1.9
 
8.9 ± 1.9 
After 2 trials 10.6 ± 1.8 10.4 ± 1.9 10.3 ± 1.9 10.3 ± 1.6 10.5 ± 1.7 
After 4 trials 12.5 ± 1.8 12.1 ± 1.7 12.3 ± 1.5 12.0 ± 1.4 12.3 ± 1.6 
After 6 trials - 13.4 ± 1.4 13.6 ± 1.8 13.5 ± 1.0 13.9 ± 1.3 
After 8 trials - - 14.9 ± 1.5 14.4 ± 0.9 15.3 ± 1.4 
After 10 trials - - - 15.4 ± 1.2 16.5 ± 1.6 
Blood lactate concentration 
Box-plot analyses identified statistical outliers for Participants 2 and 3. The scores for 
Participant 2 were 2.0, 2.2, 7.5, and 3.0 mmol.l-1 and those of Participant 3 were 7.8, 3.5, 3.1, 
and 6.4 mmol.l-1 after climbing the 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10-trial series, respectively. Given the other 
values, it is obvious that the values of 7.5 (Participant 2) and 7.8 (Participant 3) are outliers. 
Therefore, these two participants were excluded from subsequent statistical analysis of the 
blood lactate data. Blood lactate concentration was 2.7 (SD = 0.8), 2.9 (SD = 0.7), 3.2 (SD = 
0.7), and 3.3 (SD = 0.8) mmol.l-1 after climbing the 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10-trial series, respectively. 
The main effect of series did not reach significance although there was a trend, F(3, 39) = 
2.47, p < .10, ES = 0.72. 
Taking the RPE and blood lactate data together, it is safe to conclude that exertion 
progressively increased with increasing number of trials within as well as across the series of 
climbing trials. 
Actual maximum reaching height 
Table 5.2 shows the averages and standard deviations of the actual maximum reaching height 
(due to illness the results of Participant 9 are missing). An ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the actual maximum reaching heights comparing maximum reaching height before climbing, 
and after 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 trials did not show a significant main effect of number of trials, 
F(3.18, 44.52) = 1.48, p > .10. 
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Table 5.2. Means and standard deviations of the actual maximum reaching height for the 10-
trial series on Day 4, and of the perceived maximum reaching height for the series of 4-, 6-, 
8-, and 10-trial series on Days 2 and 3, Reported are participants’ actual and perceived 
maximum reaching height before climbing, and after climbing 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 trials. 
  Perceived Maximum Reaching Heighta (Days 2 and 3) 
 
Actual maximum 
reaching heighta 
(Day 4) 
(n = 15) 
 4-Trial 
series 
(n = 16) 
6-Trial 
series 
(n = 16) 
8-Trial 
series 
(n = 15) 
10-Trial 
series 
(n = 14) 
Before climbing 212.7 ± 9.0  219.4 ± 10.7 221.3 ± 12.6 220.7 ± 15.0 221.5 ± 13.9
After 2 trials 214.0 ± 8.7  218.6 ± 11.5 218.6 ± 12.5 218.6 ± 15.3 219.6 ± 14.1
After 4 trials 213.4 ± 8.6  215.9 ± 11.8 217.0 ± 14.1 216.6 ± 13.2 217.6 ± 13.4
After 6 trials 213.0 ± 9.2   215.8 ± 14.4 215.8 ± 16.0 216.6 ± 14.2
After 8 trials 212.9 ± 9.1    216.4 ± 14.5 216.1 ± 15.0
After 10 trials 212.7 ± 8.5     216.2 ± 14.6
aIn cm. 
Perceived maximum reaching height 
Table 5.2 also shows the perceived maximum reaching heights for the series of 4, 6, 8, and 10 
climbing trials. Note that the number of participants varied for the different statistical analyses 
due to technical failure of the camcorder and misinterpretation of the assessment task by one 
of the participants on Day 2. Furthermore, it is important to realize that the large standard 
deviations reported in Table 5.2 result from the varying heights of the participants, a source of 
variance that is separated from the variance due to the independent variable (i.e., level of 
exertion) in the statistical tests (e.g., Kinnear & Gray, 2000). 
For the 4-trial series a significant main effect was found on number of trials, F(1.47, 22.08) 
= 7.38, p < .05, ES = 0.31. Pair-wise comparisons using t tests revealed that after climbing 4 
trials perceived maximum reaching height was significantly lower than before climbing, t(15) 
= 3.0, p < .047, ES = 0.31, and after climbing 2 trials, t(15) = 2.6, p < .047, ES = 0.23. 
For the 6-trial series there was also a significant main effect of number of trials, F(1.94, 
29.05) = 5.91, p < .05, ES = 0.41. Pair-wise comparisons showed that perceived maximum 
reaching height after climbing 2, 4, or 6 trials was lower than before climbing, all t(15)s > 2.7, 
all ps < .043, all ESs > 0.21. After climbing 6 trials perceived maximum reaching height was 
significantly lower than after climbing 2 trials, t(15) = 2.09, p < .043, ES = 0.21. 
The analysis of the series of 8 trials also yielded a significant main effect of number of 
trials, F(4, 46) = 4.01, p < .05, ES = 0.33. In this series of trials, perceived maximum reaching 
height was significantly lower after climbing 4, 6 or 8 trials than before climbing, all t(14)s > 
2.4, all ps < .043, all ESs > 0.29). After climbing 4 or 6 trials, perceived maximum reaching 
height was significantly lower than after climbing 2 trials, both t(14)s > 2.0, both ps < .043, 
both ESs > 0.14). 
Finally, for the 10-trial series there was also a significant main effect of number of trials, 
F(3.56, 46.25) = 7.23, p < .001, ES = 0.38. After climbing 4, 6, 8, or 10 trials, perceived 
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maximum reaching height appeared to be lower than before climbing, all t(13)s > 3.3, all ps < 
.044, all ESs > 0.28). In addition, after climbing 4, 6, 8, or 10 trials participants assessed their 
maximal reach lower than after climbing 2 trials, all t(13)s > 2.5, all ps < .044, all ESs > 0.14). 
Figure 5.2 provides a graphical summary of the findings of the actual and perceived 
maximum reaching height across the series of climbing trials. As can be seen, the actual 
maximum reaching height remained fairly constant across the number of trials climbed. The 
perceptual changes were most prominent when participants were not yet fatigued, and it 
appears that for the higher levels of exertion perceived maximum reaching height levels off. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Perceived maximum reaching height (in cm) for the series of climbs of 4, 6, 8, and 
10 trials, and actual maximum reaching height (in cm). 
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Discussion 
Actual maximum reaching height did not decrease as the number of trials climbed increased. 
Thus it seems that actual action capabilities were not affected as levels of exertion increased. 
Perceived maximum reaching height did decrease as perceived exertion increased. The more 
fatigued the participants were, the lower their perception of maximum reaching height seemed 
to be (see also Figure 5.2). Note, however, that the perceived maximum reaching height 
decreased especially in the beginning of the climbing task and not at the end when higher 
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levels of perceived exertion were reported. After climbing two trials of which the exercise 
intensity was rated as very light to light (9 and 11 on the RPE scale, respectively; see Table 
5.1), the perceived maximum reaching height already decreased substantially (see Table 5.2). 
Moreover, the perceived maximum reaching height after climbing six or more trials—
accompanied by RPE scores of 13 (somewhat hard) to 15 (hard, heavy)—appeared to level 
off (see Figure 5.2). This suggests that the changes in perceptual judgements that were found 
in this experiment were not stringently related to participants’ higher levels of physical 
fatigue. At the higher levels of perceived exertion, neither perceived nor actual maximum 
reaching height decreased (see also Figure 5.2), which is in accordance with the view that 
judgements of maximum reaching height will only decrease when the actual action 
capabilities are also affected. 
A possible explanation for the finding that the perceived maximum reaching height mainly 
decreased already after 2 and 4 trials and less after 6, 8, and 10 trials might be that as 
participants gain experience in climbing the traverse, they learned to pick up the relevant 
information in order to successfully execute the perceptual task. Although the experimental 
design, with participants climbing the 4-, 6-, 8-, and 10-trial series in different orders (and on 
different days), was intended to correct for order effects, short-term calibration effects (e.g., 
Jacobs, 2001; Jacobs & Michaels, 2002; Withagen & Michaels, 2002) might still have played 
a role. To investigate this we calculated participants’ averaged perceived maximum reaching 
height before they climbed the first, second, third, and fourth series of trials. If the decrease in 
maximum reaching height after 2 and 4 trials is attributable to brief hands-on experience with 
the task, then at least lower scores of perceived maximum reaching height are expected when 
participants performed the second series of trials than when they performed the first series of 
trials. What should be expected for the third and fourth series of trials (relative to series one 
and two) is unclear as they were climbed on another day than series one and two. 
We tested the effects of series (first series, second series) and day (Day 2, Day 3) with a 
two-factor ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors. It appeared that participants 
judged their maximum reaching height to be significantly lower in the second series of trials 
(mean [M] = 219.0, SD = 13.3 cm) than in the first series of trials (M = 221.2, SD = 12.4 cm), 
F(1, 13) = 5.08, p < .05, ES = 0.17. The average perceived maximum reaching height did not 
differ significantly between Day 2 and Day 3, F(1, 13) = 1.32, p > .10, and the interaction 
between series and day was also not significant, F < 1. Apparently the effect of series was 
present on both days, suggesting that participants benefited, at least in the short run, from 
previous experiences with the task at hand. The brief hands-on experience with the task may 
have yielded perceptual information about climbing actions, which allowed calibration and 
led to changes in perceived maximum reaching height. In the General Discussion we return to 
this issue. 
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The design of Experiment 1 was largely dictated by our wish to manipulate exertion in a 
controlled manner. Therefore, all participants also climbed a maximum of 10 trials, which 
yielded exertion levels close to exhaustion in pilot testing. However, in the experiment itself 
the 10 climbing trials did not produce exhaustion in the majority of the participants, although 
many of them indicated that exertion was hard to very hard after climbing the tenth trial. 
Thus, it remains to be seen what the effects of exhaustion are on perceived and actual 
maximum reaching height in the current setting. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we asked another 
group of participants to climb to exhaustion, and we collected data about participants’ 
perceived exertion, and perceived and actual maximum reaching height at increasing levels of 
exertion. 
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to further investigate whether and how perceptual judgements 
change as a function of exertion and action capabilities by including exhaustion trials. In 
Experiment 2 participants climbed twice, once to determine perceived maximum reaching 
height, and a second time to determine actual maximum reaching height as a function of 
exertion. As in Experiment 1, we expected that the RPE scores would increase with the 
number of trials climbed. Furthermore, we expected that exhaustion would lower the actual 
and consequently the perceived maximum reaching height. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 16 female participants (aged 18 to 29 years), mainly college students, volunteered 
to participate in the experiment. None of them had participated in Experiment 1. Participants 
had little or no experience in climbing, and were naive to the purpose of the experiment. All 
participants signed a written informed consent, and were paid a small fee for their 
participation. The study’s protocol was formally approved by the Local Ethics Committee of 
the Faculty of Human Movement Sciences before the experiment was conducted. 
Experimental Set-up 
Participants climbed on the same climbing wall as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 5.1). This time 
the wall was not inclined but vertical, because now there was no need to attempt to restrict the 
climbing duration. In Experiment 1 perceived maximum reaching height was assessed with 
‘descending trials’ only (i.e., the assessment hold was lowered) while usually a combination 
of descending and ascending trials is used for such perceptual measurements (e.g., Pufall & 
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Dunbar, 1992).3 As climbing duration was no longer a serious constraint this was now also 
done in Experiment 2. The position of Hold 2 (see Figure 5.1) was slightly changed so as to 
make ascending trials possible as well. Time now also allowed perceived and actual 
maximum reaching height to be measured each time by means of a tape measure. Again, the 
Dutch version of Borg’s RPE scale (Vanden Auweele, 1991) provided an index of each 
participant’s perceived effort before climbing and after climbing every second trial. As the 
RPE scores seemed to be sufficient to establish gradual changes in participants’ perceived 
exertion, blood lactate was not measured in Experiment 2. Participants wore well-fitting 
climbing shoes and were not secured. All climbs were videotaped using an S-VHS camcorder 
(sampling rate of 50 Hz) allowing inspection of specific aspects of the experiment when 
needed. 
Procedure 
For each participant (tested individually) the experiment was spread over two days. On Day 1 
participants were familiarized with the experiment. They received a brief explanation of the 
RPE scale, and they were instructed about what was meant with maximum reaching upon 
which they had to base their judgements of maximum reaching height (see Experiment 1). 
Then they did an ‘off-the wall’ warming up, as we did not want to provide them with a brief 
hands-on experience with the climbing task. After the warming up participants climbed until 
exhaustion. As in Experiment 1 we measured perceived maximum reaching height and 
participants’ RPE before climbing and after climbing every second trial. Each time perceived 
maximum reaching height was assessed twice. The assessment hold (see Figure 5.1) was 
lowered from halfway the wall, and the participants had to verbally indicate when the hold 
would just be reachable in the prescribed manner (descending trial) (see Experiment 1). 
Perceived maximum reaching height was determined to the nearest millimetre. Subsequently 
the assessment hold was pulled up from the bottom of the wall (ascending trial) and 
perceived maximum reaching height was determined again. The descending and ascending 
trials were presented in alternating order. Again, participants were given no feedback on the 
accuracy of their assessments. After each couple of assessments, the perceived exertion was 
rated. Participants continued climbing until exhaustion. When they rated the exercise as 
extremely hard, score 19 on the RPE scale, they were urged to climb another two trials 
whereupon the perceived maximum reaching height was determined for the last time. After 
that, participants stopped climbing. 
                                                 
3 It is known that participants tend to perceive their maximum reaching height as greater on 
descending trials than on ascending trials (Pufall & Dunbar, 1992). Pufall and Dunbar (1992) 
considered this direction effect as a performance characteristic of perceptual functioning: it is an 
indication of within-observer variability and is “... systematically related to how the obstacle moves 
through the visual world, and correspondingly how it is tracked by the visual system” (p. 32). 
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On Day 2 (5 to 21 days after Day 1) participants’ actual maximum reaching height was 
determined (see Experiment 1) before climbing, and after climbing every second trial until 
exhaustion. Each time after the actual maximum reaching height was established twice, the 
perceived exertion was rated. As with the perceptual judgements, when participants rated the 
exercise as extremely hard, they were encouraged to climb another two trials whereupon the 
actual maximum reaching height was determined for the last time. After that, participants 
stopped climbing. 
Data reduction 
Each time the average of the descending and ascending trials was taken as perceived 
maximum reaching height for that moment. Similarly, actual maximum reaching height was 
the average of the two measurements that were taken each time. 
Statistical analysis 
RPE scores were analysed with a day (Day 1, Day 2) by number of trials (before climbing, 
after 2, 4, 6, and 8 trials, and after exhaustion) ANOVA with repeated measures on both 
factors. Perceived and actual maximum reaching height were analysed using one-way 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on number of trials (before climbing, after climbing 2, 4, 6, 
and 8 trials, and after exhaustion). (See also Results for explaining the number of trials 
analysed.) Violations of the assumption of sphericity were treated in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1. Again, the Bonferroni correction procedure was used, and effect sizes were 
calculated (see Experiment 1). 
Results 
To investigate the differential effects of progressively increasing levels of exertion, we 
considered it necessary to have at least six data points to achieve a continuum of exertion. 
Therefore, participants had to climb at least 10 trials so that we had measurements before 
climbing, after climbing 2, 4, 6, and 8 trials, and after exhaustion. Three participants who 
were unable to climb the required 10 trials were excluded from further analyses. All three had 
ceased their efforts because of muscle cramp. On Day 1 the number of trials after which 
exhaustion was reported ranged from 10 to 82 trials, with an average of 21.8 trials (SD = 
20.4), and on Day 2 it ranged from 10 to 50 trials, with an average of 22.0 trials (SD = 13.1).4 
An overview of the results is presented in Table 5.3. 
                                                 
4 The large difference in the maximum number of trials climbed on Days 1 and 2 can be ascribed to 
one participant who had climbed no less than 82 trials on Day 1 and 38 trials on Day 2. As there was 
no reason to exclude her from the analyses other than the extremely large number of trials climbed on 
Day 1, this participant was included in the analyses reported. Excluding her yielded a similar pattern 
of results. 
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Ratings of perceived exertion on Days 1 and 2 
The ANOVA performed on the RPE scores (see Table 5.3) revealed a significant main effect 
of Day, F(1, 12) = 12.37, p < .05, ES = 0.98. On average, participants reported significantly 
higher RPE scores on Day 1 (M = 15.2, SD = 1.1) than on Day 2 (M = 13.8, SD = 1.7). The 
main effect for number of trials was also significant, F(2.49, 29.87) = 138.81, p < .001, ES = 
6.65, indicating that the RPE score was significantly higher after every two trials, all t(12)s > 
6.2, all ps < .011, all ESs > 0.66.5 There was also a significant Day × Number of Trials 
interaction, F(3.45, 41.34) = 3.96, p < .05, ES = 6.33, which mainly occurred because the 
difference in RPE scores between Days 1 and 2 did no longer exist at the end of climbing 
when exhaustion was reported and, thus, all RPE scores (both on Day 1 and Day 2) are 20 
(see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3. Means and standard deviations of the variables Ratings of Perceived Exertion 
(RPE scores) and actual maximum reaching height on Day 2, and of the variables Ratings of 
Perceived Exertion (RPE scores) and perceived maximum reaching height on Day 1. 
Reported are participants’ RPE score, actual and perceived maximum reaching height before 
climbing, and after climbing 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 trials (Experiment 2). 
 Day 2  Day 1 
 RPE scores Actual maximum 
reaching heighta 
 RPE scores Perceived maximum 
reaching heighta 
Before climbing 9.5 ± 2.4 212.6 ± 5.9  11.1 ± 1.4 221.3 ± 9.7 
After 2 trials 11.3 ± 2.3 214.0 ± 5.0  12.8 ± 1.1 217.1 ± 11.9 
After 4 trials 12.8 ± 2.3 213.8 ± 4.9  14.5 ± 1. 5 218.2 ± 11.2 
After 6 trials 14.2 ± 2.3 212.4 ± 5.5  15.8 ± 1.8 216.7 ± 10.4 
After 8 trials 15.4 ± 2.3 212.1 ± 4.3  17.2 ± 2.0 214.4 ± 10.0 
After exhaustion 20b 210.7 ± 6.8  20b 210.9 ± 12.5 
aIn cm. 
bParticipants stopped climbing, when they rated their exertion as ‘maximal’ (RPE score: 20) so no standard 
deviation is computed. 
Actual maximum reaching height 
Analysis of the actual maximum reaching height (see also Figure 5.3) revealed a significant
main effect of number of trials, F(3.40, 40.75) = 3.77, p < .05, ES = 0.60. Pair-wise 
comparisons showed that after climbing to exhaustion, participants’ actual maximum
reaching height was significantly lower than after climbing 2 or 4 trials, both t(12)s > 3.6, 
both ps < .034, both ESs > 0.53. In addition, participants reached significantly lower after 
climbing 6 or 8 trials than after climbing 2 or 4 trials, all t(12)s > 2.2, all ps < .034, all ESs > 
0.27. In sum, very high levels of exertion affected participants’ actual maximum reaching. 
 
                                                 
5 Recall that the reported p values are on the basis of the SISA Bonferonni method (see Statistical 
Analysis section of Experiment 1). 
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Figure 5.3. Perceived maximum reaching height (indicated by ‘▲’ symbols), and actual 
maximum reaching height (indicated by ‘●’ symbols), before climbing, after climbing 2, 4, 6,
and 8 trials, and after climbing to exhaustion (in cm) (Experiment 2). 
Perceived maximum reaching height 
Figure 5.3 illustrates participants’ perceived maximum reaching height (see also Table 5.3). 
Analysis of the perceived maximum reaching height yielded a significant main effect of 
number of trials, F(3.06, 36.71) = 7.54, p < .001, ES = 0.95.6 Pair-wise comparisons showed 
that the perceived maximum reaching height after climbing 2, 6, or 8 trials, and than after 
climbing to exhaustion was significantly lower than before climbing, all t(12)s > 2.3, all ps < 
.032, all ESs > 0.38. In addition, participants perceived their maximum reach to be 
significantly lower after climbing to exhaustion than after climbing 2, 4, and 6 trials, all t(12)s 
> 2.5, all ps < .032, all ESs > 0.50. The perceived maximum reaching height after climbing 8 
trials was significantly lower than after climbing 4 and 6 trials, both t(12)s > 2.1, both ps < 
.032, both ESs > 0.22. No significant differences were found in perceived maximum reaching 
height after having climbed 4 trials compared to having climbed 2 trials, and after having 
climbed 6 trials compared to having climbed 4 trials, both t(12)s < 1.7, ps > .032). The 
                                                 
6 Given the change from using descending trials only in Experiment 1 to a combination of 
descending and ascending trials in Experiment 2, it is important to note that the pattern of results is 
similar when descending or ascending trials are analysed separately. 
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difference between 8 trials and exhaustion was not statistically significant, t(12) = 1.6, p > 
.032. 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, each time participants climbed another two trials they reported more 
exertion than before climbing the two trials, which indicates that the manipulation of exertion 
was successful. For levels of exertion perceived as light (RPE score about 11) to hard (RPE 
score about 15), participants’ actual maximum reaching height was not affected. At higher 
levels of exertion and after exhaustion participants’ actual maximum reaching height was 
affected leading to lower reaches. The changes in actual maximal reaching height may seem 
small (range 210.7 cm to 214.0 cm), but note that the actual range of reachability is probably 
closer to, say, 40 cm (i.e., maximum reaching height minus physical height) or even less. 
Even when exhausted, one will still at least succeed in raising one’s hand above one’s head. 
In that light, the observed decrease in actual maximum reaching height is both substantial and 
meaningful, as it may, for instance, be decisive in whether a route can be climbed or not. 
As in Experiment 1, the perceived maximum reaching height decreased particularly in the 
beginning of the climbing task (see Figure 5.3) when fatigue had not yet set in. In addition, 
for levels of exertion perceived as light (RPE score about 11) to hard (RPE score about 15), 
the perceived maximum reaching height did not change. At the moment that exercise 
intensities were rated, on average, as very hard and higher (RPE score 17 and higher), the 
perceived maximum reaching height again declined significantly (see Table 5.3). Overall, 
these findings seem to indicate that changes in perceived maximum reaching height followed 
changes in actual maximum reaching height rather than changes in exertion. 
General Discussion 
In the present study, we examined the relationship between perception of action possibilities, 
actual action capabilities, and progressing levels of exertion in the context of wall climbing. 
Three parts of this relationship became apparent in the results of Experiments 1 and 2 (see 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3): First, when participants were not yet fatigued a rapid decrease in 
perceived maximum reaching height occurred while the actual maximum reaching height 
remained constant. Second, levels of exertion rated as light (RPE score about 11) to hard 
(RPE score about 15), neither affected the actual nor the perceived maximum reaching height. 
Third, when exertion was rated as very/extremely hard (RPE score 18/19) to maximal exertion 
(RPE score 20), participants’ actual maximum reaching height declined, which was 
accompanied by a decrease in their perceived maximum reaching height. It is useful to discuss 
each of these parts in detail. 
First, brief hands-on experience with the task (see Discussion of Experiment 1) seems to be 
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responsible for the early changes in perceived maximum reaching height that were found in 
both experiments. Scaling of perceptual judgements on the basis of exploratory behaviour was 
also reported by Mark (1987), who found that after a change in eye-height of 10 cm observers 
quickly recalibrated their judgements of maximal sitting and stepping height when they were 
allowed to move and employ information-gathering activities such as locomotion and head 
turning. In climbing the first few trials, the participants in the present experiments may have 
calibrated their actions in relation to their environment leading to more accurate (lower) 
judgements of maximum reaching height after climbing two trials. This adaptation appeared 
to be functional because participants started with apparent overestimations. Furthermore, the 
adaptation in question occurred each time anew as is apparent from the fact that calibration 
effects were visible on the different testing days (see also Discussion of Experiment 1). 
Second, light to hard levels of perceived exertion affected neither actual nor perceived 
maximum reaching height. Thus, although the physical state of the participants changed in 
that they became more fatigued, it did not affect their judgements of maximum reaching 
height, which again seemed to be functional, as the participant’s action capabilities remained 
unaffected. 
Third, as soon as changes in participants’ action capabilities occurred, as was the case 
when perceived exertion was rated as very hard to maximal exertion, changes in perception of 
action possibilities were also apparent. Thus, perceived maximum reaching height seemed to 
follow changes in actual maximum reaching height, rather than the state of physical fatigue of 
the observer. 
These results indicate that changes in perceived exertion are not necessarily related to 
changes in perception of action possibilities. Changes in the perception of action possibilities 
only occur when changes in participants’ actual action capabilities have occurred. Thus, the 
perception of the environment in terms of action possibilities does not change when the 
observer is, for instance, somewhat fatigued, anxious, or hungry. Dropping for a moment the 
conceptual self-embargo of Footnote 1, our findings are consistent with Gibson’s (1979) 
original ideas about affordances that a change in need or state of the observer does not 
immediately alter affordances, and hence, the perception of affordances. Only as soon as the 
observer’s action capabilities are affected, for instance, when exhausted, the perception of the 
action possibilities is affected as well. 
This does not imply that changes in an observer’s state or need without changes in action 
capabilities have no effect at all on the perception and realization of affordances. A person’s 
internal state plays an important role in the selection of affordances as people have to select 
which affordances they wish to realize among the many that are afforded by the environment, 
depending on their intentions (Gibson, 1979; Michaels, 2003; Stoffregen, 2003). It is very 
likely that people’s intentions, and hence, the selection of affordances, are constrained by the 
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person’s state or need. As Gibson (1979) put it “The observer may or may not perceive or 
attend to the affordance, according to its needs, but the affordance, being invariant, is always 
there to be perceived” (p. 139). Thus, the state or need of an observer is of relevance in 
constraining the choice of action modes to achieve a particular goal (Mark et al., 1997; 
Stoffregen, 2003). 
It is important to note that the functional relationship between actual action capabilities and 
perceived action possibilities does not mean that absolute values of the estimations should be 
a perfect match of the actual action capabilities. Just as in other research into the perception of 
reaching possibilities (e.g., Bootsma et al., 1992; Carello et al., 1989; Heft, 1993; Pepping & 
Li, 1997; Pufall & Dunbar, 1992), reaching height was generally overestimated in our study. 
In this respect, Heft (1993) showed that verbal judgements of action possibilities invite an 
analytical attitude transforming what is typically a skilled, unreflective perception-action 
process, into a reflective judgement. When judgements of reach were a means to complete 
another task the analytical attitude was circumvented and the assessments of perceived reach 
were more accurate (Heft, 1993). 
As an aside, this seems to be in accordance with recent findings that there are two 
anatomically distinct streams for visual information processing, the ventral and the dorsal 
stream, each serving quite different functions dubbed vision for perception and vision for 
action, respectively (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 1995; Goodale & Haffenden, 1998). Vision for 
perception is mainly concerned with representing the world, that is, the explicit knowledge of 
environmental properties. Vision for action is primarily concerned with the control of action 
in the environment (Goodale & Haffenden, 1998; Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; Milner & 
Goodale, 1995; Norman, 2002). By implication verbal judgements would tap the ventral 
rather than the dorsal stream providing ‘information for perception’ that is not necessarily 
accurate (Goodale & Humphrey, 1998; van der Kamp, Savelsbergh, & Rosengren, 2001). 
Vision for action, as supported by dorsal stream activity, should be accurate and requires 
“veridical evaluation of the surface layout for effective interaction with the immediate 
environment” (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999, p. 1093). The use of verbal reports in our study may 
have contributed to the overestimations of maximum reaching height. 
Conclusions 
Our study supports two main conclusions. First, early during task execution when fatigue was 
not yet present, changes in perceived maximum reaching height already occurred. The brief 
hands-on experience with the task may have produced or exposed relevant perceptual 
information about climbing actions, which allowed calibration to occur and led to changes in 
perceived maximum reaching height. Second, and most important for the present study, there 
appears to be a functional fit between participants’ actual action capabilities rather than their 
physical state of fatigue and perceived action possibilities. Apart from the early changes, 
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perceived maximum reaching height followed the changes in action capabilities. When there 
were no such changes (at moderate levels of perceived exertion), no changes in perceived 
action possibilities occurred. Only when actual maximum reaching height changed (i.e., at 
higher levels of perceived exertion), this was reflected by perceptual changes. Thus, only at 
the higher and not for lower levels of exertion, perceptual judgements about action 
possibilities may change. 
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Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, a series of experiments was reported aimed at furthering our 
understanding of the impact of state variables (i.e., anxiety and fatigue) on human motor 
performance. As it was important to find an adequate and expedient way to manipulate 
anxiety, climbing on an indoor climbing wall was chosen as experimental task (see Chapters 
2-4). This task also provided a natural context to manipulate fatigue (Chapter 5). The aim of 
this epilogue is to review a selection of the results with an eye for future directions in 
studying effects of anxiety on human motor performance. First, I will summarize the major 
findings of Chapters 2-5. 
Summary of the main results of Chapters 2-5 
The studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3 were done from a process-oriented approach in order 
to identify the effects of anxiety on physiological, psychological and behavioural processes 
underlying task performance, rather than task performance per se. 
Chapter 2 reported two experiments that were conducted to study manifestations of anxiety 
at the subjective, physiological and behavioural level of analysis. Anxiety was manipulated in 
novice climbers by using a climbing wall with routes defined at different heights (low and 
high), while self-reported state anxiety, heart rate, blood lactate concentration and muscle 
fatigue, movement fluency, and climbing time were measured. When novice climbers climbed 
the high route on the climbing wall they subjectively reported significantly more anxiety than 
when they traversed the same route low on the climbing wall. At the physiological level, they 
exhibited significantly higher heart rates, more muscle fatigue, and higher blood lactate 
concentrations (climbing times were standardised). Furthermore, state anxiety also affected 
the movement behaviour of the participants in that a geometric index of the entropy of their 
trajectories as well as their climbing times increased. Indeed, anxiety manifested itself at all 
three levels, and it was tentatively concluded that anxiety induces a temporary regress to a 
form of movement execution that is associated with earlier stages of motor learning. 
Chapter 3 also focused on the impact of anxiety on movement behaviour at the climbing 
wall using novice climbers as participants. Masters’ (1992) conscious processing hypothesis 
suggests that under pressure an inward focus of attention occurs, resulting in more conscious 
control of the movement execution of well-learned skills, resulting in turn in interference with 
automatic task execution and performance decrements. Recent empirical support for this 
hypothesis was found in terms of the effects of pressure on end performance. The present 
study tested whether the changes in performance were also accompanied by changes in 
movement execution, as would be expected from Masters’ hypothesis. Again, two identical 
traverses at different heights on a climbing wall were used to create different anxiety 
conditions. In line with the conscious processing hypothesis, it was found that anxiety had a 
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significant effect on participants’ movement behaviour in that climbing time and the number 
of explorative movements were increased (Experiments 1 and 2), holds were grasped longer 
and movements between holds were slower (Experiment 2). As such, the results provided 
additional support for the conscious processing hypothesis as well as insight into the relations 
among anxiety, performance, and movement behaviour. 
Chapter 4 reported three experiments on the relation between anxiety and perception, 
again in the context of climbing with identical traverses situated high and low on a climbing 
wall to manipulate anxiety, and using novices as participants. In Experiment 1 participants 
judged their maximal overhead reachability and made maximal reaches on the climbing wall. 
Increased anxiety was found to reduce both perceived and actual maximum reaching height. 
The second experiment tested whether these perceptual changes were also accompanied by 
changes in participants’ selection of action possibilities (affordances) and, consequently, overt 
movement behaviour. As before, two identical traverses at different heights (low and high) on 
a climbing wall were used to manipulate anxiety. Participants climbed from right to left and 
back on the high and low traverses, which now entailed an abundance of holds. Elevated (self-
reported) anxiety led to increases in climbing time, as well as the number of holds used, 
consistent with the reduction of perceived and actual maximum reaching height found in 
Experiment 1. In order to gain more insight into the attentional mechanisms that might 
underlie the anxiety-induced changes in perception and realization of action possibilities that 
were found in Experiments 1 and 2, points of lights were sequentially projected around the 
participants while they were climbing in the third experiment. As participants detected less 
lights in the high-anxiety condition, it was concluded that anxiety narrowed attention. In 
general, the results underscored that the actor’s emotional state affects the perception and 
realization of affordances in a manner that is consistent with the changes that accompany this 
emotional state, such as changes in actual action capabilities and attention. 
For obvious reasons, experimental manipulation of the state variable anxiety is more 
limited in evoking extreme changes in mood state than a state variable such as fatigue. In 
Chapter 5 we therefore reported an attempt to generalize the conclusions of Chapter 4, 
regarding the relationship between anxiety and perception, to fatigue. In the first experiment, 
novices had to complete the same traverse on a climbing wall a given number of times (up to 
10 trials), in order to induce increasing levels of exertion. Before and during climbing 
participants judged their maximum reaching height, as well as perceived exertion. On a 
separate day, they climbed another 10 trials and performed actual maximum reaches during 
climbing. Higher levels of perceived exertion were correlated with decreases in perceived 
maximum reaching height while actual reaching height remained constant. However, the 
perceptual changes were found predominantly early during task execution when participants 
were not yet fatigued. When fatigue kicked in neither perceived nor actual maximum reaching 
 132
Epilogue 
height was affected. Contrary to the expectations of pilot testing, however, not all participants 
reached exhaustion after climbing 10 trials. Therefore, in Experiment 2 exhaustion trials were 
included. The findings replicated the early changes in perception, which may have resulted 
from task adaptation, also referred to as calibration. Furthermore, while climbing to 
exhaustion, perceptual judgements now changed largely in accordance with changes in the 
actual maximum reaching height. In keeping with Chapter 4, these findings were interpreted 
to imply the existence of a functional relationship between participants’ actual action 
possibilities, rather than their state of physical fatigue per se, and perceived action 
possibilities. 
The impact of anxiety on human motor performance 
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that anxiety affects a plethora of subjective, physiological and 
behavioural processes that contribute differentially, and probably interactively, to the 
resulting performance. We found changes in self-reported state anxiety, heart rate, blood 
lactate concentration, muscle fatigue, movement fluency, and climbing time. In addition, the 
number of exploratory movements changed, as did the time participants grasped the holds and 
moved from hold to hold. Anxiety was also found to reduce both perceived and actual 
maximal reaching height, which constrained the choice of behaviour evidenced by the use of a 
different number of holds when climbing a route in both anxiety conditions. Finally, we found 
indications that anxiety induced attentional narrowing. 
Thus, a number of changes due to anxiety have been identified on different levels of 
analysis, which at the level of human action can be summarized as changes in the perception 
and selection of affordances. This leads to the question how the actor’s emotional state affects 
the selection of affordances, as the commonplace situation is that the environmental layout 
affords multiple actions for achieving a particular goal. To give an example of the presence of 
multiple affordances, for some people a vertical wall affords climbing provided it has 
sufficient irregularities to be grasped and to stand on. For others, the wall hardly affords 
climbing and, if it does, other possibilities for action come to the fore: jumping back to the 
safe floor or, a less attractive possibility, falling down. The same ambiguity can be observed 
when individuals are in a safe or unsafe environment. When individuals stand on the floor, the 
holds on the wall within reach of the individual provide opportunities to step on or cling onto. 
However, situated a few metres above the floor these opportunities are less readily 
appreciated: one can slip off the hold or fail to reach the grip. Thus, how is behaviour 
constrained under anxiety conditions? I will elaborate on that issue in the next subsection. 
‘State-scaled’ information about affordances 
A critical issue in Gibson’s (1979) theory is the question of how the concept of affordances 
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constrains perception and behaviour (Cutting, 1982; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Hardy & Jones, 
1994; van Wieringen, 1988), or in other words, how affordances are selected. Evidently, the 
problem of affordance selection is inevitable. Cutting (1982) exemplifies this by listing what a 
piece of paper affords and concluded that “... it quite simply affords all the possible things I 
can do with it” (p. 216). In order to apply the theory of affordances, it seems critical to resolve 
the problem of selection or choice (e.g., Mark et al., 1997). Is the perception of affordances 
influenced by affective and cognitive factors such as anxiety? Or is a more parsimonious 
explanation available without using these concepts? For example, Jiang, Mark, Anderson, and 
Down (1993) and Jiang and Mark (1994) provided an elegant explanation for their finding 
that participants’ estimates of crossable gap width decreased as gap depth increased by 
showing that estimates of gap crossing capability depended decisively on where observers 
directed their gaze: when looking down into the gap, participants tended to underestimate 
their capabilities more than when they looked at the horizon. Thus, Jiang and colleagues 
disputed that emotional (or analytical) processes caused the more conservative assessments 
they had found in their study. Their explanation, however, does not exclude the possibility 
that gaze direction and emotional processes covaried, that is, when participants looked down 
into the gap they may have felt fear of the depth resulting from the increased risk to their 
safety. When they looked at the horizon participants may have felt no or less fear. Hence, 
anxiety might have played a role in the changes in the perception of gap crossability. 
Based on the findings of the present thesis, we would argue that an observer who is in a 
threatening environment will pick up information of the environment as well as information 
of his or her own body. The latter will deviate from ordinary feelings, sensations and so on, 
and the observer will behave accordingly (for illustrations, see Chapters 2-5). To single out an 
example from this thesis, a threatening environment affected the neuromuscular system (see 
Chapter 2),1 and observers ‘would be wise’ to account for these effects when asked for their 
action capabilities in that environment. Thus, from the perspective of the mutuality of 
observer and environment—one of the central tenets of ecological psychology (Gibson, 
1979)—it is most likely that information of the environment and the actor’s emotional state 
will be picked up and thus affect the individual’s perception of affordances and the 
performance of the action. For that reason, it is important to establish participants’ action 
capabilities in the anxiety conditions applied. (It is perhaps important to note that Jiang and 
Mark [1994] measured each person’s actual stepping capability by asking him or her to step 
as far forward as they could on the floor, hence in an emotionally neutral situation.) 
The results of Chapters 4-5 underscored the idea that state variables such as anxiety and 
                                                 
1 Note that very small changes in human motor coordination may lead to dramatic changes in end 
performance. For example, a small change in the timing of one muscle may completely deteriorate 
jumping performance (e.g., van Ingen Schenau, van Soest, Gabriëls, & Horstink, 1995; van Soest, 
1992). 
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fatigue co-determine which affordances are being perceived and realized and emphasize the 
intricate relation between perception and action. Information about changes in the state of the 
actor is automatically incorporated in perceiving and realizing affordances. The results show 
that actors use current and up-to-date information about their particular state, and changes 
therein, in perceiving and realizing affordances. Thus, it appeared that observers actually use 
this available ‘state-scaled’ information in making judgements about maximal reaching height 
(see Chapters 4-5). In this respect, the effects of (temporal) changes in one’s state greatly 
resemble the effects of, for example, (temporal) changes in eye-height (Mark, 1987), running 
speed (Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & Dolné, 1996; Oudejans, Michaels, van Dort, & 
Frissen, 1996), or ground surface on the perception of affordances (Pepping & Li, 2000). For 
instance, Mark (1987) showed that observers use the available eye-height-scaled information 
as a basis for their judgements about whether the heights of various surfaces afforded sitting 
or climbing on. Mark then increased the observers’ eye-height by having them wear 10-cm 
blocks under their feet, which increased both the observers’ eye-height and the maximum 
height of a surface on which observers could sit. The new maximum sitting height is a smaller 
fraction of the new eye-height (both are increased by the same amount, i.e., 10 cm), therefore 
observers should underestimate their own actual sitting capabilities when wearing the blocks. 
This prediction follows from the use of available eye-height-scaled information in making 
judgements about whether a surface affords sitting on. It appeared that only in the first trial 
observers underestimated their own new actual sitting capabilities, and that they quickly 
discovered the altered sitting capabilities.2 Similar effects were found in the study of Pepping 
and Li (2000). They demonstrated that depending on the elasticity properties of the ground 
surface participants judged their reach-with-jump action differently: The perceptual 
adaptation appeared to be in the same direction as the actual change of reaching ability. 
The flexible manner in which changes in the (psychological) state of the actor are 
incorporated in perception and action fits well with the quick adaptations to changes in eye-
height, running speed, and ground surface discussed in the previous paragraph, and 
underscores the importance of on-line information about environmental, task, and organismic 
constraints for perception and action. It is widely acknowledged that affordances are 
intimately linked to those constraints on action (cf. Newell, 1986), resulting in a dynamical 
animal-environment fit. People constantly adapt their actions to changes in the environment, 
the task and the human action system itself (Bingham, 1988). Regarding the human action 
                                                 
2 In a follow-up study, Mark, Balliett, Craver, Douglas, and Fox (1990) demonstrated that 
information-gathering activities (e.g., locomoting between trials, rotating the head while making the 
judgements) are crucial for revealing information about their own new actual sitting capabilities. This 
is in keeping with results of Oudejans and colleagues who demonstrated that being in motion improves 
the perception of action possibilities, such as the perception of catchableness of fly balls (Oudejans, 
Michaels, et al., 1996), or the perception of the crossableness of a busy road (Oudejans, Michaels, van 
Dort, et al., 1996). 
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system, research has predominantly focused on geometric measures (e.g., arm length, leg 
length; see, e.g., Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel, Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Mark, 1987; Mark 
et al., 1997; Warren, 1984, 1988), biomechanical constraints such as strength, limb mobility, 
and joint flexibility (e.g., Konczak, Meeuwsen, & Cress, 1992), and kinetic measures (e.g., 
Pepping & Li, 2000). The results of the present thesis support the notion that the boundaries 
for action are also defined by the observers’ state. State variables change the actors’ action 
capabilities, and in keeping with this also the perception of affordances changes. Moreover, 
the finding that brief hands-on experience with the task also led to a quick recalibration of the 
perception of maximal reaching height, is consistent with the idea that perception of 
affordances smoothly adapts on the basis of on-line information about the constraints of the 
situation encountered. 
Thus, the results suggest that throughout the movement, emotional state feedback offers 
important guidance in the ongoing control of actions by revealing changes in one’s action 
possibilities as it progresses. Rather than undermining some of the principles of ecological 
psychology, this thesis demonstrates that emotional state variables and the accompanying 
changes in perception and action are fully in accordance with those principles. 
Modelling anxiety-performance relationships 
A profound question in anxiety research is what the precise impact of anxiety is on end 
performance (e.g., Jones, 1995a). Evidently, insight into effects of anxiety on end 
performance is relevant, especially in sport and other domains in which performers often act 
under pressure such as dance, music making, installing law and order and fire fighting. Do the 
results of the present thesis tell us something about the relation between anxiety and end 
performance? To answer this question it is useful to revisit the discussion on anxiety-
performance models of Chapter 1. 
Part of the performance variance following anxiety stems from the multidimensionality of 
anxiety. In this regard, the development of the ‘multidimensional anxiety-based 
approaches’—that is, multidimensional anxiety theory (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) and 
the cusp catastrophe model (Hardy, 1990, 1996)—was a major step forward in understanding 
the anxiety-performance relationship. Recall that multidimensional anxiety theory predicts 
that cognitive and somatic anxiety will differentially influence end performance, predicting a 
negative linear relationship between cognitive anxiety and performance, and an inverted-U 
relationship between somatic anxiety and end performance.3 Hardy’s (1990, 1996) cusp 
catastrophe model also uses a multidimensional conceptualisation of anxiety to examine and 
                                                 
3 Although multidimensional anxiety theory has been tested in the sport context, with only limited 
or partial support (Gould, Greenleaf, & Krane, 2002), a body of literature has supported the utility of 
distinguishing between cognitive and somatic anxiety components in anxiety research, and “there is 
potentially a great deal to be learned from their interplay.” (Jones, 1995a, p. 456) 
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predict interactive effects of cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal upon performance. 
Cognitive anxiety would have a positive relationship with performance when physiological 
arousal is low, but a negative relationship when physiological arousal is high. When cognitive 
anxiety is low (as in most laboratory situations), the model predicts that physiological arousal 
has an inverted-U shaped relationship with performance. In contrast, when cognitive anxiety 
is high, increased levels of physiological anxiety lead to a ‘catastrophic’ drop in 
performance.4
Thus, the adoption of the multidimensional anxiety notion helps to account for some of the 
mixed and inconclusive findings regarding the effects of anxiety on end performance. 
However, these approaches are limited in that they seem less suitable to explain why the same 
anxiety manipulation may lead to different effects on performance as found in the current 
thesis. For example, in most of the reported experiments anxiety led to a longer climbing 
time. However, in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2 the climbing time in which participants had to 
execute the task was preset, and participants were able to meet the set criterion time despite 
several effects of anxiety (e.g., more muscle fatigue). Furthermore, when given the 
opportunity participants took advantage of the abundance of holds in the anxiety conditions in 
Experiment 2 of Chapter 4, while in the other experiments participants managed to climb the 
high horizontal route using significantly less holds. Apparently, participants were able to 
override several of the effects of anxiety with additional effort in order to meet the 
requirements of the specific situation. In all cases, the manipulation of anxiety was the same, 
yet different effects on performance seemed to have occurred, which are difficult to explain 
with the multidimensional-anxiety based approaches. 
In applying an ecological approach to explaining the different effects of the same anxiety 
manipulation on human motor performance, Mark’s (Mark, 1995; Mark et al., 1997) 
distinction between absolute and preferred critical boundaries is relevant. Mark et al.’s (1997) 
point of departure was that the absolute critical boundary for a particular mode of action does 
not delimit the conditions under which that action will be performed when multiple action 
modes can be used to realize the intended goal. They argued that even when the absolute 
critical boundary for a particular action mode (i.e., for reaching only using arm extension) has 
not been exceeded, that mode might not be chosen because another mode may be more 
comfortable, and require less effort to perform (i.e., reaching and using the upper torso to lean 
forward). Mark et al. therefore proposed, and demonstrated, that, rather than the absolute 
                                                 
4 Various studies offer support for the predictions of the cusp catastrophe model (e.g., Edwards & 
Hardy, 1996; Edwards, Kingston, Hardy, & Gould, 2002; Hardy, 1996; Hardy, Woodman, & 
Carrington, 2004; Woodman, Albinson, & Hardy, 1997). However, it has also been argued that the 
cusp catastrophe model, although promising, “lacks the sound framework necessary to examine the 
effects of multidimensional anxiety and physiological arousal on motor performance” (Cohen, 
Pargman, & Tenenbaum, 2003, p. 155). 
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critical boundary, the preferred critical boundary—reflecting the relative comfort of available 
modes of action—delimits the boundaries for various actions. As another example, it is 
known that gait transitions in horses, for instance, from walking to trotting to galloping, are 
for a major part determined by energetic costs of the gait patterns in question (Hoyt & Taylor, 
1981). Organismic constraints such as anxiety seem to be integrated with constraints related 
to the actor’s comfort and biodynamic costs. Consequently, if an abundance of holds is 
available (Experiment 2, Chapter 4), heightened anxiety will lead to the use of more holds to 
climb a route as participants preferred to select another, more comfortable, mode of action to 
fulfil the task. If participants are forced to climb the traverse within a preset time (Experiment 
1, Chapter 2), all participants will probably be able to meet this requirement, but only at the 
cost of more energy expenditure. Hence, it seems important to consider the factor ‘required 
effort’ in modelling anxiety-performance relationships. 
The importance of required effort was recognized by Eysenck and Calvo (1992). They 
started from the observation that increases in anxiety do not automatically have to result in 
performance decrements, and from the theoretical position that processing efficiency—that is, 
task performance divided by effort—influences the quality of task performance (performance 
effectiveness). In their view, anxiety typically impairs processing efficiency, but not 
necessarily task performance. Thus, the processing efficiency theory explains how individual 
differences in trait anxiety interact with state anxiety and attentional mechanisms in affecting 
performance. It predicts that anxious individuals will invest more effort in the task at hand if 
they feel they have a reasonable chance of success (Woodman & Hardy, 2003). As such, the 
theory might provide an answer to a growing body of literature suggesting that anxiety has 
both facilitative and debilitative functions (e.g., Jones, 1995; Jones & Uphill, 2004; Swain & 
Jones, 1996). Support for the predictions of the processing efficiency theory has been 
provided in several recent empirical investigations (e.g., Murray & Janelle, 2003; Smit, 
Bellamy, Collins, & Newell, 2001; Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002), confirming the 
idea that invested effort is an important factor in anxiety-performance relationships. 
 
The gist of the preceding discussion is that unravelling the precise details of the anxiety-
performance relationship remains a major challenge to future researchers in this area. The 
complex phenomena involved often cannot be explained in simple terms using general and 
simple models (Jones, 1995a).5 Moreover, the recent literature on choking under pressure in 
                                                 
5 In the current thesis a nomothetic (group-oriented) perspective was used, ignoring, by definition, 
the large inter-individual variability in anxiety responses. Hence, an alternative approach would be to 
develop individualized anxiety and performance measures as a means to establish individualized 
optimal anxiety performance relationships, and thus giving practitioners tools to help athletes in 
enhancing their performance. Hanin’s ‘individual zone of optimal functioning (IZOF) model (Hanin, 
1980, 1989, 2000) provides such an individualized approach. Hanin suggested that through 
retrospective and systematic multiple observations of an athlete’s anxiety and performance levels, a 
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sports reveals that several additional factors that have not been addressed in this thesis also 
play a role in the anxiety-performance relationship. Whether athletes choke or not, for 
instance, is dependent on the kind of task (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & 
Carr, 2004), task complexity (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992), personality 
characteristics (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 1992; Wang, Marchant, Morris, & Gibbs, 
2004), whether a given task was learned implicitly or explicitly (e.g., Law, Masters, Bray, 
Eves, & Bardswell, 2003; Masters, 1992; Mullen & Hardy, 2000), and expertise level (e.g., 
Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Wulf, McNevin, Fuchs, Ritter, & Toole, 2000). 
In this context, the recent work of Reeves (2005) is worth mentioning. She investigated when 
and where choking under pressure occurs while taking into account a large number of these 
factors—that is, attentional direction (external and internal), attentional relevance (relevant 
and non-relevant), task difficulty (simple and complex), and skill-level (expert, sub-elite, and 
novice). Among other things, Reeves found “that participants focusing internally on non-
relevant aspects of performance (i.e., one’s thoughts, or the arm in soccer) choke under 
pressure, regardless of expertise-level or task difficulty” (p. x). Getting used to such an 
internal focus by practising under conditions with increased internal attention has been 
demonstrated to prevent choking in beginners (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997) 
and experts alike (Oudejans & Pijpers, 2005). 
To conclude, as was amply illustrated in the present thesis, anxiety affects a plethora of 
variables at different levels, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to come up with an 
all-encompassing theory for the relationship between anxiety and performance. Nevertheless, 
systematic investigation of these changes and underlying processes might help explain 
anxiety effects on performance and provide good starting points for building such a theory 
and for developing stress management techniques. In addition, it may help in developing a 
theory of perception and action incorporating not only the more physical, but also the more 
psychological constraints. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
zone of optimal functioning (ZOF) can be identified. The model predicts that individual successful 
performance occurs when an athlete’s anxiety level is near or within the previously established 
optimal zones. For more information about the validity and practical utility of the individualized zones 
of optimal functioning model, see Jokela and Hanin (1999). 
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Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
 

Samenvatting 
De invloed van angst op perceptueel-motorisch gedrag 
Het centrale thema van dit proefschrift is de invloed van toestandsvariabelen, in het bijzonder 
toestandsangst,1 op het perceptueel-motorische gedrag. Een taak die zich goed leent voor de 
bestudering van dit onderwerp is het klimmen op een indoorklimwand. De deelnemers 
klommen zowel laag op de klimwand, de angstneutrale-conditie genoemd, als hoog op de 
klimwand, de angstconditie genoemd. In alle experimenten die in dit proefschrift worden 
gerapporteerd, bleek deze angstmanipulatie effectief te zijn. In de regel moesten de 
deelnemers een horizontale route klimmen die door middel van grepen was uitgezet op de 
klimwand. De in het proefschrift beschreven experimenten beogen op de eerste plaats meer 
inzicht te verschaffen in de processen die ten grondslag liggen aan de veranderingen in 
motorisch gedrag onder invloed van toestandsangst. Daarnaast wordt beoogd de invloed van 
toestandsvariabelen op het waarnemen, selecteren en realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden 
beter te doorgronden. Het accent ligt daarbij op de variabele angst en, in mindere mate, op de 
variabele vermoeidheid. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt het theoretische kader van dit proefschrift, de ecologische 
psychologie, kort geschetst. Binnen deze benadering wordt uitgegaan van de onlosmakelijke 
relatie tussen zowel persoon en omgeving, als tussen waarnemen en bewegen, waardoor 
uiteindelijk een beschrijving van de omgeving resulteert in termen van op de persoon 
toegesneden handelingsmogelijkheden, zogenoemde affordances (Gibson, 1979). Hoewel het 
begrip affordance behoort tot de fundamenten van de ecologische psychologie, woedt er een 
levendige discussie over de precieze betekenis van dit begrip. De verschillende opvattingen 
over het begrip affordances staan echter vragen over factoren die een rol spelen bij het 
waarnemen en realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden niet in de weg. Onderzoek naar die 
vragen kan plaatsvinden aan de hand van Newell’s (1986) driedeling van constraints. 
Constraints zijn ‘beperkende factoren’, ofwel factoren of eigenschappen die mogelijke 
handelingen inperken of begrenzen. Newell onderscheidde omgevings-constraints 
(bijvoorbeeld zwaartekracht, omgevingstemperatuur), taak-constraints (zoals taakinstructies 
en spelregels in de sport) en organisme-constraints (bijvoorbeeld sprongkracht, maximale 
loopsnelheid, maar ook factoren als nervositeit en vermoeidheid). De twee laatstgenoemde 
voorbeelden zijn psychologische toestandsvariabelen. Aan dat type variabelen is binnen de 
ecologische psychologie tot nu toe weinig aandacht besteed bij het bestuderen van het 
waarnemen en realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden, hoewel er diverse redenen zijn om te 
veronderstellen dat die variabelen een rol spelen (Stoffregen, 2003). 
                                                 
1 De term anxiety’ wordt in dit proefschrift vertaald met ‘toestandsangst‘ en wordt opgevat als een 
momentane emotionele reactie ter onderscheid van angst als dispositie of persoonlijkheidstrek (zie ook 
Hoofdstuk 1). 
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De keuze voor de ecologische psychologie als theoretisch kader voor het bestuderen van de 
relatie tussen toestandsangst en perceptueel-motorisch gedrag wordt gemotiveerd op basis van 
een kritische samenvatting van de uitgebreide literatuur over de angst-prestatie-relatie in de 
sportpsychologie en de daarbinnen vigerende theoretische modellen en methoden van 
onderzoek. De conclusie van deze uiteenzetting is dat het gebrek aan eenduidigheid in de 
resultaten van het onderzoek naar de invloed van toestandsangst op het motorisch gedrag in 
belangrijke mate kan worden toegeschreven aan het overwegend productgeoriënteerde 
karakter van de gehanteerde theoretische modellen. De verwachting is dat een 
procesgeoriënteerde benadering een betekenisvolle(re) bijdrage kan leveren aan het 
verhelderen van het verband tussen toestandsangst en perceptueel-motorisch gedrag, en dat 
het theoretische kader van de ecologische psychologie bij uitstek geschikt is om een 
dergelijke benadering te ontwikkelen. 
In de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 wordt vanuit een procesgeoriënteerde invalshoek het verband 
tussen toestandsangst en bewegingsgedrag bestudeerd. In Hoofdstuk 2 worden de 
manifestaties van toestandsangst op drie niveaus onderzocht, te weten het niveau van 
subjectieve ervaring, het fysiologische niveau en het gedragsniveau. In Experiment 1 werd de 
deelnemers gevraagd een klimtaak binnen een vastgestelde tijd uit te voeren, zowel in een 
angstneutrale conditie als in een angstconditie. Vergeleken met de angstneutrale conditie 
ervoeren de deelnemers in de angstconditie meer toestandsangst, waren de gemiddelde 
hartslag en melkzuurconcentratie in het bloed van de deelnemers hoger en was hun 
spiervermoeidheid groter. Het tweede experiment had tot doel te onderzoeken of de 
subjectieve en fysiologische veranderingen bij toestandsangst gevolgen hebben voor de 
bewegingsuitvoering. Het idee dat hieraan ten grondslag ligt, is dat toestandsangst een 
(tijdelijke) terugval teweegbrengt in de bewegingsuitvoering naar een uitvoering die 
kenmerkend is voor een eerdere fase in het motorische leerproces. De taak wordt als het ware 
op een lager vaardigheidsniveau uitgevoerd met de bij dat niveau van uitvoering behorende 
bewegingskarakteristieken zoals langzame, onregelmatige, schokkerigere en houterige 
bewegingen. Om het bewegingsgedrag in de twee angstcondities in kaart te brengen, werd 
gebruikgemaakt van de zogenoemde ‘geometric index of entropy’, in het vervolg kortweg 
‘entropie’ genoemd. Cordier e.a. (1993, 1994) ontwikkelden deze entropiemaat om de 
moeilijkheidsgraad van klimroutes te kwantificeren: hoe hoger de entropie, des te moeilijker 
de route. De auteurs beargumenteerden ook dat er een sterke correlatie is tussen de 
vaardigheid van een klimmer en de mate van entropie: hoe vaardiger de klimmer, hoe 
vloeiender hij of zij klimt en des te lager de entropie. Uitgaande van het idee dat in de 
angstconditie deelnemers terugvallen naar een lager vaardigheidsniveau, werd in Experiment 
2 verwacht dat in die conditie de entropie stijgt, evenals de tijd die het kost om de klimroute te 
voltooien. Beide verwachtingen kwamen uit en duiden erop dat de bewegingsuitvoering onder 
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invloed van toestandsangst gelijkenis gaat vertonen met die van een ‘beginner’. De 
bevindingen zijn in overeenstemming met de hypothese van de bewuste informatieverwerking 
van Masters (1992). Volgens deze hypothese kan toestandsangst een bewuste 
bewegingssturing oproepen die vervolgens kan leiden tot een tijdelijke terugval naar een lager 
vaardigheidsniveau of naar een uitvoering die kenmerkend is voor een eerdere leerfase. De 
bewuste processen interfereren met de in de regel automatisch verlopende taakuitvoering 
waardoor de taakprestatie verslechtert. 
Hoofdstuk 3 borduurt voort op Hoofdstuk 2 en rapporteert twee experimenten waarin de op 
basis van Masters’ (1992) hypothese verwachte effecten van toestandsangst op de 
bewegingsuitvoering werden onderzocht. Verwacht werd dat angst zou leiden tot een 
verhoogd zelfbewustzijn waardoor de bewegingssturing meer bewust en serieel zou worden, 
resulterend in langzamere bewegingen van greep naar greep en een langere voorbereidingstijd 
(dat wil zeggen, langer contact met de grepen). In Experiment 1 werd de deelnemers gevraagd 
een klimtaak uit te voeren in beide angstcondities waarbij geen tijdsbeperkingen werden 
opgelegd. Evenals in Hoofdstuk 2 bleek dat de klimtijd in de angstconditie langer was dan in 
de angstneutrale conditie, hetgeen onder meer te maken had met een toename van het aantal 
explorerende handelingen. Die toename kon de langere klimtijd echter niet volledig verklaren, 
reden waarom in Experiment 2 ook de temporele aspecten van de bewegingen werden 
geanalyseerd. Temporele veranderingen kunnen duiden op een door toestandsangst 
teweeggebrachte bewuste bewegingssturing zoals voorspeld door Masters. Uit de resultaten 
bleek dat bij hogere toestandsangst-scores de klimtijd langer was, meer explorerende 
bewegingen werden gemaakt, de contacttijd van handen en voeten met de grepen langer was 
en, ten slotte, bewegingen van greep naar greep trager waren. Deze bevindingen zijn, net als 
die in Hoofdstuk 2 (Experiment 2), in overeenstemming met Masters’ hypothese. 
De in de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 toegepaste en gepropageerde procesgeoriënteerde 
benadering van de relatie tussen angst en motorische prestatie leidde tot de constatering dat er 
vooralsnog weinig aandacht is besteed aan de rol van perceptuele processen binnen het 
onderzoek naar angst en motorische prestatie. In het licht van de nauwe verbondenheid tussen 
waarnemen en bewegen, zoals ook sterk benadrukt in de ecologische psychologie, ligt de 
bestudering van de invloed van angst op perceptuele processen voor de hand. In Hoofdstuk 4 
worden drie experimenten beschreven waarin de rol van toestandsangst bij het waarnemen en 
realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden werd onderzocht. In Experiment 1 werd deelnemers 
gevraagd om, staande in de klimwand, schattingen te maken van hun maximale reikhoogte. 
Toestandsangst werd gemanipuleerd door de schattingstaak laag en hoger op de klimwand te 
laten uitvoeren. Na de schattingen werd in beide condities de maximale reikhoogte bepaald 
(in het vervolg de ‘werkelijke’ reikhoogte genoemd). Toestandsangst bleek te leiden tot een 
reductie van zowel geschatte als werkelijke reikhoogte. 
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In Experiment 2 werd onderzocht of naast de veranderingen in de geschatte en de 
werkelijke maximale reikhoogte ook veranderingen optraden in het realiseren van 
handelingsmogelijkheden. De deelnemers werd (veel) keuzemogelijkheden geboden bij het 
klimmen van de route door een route uit te zetten die bestond uit een groot aantal grepen. De 
deelnemers klommen opnieuw in beide angstcondities. Net als in Experiment 1 van 
Hoofdstuk 3, bleek dat de deelnemers in de angstconditie meer explorerende bewegingen 
maakten dan in de angstneutrale conditie. Tevens bleek dat de proefpersonen in de 
angstconditie meer grepen gebruikten om de route te klimmen dan in de angstneutrale 
conditie. 
In Experiment 3 werd de hypothese getoetst dat naast de veranderingen in waargenomen 
en werkelijke reikhoogte als gevolg van toestandsangst, ook veranderingen in aandacht 
plaatsvinden. Aandachtsverschuivingen kunnen worden beschouwd als onderliggend 
mechanisme van veranderingen in het waarnemen en realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden 
door toestandsangst. De deelnemers aan Experiment 3 voerden behalve de klimtaak ook een 
tweede taak uit. Terwijl de deelnemers klommen (opnieuw in de beide angstcondities) werden 
lichtjes geprojecteerd op de klimwand. De taak van de deelnemers was om telkens als zij een 
lichtje hadden waargenomen dit zo snel mogelijk verbaal aan te geven. Uit de resultaten bleek 
dat de deelnemers in de angstconditie minder lichtjes detecteerden dan in de angstneutrale 
conditie, hetgeen opgevat werd als indicatie van versmalde aandacht. De conclusie van de 
studie was dat de emotionele toestand van de waarnemer invloed heeft op het waarnemen en 
realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden, in samenhang met veranderingen in aandacht en de 
werkelijke capaciteiten van de deelnemers. 
Een nadeel van het manipuleren van een variabele zoals angst is dat de mogelijkheden om 
gecontroleerde gradaties in angst op te wekken beperkt zijn; ook heeft het uitlokken van 
extreme angst ethische beperkingen. Genoemde beperkingen gelden in mindere mate voor een 
variabele als vermoeidheid. Om die reden wordt in Hoofdstuk 5 de invloed van vermoeidheid 
op het waarnemen en realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden onderzocht teneinde na te gaan 
of de bevinding van Hoofdstuk 4 – angst speelt een rol bij het waarnemen en realiseren van 
handelingsmogelijkheden – gegeneraliseerd kan worden naar een andere toestandsvariabele, 
in dit geval, vermoeidheid. In Experiment 1 klommen de deelnemers een horizontale route 
laag op de klimwand. Het aantal keren dat de route moest worden geklommen varieerde om 
de vermoeidheid van de deelnemers te manipuleren. Verspreid over twee dagen klommen de 
deelnemers 4, 6, 8 of 10 trials (de volgorde werd aselect zonder teruglegging bepaald) waarbij 
1 trial was gedefinieerd als het van rechts naar links klimmen van de route en vervolgens weer 
terugklimmen naar de uitgangspositie. Voorafgaand aan het klimmen en na iedere twee trials 
schatten de deelnemers hun maximale reikhoogte en gaven ze aan hoe vermoeid ze zich op 
dat moment voelden (RPE-scores, ratings of perceived exertion, Borg-schaal). Op een andere 
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dag klommen de deelnemers opnieuw 10 trials, maar nu werd na iedere twee trials de 
werkelijke reikhoogte bepaald. Hogere vermoeidheidsscores gingen gepaard met lagere 
schattingen van de maximale reikhoogte; de werkelijke reikhoogte bleef echter constant. 
Opmerkelijk was dat de perceptuele veranderingen vooral optraden aan het begin van de 
taakuitvoering wanneer de deelnemers aangaven nauwelijks vermoeid te zijn. Wanneer de 
vermoeidheid toenam, had dat nauwelijks effect op de waargenomen (en werkelijke) 
reikhoogte. 
Op basis van de resultaten van pilotstudy’s werd verwacht dat de meeste deelnemers 
uitgeput zouden zijn na het klimmen van 10 trials. Dit bleek echter niet het geval te zijn voor 
een deel van de deelnemers aan Experiment 1. Daarom werd in Experiment 2 aan een andere 
groep deelnemers gevraagd tot uitputting te klimmen. Opnieuw werd gevonden dat vooral aan 
het begin van de taakuitvoering perceptuele veranderingen optraden. Wanneer de deelnemers 
aangaven zeer vermoeid tot uitgeput te zijn, liepen de perceptuele veranderingen in de pas met 
de werkelijke veranderingen in maximale reikhoogte. Op basis van de resultaten van 
Experimenten 1 en 2 (en in overeenstemming met de eindconclusie van Hoofdstuk 4) kan 
worden gesteld dat er een functioneel verband bestaat tussen waargenomen 
handelingsmogelijkheden en de werkelijke capaciteiten van de deelnemers en niet zo zeer een 
verband tussen de mate van vermoeidheid an sich en waargenomen handelingsmogelijkheden. 
In de epiloog, Hoofdstuk 6, worden de belangrijkste resultaten van dit proefschrift 
samengevat en worden de implicaties ervan besproken voor het onderzoek naar de invloed 
van toestandsangst op het perceptueel-motorische gedrag. Beargumenteerd wordt dat het 
waarnemen en realiseren van handelingsmogelijkheden geschiedt mede op basis van 
‘toestandsgeschaalde’ informatie, dat wil zeggen, up-to-date informatie over de toestand 
(bijvoorbeeld mate van nervositeit of vermoeidheid) van de handelende persoon. De 
resultaten stroken met de uitgangspunten van de ecologische psychologie zoals besproken in 
Hoofdstuk 1. 
Het belang van een procesgeoriënteerde benadering van de relatie tussen toestandsangst en 
motorische prestatie wordt (nogmaals) benadrukt omdat met zo’n benadering naar 
verwachting recht kan worden gedaan aan het grote aantal processen dat van invloed is op, en 
ten grondslag ligt aan, het effect van toestandsangst op de uiteindelijke prestatie. 
Geconcludeerd wordt dat er vooralsnog geen alomvattend angst-prestatie-model bestaat dat 
rekening houdt met het grote aantal relevante factoren. Systematisch onderzoek naar de 
onderliggende processen van de toestandsangst-prestatie-relatie biedt evenwel 
aanknopingspunten voor het ontwikkelen van een dergelijk model; bovendien biedt het 
mogelijkheden een theorie van waarnemen en bewegen te ontwikkelen waarin ook plaats is 
voor psychologische organisme-constraints. 
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Opeens (nou ja…,) is het er, dit proefschrift. Zoals sporters geheel kunnen opgaan in het 
sporten zonder zich te bekommeren om het eindresultaat en enigszins ontdaan reageren als de 
wedstrijd ‘opeens’ voorbij is, zo ervaar ik het bereiken van deze mijlpaal. Met zo’n instelling 
ben je verzekerd van plezier in je werk, een belangrijke voorwaarde voor succes volgens alle 
sportpsychologische handboeken, maar een beetje sturing van bovenaf kan dan geen kwaad. 
Dit proefschrift was dan ook vrijwel zeker niet tot stand was gekomen zonder de hulp van de 
volgende drie personen. 
Dr. Frank C. Bakker, copromotor, die er kennelijk fiducie in had dat ik ooit zou 
promoveren ondanks dat ik daar weinig aanleiding voor gaf en bijvoorbeeld met een zeker 
gemak planningen overschreed en weer eens aan andere zaken voorrang gaf. Frank, zeer 
bedankt voor de geboden kansen, de vrijheid, het delen van kennis, je inzicht in wat 
publiceerbaar is en wat niet, het in de gaten houden van de grote lijn, maar vooral ook voor de 
bijzonder prettige samenwerking in de afgelopen jaren die zich op diverse terreinen heeft 
afgespeeld. Gelukkig betekent het verschijnen van dit proefschrift niet het einde van onze 
samenwerking. 
Dr. Raôul R.D. Oudejans, copromotor, dagelijks begeleider of misschien benadert het 
woord ‘maatje’ wel het beste de feitelijke situatie. Sinds het jaar 2000 werken we intensief 
samen aan onder andere dit proefschrift. Over veel zaken hebben we aan een half afgemaakte 
zin van de een, of aan een slordig geformuleerde gedachte van de ander genoeg en weten we 
hoe we verder moeten. Dat is bijzonder prettig werken. Raôul, hartelijk dank voor het plezier, 
je vermogen om anderen te leren hoe je in fatsoenlijk Engels artikelen schrijft, je collegialiteit 
en de gesprekken over de meest uiteenlopende zaken. 
Prof. dr. Peter J. Beek, promotor, pas in een latere fase van het proefschrift ben je erbij 
betrokken geraakt en heb je je er op cruciale momenten intensief mee bezig gehouden. Peter, 
je moet af en toe vertwijfeld zijn geweest over mijn op z’n minst atypische 
promovendusgedrag ook al leek er in de loop van de tijd een soort berusting bij jou te 
ontstaan toen je je eens liet ontvallen dat ik “nu eenmaal een apart tijdsbesef heb”. Graag wil 
ik je bedanken voor je belangrijke bijdrage aan dit proefschrift, die zich uitstrekte van het naar 
een hoger plan brengen van de theoretische gedeeltes van dit proefschrift tot aan het plaatsen 
van een komma op de juiste plaats. 
 
Aan de Faculteit der Bewegingswetenschappen werkt een flink aantal mensen dat op enigerlei 
wijze een rol heeft gespeeld bij mijn onderzoek. Uiteraard de leden van de onderzoekslijn 
‘Perceptueel-motorische controle: ontwikkeling, leren en prestatie’. Altijd prettig om in een 
informele sfeer bij een collega te kunnen binnen wandelen en vragen kwijt te kunnen. Twee 
165 
Dankwoord 
leden uit die onderzoeksgroep wil ik er apart noemen, FBW-overbuurman prof. dr. Geert 
Savelsbergh met wie ik vooral tijdens mijn studie veel te maken heb gehad en die samen met 
wijlen prof. dr. John Whiting me het plezier van het doen van onderzoek heeft bijgebracht. 
Geert bedankt voor je (prikkelende) opmerkingen, je pragmatische oplossingen, suggesties, 
hints en humor die er ook hebben toe bijgedragen dat er een prettig werkklimaat is in de 
onderzoekslijn. Ten tweede, dr. John van der Kamp, John, we liggen elkaar wel ook al weten 
we niet precies waarom. Is het de liefde voor relativeren? Voor Voskuil? Voor de interesse in 
volstrekt irrelevante zaken zoals de geschiedenis van AFC? Bedankt voor alle terloopse tips 
en je commentaar (gevraagd en vooral ook ongevraagd) op delen van dit onderzoek. 
Prettige herinneringen bewaar ik aan mijn oud-kamergenoten Peter Heij, Anja Heida, 
Johan Steenbergen en Marc Boschker. De vertrouwelijkheid van een gemeenschappelijke 
kamer leidt tot boeiende gesprekken. (Ik doe er verder het zwijgen toe.) 
Dank ook aan de studenten! Een aantal is al bij naam genoemd bij de afzonderlijke 
hoofdstukken, maar ook wil ik die studenten bedanken die als proefpersonen fungeerden en 
zonder morren de niet altijd even leuke taken uitvoerden. 
De ‘techneuten’, ook al zo’n onmisbare groep: Rink Zevering, Hans de Koning en Bert 
Coolen, bedankt voor jullie bijdrage. De mensen van de firma Bosan Sport verdienen 
eveneens een pluim. Waar andere firma’s zich verscholen achter verzekeringstechnische 
argumenten om maar geen verstelbare klimwand van zo’n zeven meter hoog te leveren, 
durfde Bosan Sport het aan om een uit de kluiten gewassen ‘wandrek’ te ontwikkelen en te 
plaatsen in de experimenteerruimte van de faculteit. 
 
Familie en vrienden, jullie hebben er voor gezorgd me zowel op een prettige manier af te 
leiden van ‘het werk’ als er op gefocust te raken (‘Hoe is ’t eigenlijk met je onderzoek?’ 
‘Moeten we al een dag vrij plannen?’ ‘Je houdt toch wel een feest?’). Die aanhoudende 
belangstelling heeft me goed gedaan, bedankt daarvoor! 
 
Blijven er drie over om apart te bedanken: Annemieke, Mariska en Anouk. ,,Hoezo 
bedanken?” hoor ik jullie al tegensputteren, ,,we hebben er toch niets aan gedaan?” Maar er is 
toch niets aan zonder jullie ‘Pap, zullen we gaan zwemmen’, zonder het heerlijke gekissebis 
aan tafel, het mopperen over die stomme leraren/jongens/vriendinnen/ouders/zusje/school, 
zonder de gesprekken over werk, gevoelens, kortom, zonder jullie levensvreugde? 
 166
  
 
 
 
 
 
The author… 
 
 
 
                                                                           Foto: Annemieke Slager 
 
 
… and how to reduce anxiety 
 
 
